Draft:Federal Southeast Asia

Map of ASEAN

A federal Southeast Asia, also referred to as the South East Asian Federation (SEAF) or a Southeast Asian Union, is a hypothetical scenario of Southeast Asian integration leading to the formation of a sovereign superstate (similar to the United States of America), organised as a federation of the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as contemplated by political scientists and politicians.

Proposals for closer union

See also: History of ASEAN and Enlargement of ASEAN

In the aftermath of World War II, Southeast Asia was undergoing rapid decolonization and facing new geopolitical challenges. European colonial powers were retreating, and newly independent nations sought to assert their sovereignty and collaborate on common goals. At the same time, the early Cold War was unfolding – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formed in 1949 as a Western military alliance, and communism was spreading in East Asia (with the Chinese Civil War and local communist insurgencies). This context prompted regional leaders to consider forming their own cooperative bloc in Asia.

Romulo-Quirino concept

Carlos P. Romulo

The Philippines, led by President Elpidio Quirino and represented internationally by diplomat Carlos P. Romulo, emerged as one of the first to create the concept of a federal Southeast Asia. Romulo, who served as the Philippines’ UN representative (and was President of the UN General Assembly in 1949–50), believed that Asia’s newly free countries needed a collective voice and mutual support system. He and Quirino envisioned a regional federation that could bolster their political independence, economic development, and collective security but crucially, one that would not be a formal military alliance. Romulo’s concept, often referred to at various times as a "Pacific Union," "Asian Union," or "Southeast Asia Union," was essentially a proposal for a federation of Southeast Asian and nearby states bound by common ideals and cooperation. In an official letter of instruction from President Quirino (which Romulo helped draft and publicized in 1949), the plan was described as "rooted in deep stirrings of political consciousness" of Asian nations. The proposed union would operate "on the economic, political, and cultural level, in tune with the work of the ECAFE [UN Economic Commission for Asia] and the program of UNESCO," and "would involve no military commitments". Quirino and Romulo believed that "in the long run the strongest defense against totalitarian subversion would lie in providing a life of substance and contentment and promoting higher living standards among the Asian peoples. Thus it would be a real union on the basis of common counsel and assistance for the preservation of peace, democracy, and freedom in Asia.

Romulo framed this nascent Southeast Asian Union as serving several overarching goals. First, it would encourage political and economic cooperation among Asian states, allowing them to tackle shared problems together and present a united front in world affairs. Second, it was implicitly anti-imperialist – "fighting European imperialism and foreign interference in the region" was one of the aims Romulo highlighted when pitching the idea. Having experienced Western colonialism, countries in the region were eager to guard their independence and ensure that Asia’s fate would be determined by Asians themselves. Third, it was also anti-communist in inspiration, though Romulo sought a non-military approach. The spread of communism was seen as a threat to the "free countries" of Asia, but Romulo argued that a positive program of improving peoples’ welfare and unity would be the best defense. In his view, raising living standards and collaborating on economic progress would undercut the appeal of communist revolution, providing "our strongest defense against totalitarian subversion". Notably, Romulo insisted the federation remain within the spirit of the United Nations framework. He often emphasized that this regional union would complement, not contradict, international efforts. For example, during the eventual Baguio Conference, he pointed out that many issues were already discussed in UN agencies, "but added that there was a distinct advantage in countries of this part of the world discussing the same problems in order to speed up their implementation.

Romulo’s push for a Southeast Asian federation was driven by a combination of security concerns and postcolonial solidarity. On one hand, there was a desire to contain the spread of communism in Asia without directly entangling the region in superpower military blocs. Romulo and Quirino initially contemplated a "Pacific Pact" explicitly modeled on NATO – a collective defense against communist aggression in Asia. However, they quickly realized that many Asian leaders (notably India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru) were firmly against joining any military alliance or "big power" bloc in the early Cold War. Neutralist countries feared that a formal anti-communist pact would undermine their independence and drag them into great-power conflicts. Thus, Romulo’s strategy evolved to pursue a non-military union, maintaining an anti-communist orientation but without binding defense commitments. This shift was not only to assuage neutral nations but also because Romulo genuinely believed in an alternate path to security through development and unity, as noted above.

On the other hand, the federation was motivated by Asian pride and diplomatic agency. Romulo was a passionate advocate of decolonization and "Asia for Asians." Under his and Quirino’s leadership, the Philippines wanted to take initiative in convening Asian nations to address their own destiny. Ideologically, Romulo stood for the principles of freedom, anti-colonialism, and racial equality – he had made his mark in the UN championing the rights of "little nations" against imperial "Goliaths." The envisioned Southeast Asian Union was an expression of that ethos: a grouping of newly independent states asserting their collective voice on the world stage and helping each other throw off the vestiges of colonialism. Romulo explicitly predicated the union on the withdrawal of colonial powers from Asian territories, arguing that true regional cooperation required Asian peoples to be free to govern themselves. In practice, this meant the proposed federation would exclude the old European colonial empires and even dominion powers like the UK or France, focusing instead on Asia’s self-governing nations. It also meant supporting the principle of self-determination in places still under colonial rule. For instance, the federation idea was intertwined with support for Indonesia’s independence (achieved in 1949) and sympathy for other anti-colonial movements – albeit balanced by the anti-communist stance (so support did not extend to communist-led revolutions).

Another major objective was to create regional economic development and social progress. The late 1940s saw Southeast Asia facing poverty, instability, and the need for postwar reconstruction. Romulo’s federation was meant to pool resources and knowledge to uplift the region. By working together on development – possibly through cooperative projects, sharing technical assistance, and increasing intra-Asian trade – the Southeast Asian countries could strengthen their economies. This was seen both as an end in itself (improving people’s lives) and as part of the security strategy (prosperous societies being less vulnerable to communist appeal). Culturally, Romulo also spoke of an "Asia for Asians" renaissance: the federation would enable Asians to revive and share their rich cultural heritage, reinforcing a regional identity and solidarity after centuries of colonial division. Romulo often described the would-be union as a "moral force" or "moral entente" rather than a material alliance. In his view, uniting Southeast Asian nations in common purpose would "alert the people of Southeast Asia to present dangers and stiffen their morale" even without military power. It was an almost idealistic rationale: that a fraternity of nations holding each other up would by itself be a bulwark against both external domination and internal subversion.

The seeds of Romulo’s federation idea were planted as early as 1947–48, during pan-Asian gatherings. Romulo participated in conferences like the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, where Asian solidarity against colonialism was a major theme. By January 1949, he was actively floating the notion of an Asian alliance. In a New Delhi meeting in early 1949, Romulo privately proposed a "Pacific Pact" to Nehru and other leaders, originally suggesting a military alliance of Asia’s non-communist states. This was at Quirino’s behest – in March 1949, President Quirino had publicly announced intentions to establish a Pacific Pact with an anti-communist, defense character, envisaged as a "parallel safeguard for Asia" akin to NATO. Quirino even invited Chiang Kai-shek of Nationalist China and President Syngman Rhee of South Korea – leading anti-communist figures in East Asia – to talks in Baguio, Philippines in July 1949 to discuss forming such a regional defense arrangement

However, those early efforts quickly encountered resistance. Many Asian countries were wary. India, in particular, had a firm policy of non-alignment and saw the Pacific Pact idea as an American-influenced anti-Soviet "stunt". Nehru made it clear that India would not join any overt military front, and he cautioned neighbors like Burma (Myanmar) about rushing into such plans. Even within the Philippines’ circle, there was an understanding that a purely military alliance might be premature and divisive. The United States, whom Quirino hoped to please, was also lukewarm – in mid-1949 Dean Acheson at the State Department indicated the U.S. was not considering any "Asian NATO" at that time. Washington preferred Asia to handle its own regional cooperation "spontaneously," and U.S. officials quietly discouraged Quirino’s Pacific Pact proposal as potentially overreaching

Realizing the diplomatic obstacles, Romulo astutely shifted course by late 1949. He removed the military and defense elements from the plan in order to make it palatable to countries like India and Indonesia. The focus was recast entirely on economic, political, and cultural collaboration. Romulo even dropped contentious participants – notably Nationalist China (Taiwan) and South Korea were quietly set aside from the proposed membership to avoid provoking objections from neutral nations or from communist neighbors (India, for example, flatly refused to attend any meeting that included Chiang Kai-shek). By narrowing the scope to Southeast Asia and immediate neighbors, the initiative distanced itself from the great-power rivalry in Northeast Asia. Indeed, Quirino’s letter explicitly spoke of "forging a closer union among the peoples of Southeast Asia" – a significant refinement from earlier references to a pan-Asian or Pacific pact. As one analysis noted, this made the proposal more practical: it was easier for Southeast Asian and South Asian states to agree among themselves than to try to include all of "the Far East" amid the Chinese civil war and Korean situation.

Romulo’s public speeches in this period echoed the updated vision. In August 1949, he addressed a convocation at the University of the Philippines where he described the proposed union in glowing terms (this speech was later published). He stressed that Asia’s fate was intertwined with world peace, and called for an Asian cooperative movement "with a minimum of bitterness" despite the region’s tumult – indicating his hope to reconcile anti-colonial fervor with pragmatic unity. The Union, he said, "would involve no military commitments," and he reiterated the belief that uplifting people’s welfare was the key to stability. This messaging was aimed at both domestic and international audiences: domestically to rally Filipinos around a leadership role in Asia, and internationally to dispel fears that the Philippines was creating a military bloc on behalf of the West.

Aung San's proposal

In early 1947, Asian leaders were exploring regional solidarity as colonial empires waned. Jawaharlal Nehru hosted the Asian Relations Conference (ARC) in New Delhi (23 March–2 April 1947) to promote inter-Asian cooperation.^[1] Delegates from across Asia, including Burma (still under British transition), Indonesia, Vietnam, Siam (Thailand), Malaya, and others, convened and voiced common anti-colonial goals. For example, the Vietnamese and Indonesian delegates issued a joint statement at the conference urging that "all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Asia" to prevent any re-establishment of colonial rule. Widespread determination among Asian nationalists spoke of safeguarding their coming independence from external domination. However, many smaller Southeast Asian nations were wary of dominance by larger powers (even regional ones like India or China). Indeed, Ceylon’s S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike used the ARC to propose forming an Asian, or to the least, Southeast Asian economic bloc so that neighboring countries could trade more with each other rather than depend on former colonial markets. This idea resonated with Southeast Asian delegates, who agreed that closer regional cooperation was needed.^[2] Some countries noted from Burma, Siam, Indonesia, Vietnam, and others discreetly decided to follow up after the Delhi conference, rather than join a broad India/China-led forum. "Most nations were not enthusiastic about the [formal Asian Relations Organization]… This led to delegates of some Southeast Asian nations visiting Aung San in Rangoon immediately after the conference to discuss formation of a Southeast Asian organisation.

Aung San

General Aung San of Burma, a leading anti-colonial figure, emerged from the ARC with a clear sense of urgency for regional unity. Even before the conference, Aung San had contemplated a federation of Southeast Asian countries. In 1946 he floated the bold idea of a "United States of Indochina" – effectively a union of Burma, French Indochina, Malaya, Siam, and Indonesia – so that newly liberated states could stand together[5]. Such a proposal showed Aung San’s strategic vision: he believed the peoples of Southeast Asia, all of whom had suffered under colonial rule, shared common interests in freedom and economic self-reliance. The ARC reinforced these views. Burma’s own delegation in Delhi (led by Justice Kyaw Myint) observed the conference’s strengths and limitations. Aung San grew concerned that a pan-Asian grouping might be too unwieldy or dominated by big players, and that a tighter Southeast Asian coalition of immediate neighbors would better serve the region’s needs[4]. In particular, Aung San was focused on preventing the return of imperialism and also countering the rising communist movements in the region. Notably, he distinguished genuine nationalist resistance from communist agitation – insisting that "those persons creating disturbances in [our] country are not resisters of imperialism but Communists", a pointed comment given Burma’s own communist insurgents[6]. Thus, by April 1947, Aung San was motivated by multiple factors: safeguarding independence from any foreign domination, promoting economic development through regional trade, and containing ideological threats. The stage was set for him to advance a Southeast Asian cooperative framework as Burma edged toward independence (scheduled for January 1948).

Rangoon meeting

Immediately after the ARC, Aung San took the initiative to bring Southeast Asian leaders together. In mid-April 1947 – barely days after the Delhi conference – Rangoon became a gathering point for regional discussions. Aung San invited the ARC delegates from neighboring countries to stop over in Burma’s capital for informal talks on forming a "Southeast Asian Union." Several responded. The Siamese (Thai) delegation to the ARC visited Rangoon around Burmese New Year (mid-April), as did representatives of the Vietnamese and Indonesian delegations. These encounters were kept low-profile (one account notes the groundwork for a regional association was laid "with considerable secrecy" in Rangoon at that time[4]) – likely to avoid alarm in colonial circles or premature publicity. Nonetheless, we have detailed records of what transpired.

On 17 April 1947 (Burmese New Year’s Day), General Aung San hosted a luncheon in Rangoon to honor the visiting Thai delegation. At that gathering, he delivered a significant speech emphasizing regional camaraderie. "Our mutual interest and our past experience require we stand together," Aung San told his Thai guests[7]. He announced that, with this goal in mind, Burma would soon appoint a diplomatic representative to Siam – a striking move since Burma had not yet fully sovereign foreign relations. This gesture showed Aung San’s determination to forge direct neighborly ties ahead of formal independence. It was warmly received by the Thai delegates. Around the same time, Aung San conferred with delegates from Indonesia and Vietnam who had stopped in Rangoon. (One Vietnamese delegate, Dr. Trần Văn Luân, even told the Burmese press he was "thrilled" by anti-colonial uprisings like the ongoing Malagasy revolt against the French[8], underlining the shared revolutionary zeal during the Rangoon meetings.) All these exchanges pointed toward a nascent alliance of Southeast Asian nationalists determined to support one another’s struggles.

The culmination of Aung San’s efforts came on Burmese New Year’s Day (17 April), when he addressed a massive public gathering in Rangoon. Speaking to a record crowd, Aung San outlined both his domestic program and his foreign policy vision. First, he reaffirmed that expelling foreign troops from Burma was the AFPFL government’s immediate priority (British military units were still present)[9]. He downplayed the technical debate of Dominion status vs. full independence, insisting that either way Burma "must have an alliance with foreign powers" once self-governing, for security and support[9]. Crucially, he specified that at present "there is only Britain and America to whom Burmese can turn as they are the only two great foreign powers."[10] This pragmatic statement revealed Aung San’s thinking about the emerging Cold War alignment – he saw future Burma aligning with friendly Western powers rather than the Soviet bloc, to safeguard its independence. But in the very next breath, Aung San turned to the regional dimension: he "favored formation of a Southeast Asia Union with Indonesia, Siam, Indochina, [and] Malaya for establishment of economic solidarity."[11] In calling for a Southeast Asia Union, Aung San explicitly named the countries he hoped to unite: the soon-to-be independent nations or colonies of the region (Vietnam/Indochina and Malaya were still under French and British rule, respectively, but with active independence movements; Indonesia was in revolution against the Dutch; Siam was sovereign). The emphasis was on economic cooperation – pooling resources, fostering intra-regional trade, and mutual development – so that Southeast Asian states could reduce reliance on former colonial markets and present a united front in economic dealings[6]. Aung San saw "economic solidarity" as the foundation for political strength in the region. He was effectively sketching an early prototype of what would much later become regional groupings like ASEAN – though his proposed union was more overtly anti-colonial in purpose.

In his New Year speech, Aung San also alluded to security and ideological issues. He warned that not all who claimed to fight imperialism were friends of Burma – identifying local communists as a disruptive force rather than true anti-colonial patriots[12]. This was a significant point: Aung San was positioning his envisioned Southeast Asian Union as a forum of nationalist, independent states, implicitly non-communist or at least not under communist leadership. (Indeed, at the Rangoon meetings, delegates like those from Vietnam and Indonesia were non-communist nationalists – the Vietnamese delegation at ARC represented Ho Chi Minh’s DRV government, which was communist-led, but figures like Trần Văn Luân were moderates; Indonesia’s delegation included Republicans fighting Dutch re-colonization, not communists.) Thus, Aung San’s regional proposal had a dual strategic thrust: collective self-reliance against colonialism, and a cooperative bulwark against extremist ideologies.

Aung San’s mid-April 1947 initiative drew attention both regionally and from international observers. The British and Americans monitored these developments through diplomatic channels. The US Consul-General in Rangoon reported Aung San’s New Year speech to Washington almost immediately, highlighting his call for a Southeast Asian federation and his intent to align with friendly powers[9]. This U.S. report noted Aung San’s stress on economic union with neighboring countries and his clear rejection of local communist agitators[13]. Such signals reassured Western officials that an independent Burma under Aung San would likely be anti-communist and regionally cooperative. In Ceylon, Bandaranaike praised the ARC outcomes and noted that the "foundations of Asian unity have been well and truly laid" by early 1947[14]. He and others surely saw Aung San’s Rangoon follow-up as building on those foundations in Southeast Asia specifically. Southeast Asian leaders themselves were very receptive – Thailand, for instance, quickly agreed to exchange diplomatic missions as Aung San proposed[7]. For the Thai government, Burma’s outreach was welcome validation of its post-war regional role. Indonesia’s leaders, locked in a fierce independence war in 1947, valued Burma’s moral support; informal contacts through Rangoon would later bloom into formal ties after both nations achieved sovereignty.

Despite the momentum of April 1947, Aung San’s proposal did not immediately materialize into a formal organization. The Rangoon meetings were essentially a preliminary summit of like-minded nationalist leaders, without the British or other colonial authorities present. Historians note that these discussions in April 1947 "laid the foundation for a closer association" among Southeast Asian countries, even if no treaty was signed then[4]. Tragically, events in Burma derailed further progress – Aung San and most of his cabinet were assassinated just three months later, on 19 July 1947, in an attack by political rivals. This shocking loss robbed Burma (and Southeast Asia) of one of its most visionary leaders on the eve of independence. The nascent idea of a Southeast Asian Union lost its chief architect. In the ensuing years, Burma’s Prime Minister U Nu maintained an interest in Asian cooperation but was preoccupied with internal challenges and a neutralist foreign policy. Other regional initiatives in the 1950s (such as the US-led SEATO in 1954 and the non-aligned Bandung Conference in 1955) took very different forms than what Aung San had envisioned[15][16]. It was not until the 1960s that Southeast Asian nations – by then all independent – revisited the concept of a regional grouping on their own terms, leading to the formation of ASEAN in 1967.

SEAL under Pridi Banomyong

The impetus for SEAL’s formation grew out of the spirit of Asian solidarity in the aftermath of WWII. Earlier in 1947 (23 March – 2 April), the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi had brought together many Asian leaders, and Southeast Asians in attendance (such as Burma’s Aung San) discussed forming a "South-East Asian Association" to pursue a shared destiny.^[3] Following up on these ideas, Thai statesman Pridi Phanomyong took the initiative to convene a regional league. In July 1947, the Thai government pointedly refused to join a French-proposed "Pan-Asian Union" under colonial auspices. This was in the aftermath of negotiation results of the Franco-Siamese Conciliation Commission determined that a "Joint-Pan Asian Union" would quell nationalist uprisings in Indochina in Pridi would declare that Thailand would only cooperate if France granted Cambodia and Laos immediate independence. Rejecting French notion and a return to colonialism, Pridi would charter the creation of the South East Asia League as an alternative to Western-led regional plans.^[4] The Central Inteligence Agency believes that the alliance held the opportunity to aid his own effort to get the neighboring territory of Cambodia out of French control.^[5]

By 8 September 1947, a group of 60 residents claiming to represent the people of Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia and Malaya held the first SEAL meeting at Ratanakosin Hotel in Bangkok. Bangkok was chosen as the venue and de facto headquarters, as the Thai government (under Pridi’s influence) was then sympathetic to regional anti-colonial causes stemming from resistance within the Free Thai Movement.^[6] At the founding conference, the delegates unanimously adopted a constitution for the South East Asia League.^[7] the League proclaimed its aim to secure "freedom, independence, stability and prosperity" for the peoples of Southeast Asia.^[7] A radical key objective enshrined in the constitution was the eventual establishment of a "Federation of Southeast Asia."^[6] According to a United States military attaché, Vietnamese government representative Dr. Nguyen Duc Quon stated that there had been considerable discussion regarding the desirability of establishing a federation of Southeast Asian countries. Dr. Quon expressed the view that Thailand, and particularly for Pridi Banomyong, would be the natural leader of such a league.^[8] According to a CIA assessment, Pridi held ambition in the potential in organizing the foundations of a Southeast Asian federation. The report suggested that, Bangkok might have become an important center for this initiative had he not been removed from office in November.^[5]

The organization operated via a committee structure. A Central Executive Committee and a Permanent Committee were instituted, with offices like President, Vice-President, Treasurer, etc., as indicated by the constitution. Day-to-day leadership in Bangkok fell to a group of Thai academics and activists close to Pridi. Sukich Nimmanheminda (or Nimmanhemin), a respected professor and administrator, was involved in drafting the SEAL constitution. Thai ministers from the civilian government also joined SEAL’s executive council.^[7] The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), though embroiled in war with France, dispatched representatives or maintained contacts in Bangkok to participate in SEAL. Vietnamese communist cadres played a central role in the creation of SEAL. So much so, some scholars denote SEAL as "Viet Minh sponsored."^[9] Prince Souphanouvong, as Foreign Minister of the Lao Issara exile government, residing in Bangkok and was deeply involved in regional networking. His name appears as one of the delegates involved in the creation of SEAL.^[7]

Scheme

... advocated for

See also

• Federal Europe

References

1. "Ties that Bind: India and Southeast Asia Connectivities". Association for Asian Studies. Retrieved 2025-09-06.
2. "Indian Daily Mail, Vol. III, No. 19". Indian Daily Mail. 8 April 1947. Retrieved 11 June 2025.
3. [e-mail]. "Asia-Europe Institute (AEI)". aei.um.edu.my. Retrieved 2025-08-25.
4. Becka, Jan (2013). "Embracing the "enemy": Some Aspects of the Mutual Relations Between the United States and Thailand Under Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram, 1948–1957". Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Studia Territorialia 3.
5. Cite error: The named reference :32 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
6. "ASEAN Turns Fifty: Reflections on the Origins of Southeast Asian Regionalism - AIIA". Australian Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved 2025-08-25.
7. League, South East Asia (1947). Constitution of the South East Asia League (S.E.A.L.) Done at Bangkok the 8th of September 1947. Prachandra Press.
8. Aphornsuvan, Thanet (1987). "The United States and the Coming of the Coup of 1947 in Siam" (PDF). Journal of the Siam Society. 75. The Siam Society Under Royal Patronage: 187–214. Retrieved 11 June 2025.
9. "Regionalism and Nationalism", The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Cambridge University Press, pp. 585–646, January 1993, retrieved 2025-08-25