China–Singapore relations

  1. Home
  2. Wiki

China–Singapore relations
Map indicating locations of China and Singapore

China
Singapore
Diplomatic mission
Embassy of China, SingaporeEmbassy of Singapore, Beijing
Envoy
China Ambassador to Singapore Cao ZhongmingSingapore Ambassador to China Peter Tan Hai Chuan

China–Singapore relations (Chinese: 中国–新加坡关系; pinyin: Zhōngguó–Xīnjiāpō Guānxì), also referred to as Chinese–Singaporean relations or Sino–Singaporean relations, are the bilateral relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Singapore. Singapore formally recognised the PRC only in 1990, later than many other countries, due to its historically closer ties with Taiwan particularly during the latter half of the 20th century.[1]: 117  Diplomatic missions were established in the early 1990s, driven by expanding trade and the broader regional shift in ASEAN towards engagement with mainland China.

Singapore and China have maintained cordial relations, with Singapore recognising China's growing regional importance while ensuring its own national interests are upheld. Singapore supports constructive Chinese engagement in the Asia-Pacific, but does so on the basis of mutual respect and regional stability. Its co-operation with China, including on security and counterterrorism efforts through ASEAN, reflects Singapore's proactive and independent approach to regional diplomacy.[2][3][4][5] Singapore has also participated in China's waves of industrialization by sharing experiences via state level cooperations in the establishment of China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park, Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city, Sino-Singapore Guangzhou Knowledge City, Singapore-Sichuan Hi-Tech Innovation Park and the Sino-Singapore Jilin Food Zone.[6]

While the relationship between the two countries remains strong, it has been strained during numerous high-profile events, especially during the 2010s and 2020s, including Singapore's stance against China regarding the South China Sea dispute, Singapore's support for the United States' military presence and alliance system in Asia, and the seizing of Singapore Armed Forces' (SAF) vehicles by Hong Kong authorities in 2016.[7] Singapore also often engages with Taiwan through unofficial channels, with relations shaped by shared economic priorities and limited political alignment especially during the Cold War. Singapore's delayed recognition of the PRC stemmed largely from its sustained ties with Taiwan throughout the latter part of the 20th century.[1]: 117  Even after recognising the PRC, Singapore has continued informal cooperation with Taiwan in areas such as trade, education and cultural exchanges. While this has occasionally attracted disapproval from Beijing, it reflects Singapore's longstanding commitment to strategic independence and balanced diplomacy.

Despite occasional tensions, Singapore and China have sustained steady cooperation across a wide range of sectors, including defence, trade, education and infrastructure development. While both sides regularly reaffirm strong bilateral ties, Singapore has pursued these relations from a position of mutual benefit rather than deference. Its participation in initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative reflects a pragmatic approach focused on national interest rather than alignment with China's geopolitical goals. Singapore has also consistently advocated for ASEAN centrality and has sought to mediate between Beijing and the organisation, making clear that its support for regional cooperation does not equate to uncritical endorsement of China's policies.[8][9][10]

History

[edit]
See also: Foreign relations of Singapore

Singapore as a British colony and as a part of Malaysia

[edit]

The historic connections between the peoples of Singapore and China date back well before the establishment of the PRC in October 1949. Many early Chinese migrants came to the region known as Nanyang seeking to escape poverty and conflict during the Qing dynasty. A significant portion of ethnic Chinese Singaporeans trace their ancestral origins to southern Chinese provinces such as Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan.[11]

During the Second Sino-Japanese War, which later became part of the larger World War II, many ethnic Chinese in Malaya and Singapore strongly supported China. This included providing aid to both the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in their fight against Japanese forces. After Japan's conquest in the Malayan campaign and the Fall of Singapore, the Japanese retaliated with harsh reprisals against the ethnic Chinese population through operations such as Sook Ching, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. The Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), initially a resistance group, later evolved into the communist-aligned Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA). During the subsequent Malayan Emergency and Second Malayan Emergency, the communist insurgency under the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was viewed as an extension of China's revolutionary influence in Southeast Asia.[12] However, China ended its support for the MCP following the establishment of diplomatic ties between Malaysia and China in 1974.

Ethnic Chinese in Singapore (and also in Malaya) were early supporters of MCP, which led to suspicion from the British colonial authorities and later from the ruling People's Action Party (PAP). Chinese-language secondary schools and Nanyang University were viewed as hotbeds of communist activity. The government's efforts to curb communist influence included major events such as the Chinese middle schools riots and Operation Cold Store. Nanyang University was eventually reorganised and merged with the University of Singapore to form the National University of Singapore (NUS).[13][14]

Post–Singapore independence

[edit]

Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's first Prime Minister of Singapore, was careful to avoid any perception among Southeast Asian nations that Singapore, with its predominantly ethnic Chinese population, was a "Third China" alongside the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China (PRC). This caution stemmed from Singapore's experiences with communism, the ongoing Vietnam War and domestic political factors. Consequently, Singapore delayed establishing diplomatic relations with China until other Southeast Asian countries had done so in order to avoid appearing biased towards China.[15][12] Lee's official visits to China from 1976 onwards were conducted in English to reaffirm that he represented Singapore, not a "Third China".[16]

During this era, Lee firmly believed in resisting communism in line with the domino theory.[17] Having witnessed the British failure to defend Singapore in World War II and doubting the United States’ willingness to defend Singapore against communism, Lee welcomed the American presence in the region as a necessary counterbalance to the Soviet Union and China.[15] In the 1970s, Singapore and China began unofficial relations,[18] which led to the exchange of Trade Offices in September 1981.[19] Commercial air services between Singapore and mainland China commenced in 1985.[20] Formal diplomatic relations were finally established on 3 October 1990,[21] making Singapore the last Southeast Asian country to officially recognise the PRC.[22]

Despite maintaining strong relations with China, Singapore continues to uphold unofficial ties with Taiwan, including a military training and facilities agreement dating back to 1975,[23] with annual official exercises known as Exercise Starlight (星光計畫).[24] This arrangement exists due to Singapore's limited land area.[23] During the 2000s, China tried to offer Singapore the option to move its training facilities to Hainan.[25][26] In 2004, prior to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong assuming office, he visited Taiwan to understand recent developments there.[27] China objected strongly to the visit because of Taiwan's sensitive political status.[28] Later that year, China put bilateral relations on hold.[29] In his first National Day Rally speech, Lee expressed concern that Taiwanese leaders and citizens might have overestimated the level of support they would receive from the international community if they were to declare independence, reflecting Singapore's cautious approach towards maintaining regional stability.[30]

Diplomatic events and perspectives

[edit]

China has its embassy on Tanglin Road in Singapore, while Singapore's embassy in Beijing on Jianguomen Wai Avenue, Chaoyang District was established in 1990,[31] and it has Consulates-General in Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Xiamen, as well as Hong Kong, known during the era of British rule as the Singapore Commission.[32]

South China Sea dispute

[edit]

While Singapore is not a party to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, it has an interest in the outcome of these disputes since they have implications for international law, freedom of navigation, and ASEAN unity.[33] In 2016, Chinese Communist Party tabloid Global Times accused Singapore of supporting the Philippines v. China ruling in favour of the Philippines during the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Venezuela, based on unnamed sources.[34] The Global Times' account was disputed by Singapore's ambassador to China, Stanley Loh.[35] The same year, Yin Jinnan of the PLA National Defence University commented that "Beijing should make Singapore pay the price for seriously damaging China's interests" with sanctions.[36]

2016 Terrex seizure incident

[edit]

In November 2016, nine Singapore Army Terrex ICV armoured personnel carriers and associated equipment were seized by the Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department at the Kwai Tsing Container Terminal (formerly Kwai Chung Container Terminal).[37] The vehicles and equipment were being shipped back to Singapore from Taiwan after a military exercise in Taiwan.[38]: 56–57  The shipment was allegedly seized because American President Lines (APL), the private shipping company engaged by the Singapore military to handle the shipment, did not have the appropriate permits for the vehicles equipment,[39] though it has been alleged that China manufactured the incident to protest against the Singaporean Army's use of Taiwan for training against the backdrop of worsening ties between both states then.[40] The shipment was later moved to the Hong Kong Customs depot at Hong Kong River Trade Terminal and kept indoors since 6 December 2016. This was Hong Kong's biggest seizure of such equipment in the past twenty years.[41][42] On 24 January 2017, Hong Kong Customs announced that the military vehicles would be returned to Singapore.[38]: 56  Commissioner of the Customs and Excise Department, Roy Tang Yun-kwong, said that shipping company American President Lines would likely face criminal charges over the incident for suspected breach of the Hong Kong Law.[43] In 2019, American President Lines and the captain of the involved ship was charged with violating the Import and Export (Strategic Commodities) Regulations, which they both pleaded not guilty to. In April 2019, they were found guilty,[44] with American President Lines sentenced to 90,000 HKD in fines (10,000 HKD for each vehicle), and the captain sentenced to 9,000 HKD in fines (1,000 HKD for each vehicle) and 3 months of jail time (suspended for 1.5 years).[45]

Taiwan

[edit]
Main article: Singapore–Taiwan relations

Since 1975, Singapore has conducted regular military training exercises with the Republic of China Armed Forces, a longstanding defence arrangement that continues despite objections from Beijing.[46][47] Ties between Singapore and Taiwan extend beyond the military sphere and include decades of close co-operation in trade, education and technology. In 1993, Singapore hosted the historic Wang–Koo summit, the first formal meeting between Chinese and Taiwanese officials since 1949, underscoring its role as a trusted intermediary in cross-strait relations.[48]: 78  Singapore also hosted the First Ma–Xi meeting, which marked the first encounter between the top political leaders of both sides of the Taiwan Strait since the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. It was the first such meeting since Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong held talks in Chongqing during the Double Tenth Agreement negotiations in August 1945.[49]

Despite pressure from China,[50] Singapore has maintained its unofficial ties with Taiwan as a matter of strategic autonomy and principled engagement. Singapore has consistently emphasised the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, while avoiding entanglement in cross-strait disputes. On 4 November 2021, Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen acknowledged Taiwan's political status as a highly sensitive issue for China, warning of the grave consequences of any military conflict and stating, "I would advise us to stay very far away from that."[51] Nonetheless, Singapore's engagement with Taiwan continues to draw criticism from Beijing, such as in January 2024 when Singapore extended formal congratulations to President-elect Lai Ching-te, prompting a diplomatic rebuke from China.[52]

Economics

[edit]

The bilateral trade between China and Singapore developed rapidly in recent years and Singapore has maintained the first position among ASEAN countries in their trade with China.[20] China's transformation into a major economic power in the 21st century has led to an increase of foreign investments in the bamboo network, a network of overseas Chinese businesses operating in the markets of Southeast Asia that share common family and cultural ties.[53][54]

In 1998, volume of trade was US$8.154 billion[20] In 1999, the trade value has increased to US$8.56 billion.[20] In 2000, the amount increased to US$10.821 billion.[20] In 2009, the total trade volume was SGD 75.1 billion (US$58.4 billion).[55]

Singapore is China's 9th largest trading partner,[56] while China is Singapore's 3rd largest trading partner which consisted of 10.1 percent of Singapore's total external trade from the previous year.[citation needed]

China's exports to Singapore were textiles, clothing, agriculture produce, petrochemical, metals, electromechanical equipment, feed, coking coal, shipping, machinery supplier, communication equipment and electronic components.[20]

Companies such as Capitaland and Breadtalk have made substantial inroads into China's domestic economy.[57][58][59] Others such as Temasek Holdings, Singapore Airlines have each invested in China Eastern Airlines.

Singapore is a significant destination for Chinese outbound foreign direct investment.[1]: 49  Singaporean investment in China became particularly important to Singapore during the 1990s, as Singapore sought to adjust its economic model.[48]: 79–80 

Cooperation projects

[edit]

Suzhou Industrial Park developed as a result of high-level intergovernmental cooperation between China and Singapore.[48]: 78  In the late 1980s, Singapore's export-driven economic model required adjustment for further growth and Singapore's government viewed investment in China as part of its policy adjustment.[48]: 79  Through its Regional Industrial Parks program, Singapore proposed to develop industrial manufacturing locations in other Asian countries, modeled after its own Jurong Industrial Estate.[48]: 80  In 1993, Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew contacted Vice Premier Zhu Rongji and proposed a government-to-government cooperation program to develop an industrial estate on an unbuilt site in Suzhou.[48]: 83  The next year, the two countries signed the Agreement on the Joint Development of Suzhou Industrial Park.[48]: 83 

In 2007, China and Singapore began the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City project.[48]: 209 

Culture and education

[edit]

A Confucius Institute in Singapore was established in 2005 as a collaboration with Nanyang Technological University (NTU), the successor to the former Chinese-language Nanyang University. Its stated mission is to provide Singapore with a platform for learning the Chinese language and culture and to enhance communication with other Chinese communities.[60] In November 2015, China opened the China Cultural Centre in Singapore to facilitate exchanges in arts and culture.[61] While some Chinese policymakers have studied aspects of Singapore's dominant party system as a model for governance, the country maintains a firm distinction between its domestic political identity and external interest in its policy outcomes.[62][63] For instance, the popularity of NTU's postgraduate programmes among Chinese public officials reflects Singapore's educational standing, not political convergence.[64]

Singapore's attractiveness to Chinese students largely stems from its high-quality education system, safe urban environment and regional proximity. While some are drawn by perceived shared language and traditions, others explicitly cite Singapore's rule-based, meritocratic environment as a key distinction from the mainland's guanxi-oriented norms.[65] A 2016 study on Chinese students' integration showed generally positive interactions, although many still socialised in insular circles.[66] Singapore's Chinese-language Lianhe Zaobao has long served as an outlet of Singapore's regional soft power.[67] While it is read by Chinese audiences and officials, its periodic censorship inside China, including blackouts in 2009 and 2019 for critical reporting on issues such as internet controls and the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests, further highlights Singapore's independence in managing its media and public discourse.[68][69]

Immigration and people-to-people relations

[edit]
See also: Immigration to Singapore and Chinese nationals in Singapore
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew consistently affirmed Singapore's distinct ethnic identity in both bilateral relations with China and domestic policy. He made clear that Singaporean Chinese are culturally, politically and socially different from the Chinese in China, emphasising that shared ancestry does not translate into shared allegiance or values.

Chinese people have immigrated to what is known as Singapore since Zheng He's voyages in the 15th century; those early immigrants integrated into the host societies, and their descendants are now known as Peranakans.[70]

While the majority of Singaporeans are of ethnic Chinese descent at around 70 to 75%, this demographic fact is often misinterpreted by some in China, who assume that Singapore is culturally aligned and ideologically sympathetic to Chinese interests.[71][72][73] In reality, the Chinese community in Singapore has diverged significantly from that in China, having been shaped by centuries of migration, multiculturalism, colonial legacy and independent nation-building.[74] This misconception was evident in early bilateral exchanges, where Chinese officials referred to visiting Singaporeans as "kinsmen". While Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew acknowledged a "special relationship", he firmly rejected the notion of ideological or emotional kinship, stating, "We are different like the New Zealanders and the Australians are different from the British... I have no ideological empathy."[15] His response underscored Singapore's distinct national identity and independent worldview, particularly in economic and political matters.[75]

In 2012, some Chinese netizens began referring to Singapore as "Po County" (坡县), a label that many Singaporeans found deeply offensive.[76] While a few Chinese commenters viewed it as a harmless or affectionate nickname, the implication that Singapore is merely a minor appendage of China was widely condemned.[76] Many Singaporeans, regardless of ethnicity, saw the term as a patronising and dismissive attempt to diminish the country's sovereignty and independence.[77]

The Singaporean Chinese today are overwhelmingly locally born and raised, with only a small minority comprising first-generation immigrants from China. They possess no allegiance to either the People's Republic of China (PRC) or the Republic of China (Taiwan), and instead identify firmly with Singapore's national identity and multicultural society.[78] Singapore's historical experience with racial riots has made social harmony a top national priority,[79] and the government has invested decades of effort in cultivating a cohesive, inclusive identity that places Singapore first, above all ethnic and foreign affiliations.[80]

Despite this, misalignment between Singapore's national identity and the attitudes of some newcomers from mainland China has resulted in tension. Incidents such as the curry dispute,[81] the 2012 Singapore bus drivers' strike,[82] and an infamous fatal speeding accident caused by a wealthy Chinese national,[83] have stoked public frustration. These cases are viewed by many Singaporeans as emblematic of certain Chinese immigrants' failure to respect or integrate into Singapore's multicultural society. The resentment is intensified when these newcomers appear to disregard local values such as courtesy, meritocracy and the rule of law.[84]

Singaporeans' firm sense of national identity is reflected in how they respond to perceived foreign encroachments, even in symbolic domains like sport. Olympic medals won by China-born athletes who had only recently obtained Singaporean citizenship were not widely celebrated by the local population compared to native-born winners, who saw them as "mercenaries" rather than true Singaporean champions.[85][86] This reflects the fact that Singapore's national identity is grounded in shared civic values, historical experience and a state-building process developed independently of China. Efforts to assert cultural affinity or political alignment based solely on ethnic similarity are considered inaccurate and inappropriate by Singaporeans, including by its leadership.[75][86]

Security and military relations

[edit]

In 2002, it was revealed that China had officially proposed relocating Singapore's military training operations from Taiwan to Hainan. However, Singapore declined the offer, choosing to maintain its long-standing defence arrangements with Taiwan.[25][26] Nonetheless, Singapore has kept open channels for pragmatic engagement with China in defence matters. In 2008, both countries signed the Agreement on Defense Exchanges and Security Cooperation, facilitating limited interactions such as official visits, port calls and professional exchanges. In 2009, Exercise Cooperation, the first bilateral army exercise, was held in Guilin, China, followed by a joint counterterrorism exercise in 2010 and 2014.[87][38]: 159 : 164 

Singapore has consistently managed defence engagements with China on its own terms, maintaining a balanced approach. In 2019, Exercise Cooperation was held in Singapore and involved the Singapore Army's 3rd Singapore Division and 1st Commando Battalion alongside the People's Liberation Army’s 74th Army Group.[87] While an enhanced Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation was signed later that year,[88] Singapore has taken care to preserve its strategic autonomy. Military activities were paused during the COVID-19 pandemic, and while resumed in 2022 with agreements on defence education and exchanges, Singapore continues to engage China in ways that protect its sovereign interests and broader regional relationships.[88]

In July 2025, K. Shanmugam, Singapore's Coordinating Minister for National Security, stated that the country's critical infrastructure was attacked by UNC3886, a cyber-espionage group previously linked to China.[89] Singapore's Cyber Security Agency was deployed in the response to the attacks.[90]

Public opinion

[edit]

In July 2020, Singaporean journalist Maria Siow reported that many mainland Chinese, echoing official narratives, tend to view Singapore as a model for China.[91] This perception stems from Singapore's status as a one-party dominant state, which, while considerably more democratic and open than China, is often characterised by political stability, limited dissent and a reputation for low corruption. Singapore is also credited with having contributed to China's development during the period of Chinese economic reform, and Lee Kuan Yew is widely regarded by Chinese observers as an exemplary leader.[92]

Singapore enjoys generally favourable views among Chinese respondents, as shown by multiple surveys conducted over recent years. A November 2020 study by scholars from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and the University of British Columbia found that 69% of Chinese participants held positive opinions of Singapore.[93] Similarly, a March 2022 survey funded by the European Regional Development Fund and conducted by the Central European Institute of Asian Studies reported that most mainland Chinese respondents viewed Singapore positively and regarded Singaporeans as friendly to Chinese travellers.[94] Furthermore, according to a 2022 survey by Renmin University of China and the Global Times Research Center on Chinese views of ASEAN, Singapore was identified as the most appealing ASEAN member to Chinese respondents.[95]

From the Singaporean perspective, favourable views of China remain strong but nuanced. A 2022 poll by Pew Research Center found that 67% of Singaporeans expressed a positive view of China.[96] A separate 2022 survey by the Central European Institute of Asian Studies similarly showed most Singaporean respondents holding positive views of China.[97] According to analyst Russell Hsiao, support for China in Singapore is generationally divided, with older Chinese Singaporeans generally expressing stronger affinity, while younger generations tend to feel less connected to China.[98]

Resident diplomatic missions

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b c Han, Enze (2024). The Ripple Effect: China's Complex Presence in Southeast Asia. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-769659-0.
  2. ^ "Asean to step up terror fight, hold naval drill with China". The Straits Times. 7 February 2018. Archived from the original on 24 February 2018. Retrieved 24 February 2018.
  3. ^ "Singapore, China leaders laud deep, growing ties". TODAYonline. Archived from the original on 25 February 2018. Retrieved 24 February 2018.
  4. ^ "Singapore and China's common interest 'greater than any occasional difference of views': DPM Teo". Channel NewsAsia. Archived from the original on 25 February 2018. Retrieved 24 February 2018.
  5. ^ "Singapore a 'strong supporter' of China's peaceful development". The Straits Times. 25 May 2017. Archived from the original on 24 February 2018. Retrieved 24 February 2018.
  6. ^ "The special relationship with China". TODAYonline. 25 March 2015. Archived from the original on 18 July 2024. Retrieved 15 September 2024.
  7. ^ Liang Fook Lye (8 December 2016). "Singapore-China relations hit another snag". Asia & The Pacific Policy Society. Archived from the original on 9 December 2016. Retrieved 9 December 2016.
  8. ^ "Scope for greater Singapore-China cooperation in education and transport: Ng Chee Meng". The Straits Times. 1 August 2017. Archived from the original on 20 October 2017. Retrieved 19 October 2017.
  9. ^ "Singapore to promote stronger Asean-China cooperation: PM Lee Hsien Loong". The Straits Times. 19 September 2017. Archived from the original on 20 October 2017. Retrieved 19 October 2017.
  10. ^ "Singapore-China ties 'stable, in good state', PM Lee says after prominent visit". TODAYonline. Archived from the original on 19 October 2017. Retrieved 19 October 2017.
  11. ^ John Wong. "Sino-Singapore Relations: Looking Back and Looking Forward". Singapore China Friendship Association. Archived from the original on 1 March 2017. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  12. ^ a b Tommy Koh (15 March 2016). "Taking stock of Singapore-China ties – past, present and future". The Straits Times. Archived from the original on 24 August 2017. Retrieved 24 August 2017.
  13. ^ "Nanyang University". Singapore Infopedia. National Library Board. 9 September 2014. Archived from the original on 4 July 2017. Retrieved 17 July 2017.
  14. ^ Kartini Binte Saparudin; Lee Meiyu (9 April 2014). "Nanyang University's student activism". Singapore Infopedia. National Library Board. Archived from the original on 19 July 2017. Retrieved 17 July 2017.
  15. ^ a b c "Transcript of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by David Cox of London Weekend Television, recorded in Kingston, Jamaica, in May 1975" (PDF). National Archives of Singapore. 1975. Archived (PDF) from the original on 19 September 2017. Retrieved 17 July 2017.
  16. ^ "Lee Kuan Yew's Legacy for China-Singapore Relations". The Diplomat. 5 December 2016. Archived from the original on 12 August 2017. Retrieved 17 July 2017.
  17. ^ Lee, Kuan Yew (2000). From Third World to First: The Singapore Story – 1965–2000. New York: Harper Collins. p. 467,573. ISBN 978-0-06-019776-6.
  18. ^ Zheng, Yongnian; Lye, Liang Fook (6 November 2015). Singapore-China Relations: 50 Years. National University of Singapore: World Scientific. p. 10. ISBN 978-981-4713-56-6.
  19. ^ Zheng, Yongnian; Lye, Liang Fook (6 November 2015). Singapore-China Relations: 50 Years. National University of Singapore: World Scientific. p. 11. ISBN 978-981-4713-56-6.
  20. ^ a b c d e f "Brief Introduction to Relations between China and Singapore". Xinhua News Agency. 17 May 2002. Archived from the original on 7 March 2010. Retrieved 4 January 2011.
  21. ^ "Singapore and China establish formal diplomatic ties". The Straits Times. 4 October 1990. Retrieved 15 October 2023 – via National Library Board, Singapore.
  22. ^ "Singapore: Foreign Policy, China". Singapore: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress Country Studies. 1989. Archived from the original on 11 January 2016. Retrieved 4 January 2011.
  23. ^ a b "Singapore military ties now a 'threat'". Taipei Times. 23 April 2002. Archived from the original on 8 October 2012. Retrieved 4 January 2011.
  24. ^ "星光計畫 – 台灣大百科全書 Encyclopedia of Taiwan". Taiwanpedia.culture.tw. 16 November 2012. Archived from the original on 18 April 2013. Retrieved 20 November 2012.
  25. ^ a b "Singapore set to move training facilities from Taiwan to China". Agence France Presse. Singapore Window. 22 September 2002. Archived from the original on 20 June 2010. Retrieved 4 January 2011.
  26. ^ a b Barry Wain (5 August 2004). "A David-and-Goliath tussle". Far Eastern Economic Review. Archived from the original (archived at Singapore Window) on 16 July 2012. Retrieved 20 November 2012.
  27. ^ "China warns Singapore officials against future visits to Taiwan". Singapore-window.org. Agence France Presse. 26 August 2004. Archived from the original on 16 July 2012. Retrieved 20 November 2012.
  28. ^ "China opposes Lee Hsien Loong's visit to Taiwan" (Press release). Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America. 12 July 2004. Archived from the original on 6 May 2010. Retrieved 4 January 2011.
  29. ^ BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific,1 (21 February 2005). "Chinese ambassador says ties with Singapore fully restored". 795797051.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  30. ^ "Prime Minister's Office – National Day Rally Videos & Speeches". Nettv.1-net.com.sg. Archived from the original on 20 September 2012. Retrieved 20 November 2012.
  31. ^ "Embassy of the Republic of Singapore, Beijing: About the Embassy". Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Archived from the original on 4 January 2018. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  32. ^ Consulate-General of the Republic of Singapore, Hong Kong: About the Consulate-General Archived 29 October 2015 at the Wayback Machine, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore
  33. ^ "NDR 2016: Singapore must choose its own place to stand on South China Sea issue, says PM Lee". Channel NewsAsia. 21 August 2016. Archived from the original on 7 June 2017. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  34. ^ "Global Times: Singapore raises South China Sea arbitration at NAM summit of heads of state despite opposition". The Straits Times. 27 September 2016. Archived from the original on 5 March 2017. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  35. ^ "Singapore accuses Chinese paper of fabricating South China Sea story". Reuters. 27 September 2016. Archived from the original on 12 January 2017. Retrieved 25 August 2017.
  36. ^ Chan, Minnie (1 October 2016). "Chinese defence adviser turns up heat on Singapore over South China Sea row". South China Morning Post. Retrieved 20 July 2024.
  37. ^ "China-Singapore Relations in Seizure". Foreign Brief. 30 November 2016. Archived from the original on 6 January 2019. Retrieved 21 June 2018.
  38. ^ a b c Loh, Dylan M.H. (2024). China's Rising Foreign Ministry: Practices and Representations of Assertive Diplomacy. Stanford University Press. ISBN 9781503638204.
  39. ^ Adrian Lim (31 December 2016). "Terrex seizure: SAF will learn from incident, says Ng Eng Hen". The Straits Times. Archived from the original on 6 January 2017. Retrieved 6 January 2017.
  40. ^ "China pressures Singapore with seizure of military hardware". Lowy Institute. Retrieved 20 July 2024.
  41. ^ "Singapore military vehicles still detained, says Hong Kong customs". Archived from the original on 6 January 2017. Retrieved 6 January 2017.
  42. ^ Phila Siu (3 January 2017). "Terrex vehicles seized by Hong Kong moved indoors". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 6 January 2017. Retrieved 6 January 2017.
  43. ^ Bhavan Jaipragas (24 January 2017). "Hong Kong to return seized armoured vehicles to Singapore". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 26 January 2017. Retrieved 26 January 2017.
  44. ^ "DCCC 446/2017 Reasons for Verdict" (PDF). 29 April 2019.
  45. ^ "DCCC 446/2017 Reasons for Sentence" (PDF). 29 April 2019.
  46. ^ "Singapore military training exercises in Taiwan will continue: report". Yahoo News. 5 October 2017. Retrieved 20 July 2025.
  47. ^ Chang, I-wei Jennifer (6 May 2020). "Taiwan's Military Ties to Singapore Targeted by China". Global Taiwan Institute. Retrieved 20 July 2025.
  48. ^ a b c d e f g h Lin, Zhongjie (2025). Constructing Utopias: China's New Town Movement in the 21st Century. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-779330-5.
  49. ^ Perlez, Jane; Ramzy, Austin (4 November 2015). "China, Taiwan and a Meeting After 66 Years". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 3 September 2017. Retrieved 21 July 2025.
  50. ^ Torode, Greg; Zaharia, Marius (25 November 2016). "Beijing warns against Taiwan ties as Singapore tries to free troop carriers in Hong Kong". Reuters. Retrieved 8 August 2025.
  51. ^ Ma, Xinru; Kang, David C. (2024). Beyond Power Transitions: The Lessons of East Asian History and the Future of U.S.-China Relations. Columbia Studies in International Order and Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 183. ISBN 978-0-231-55597-5.
  52. ^ "China Rebukes Countries for Congratulating Taiwan Election Victor". Time. 16 January 2024. Retrieved 20 July 2024.
  53. ^ Quinlan, Joe (13 November 2007). "Insight: China's capital targets Asia's bamboo network". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 23 April 2015. Retrieved 30 May 2013.
  54. ^ Murray L Weidenbaum (1 January 1996). The Bamboo Network: How Expatriate Chinese Entrepreneurs are Creating a New Economic Superpower in Asia. Martin Kessler Books, Free Press. pp. 4–8. ISBN 978-0-684-82289-1.
  55. ^ "External Trade". Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, 2010 (PDF). Department of Statistics Singapore. Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 November 2010. Retrieved 4 January 2011.
  56. ^ "US-China Trade Statistics and China's World Trade Statistics". The US-China Business Council. Archived from the original on 18 January 2013. Retrieved 12 January 2013.
  57. ^ Sonia Kolesnikov-Jessop (21 December 2010). "Bakeries Claim a Growing Niche in China". I.H.T. Special Report: Doing Business in China. Archived from the original on 21 August 2017. Retrieved 25 August 2017.
  58. ^ "CapitaLand China to sell stake in Senning Property". China Knowledge. 31 December 2010. Archived from the original on 8 July 2011.
  59. ^ "CapitaLand China". Archived from the original on 27 December 2010. Retrieved 4 January 2011.
  60. ^ "Confucius Institute: About Us". Nanyang Technological University. Archived from the original on 30 June 2017. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  61. ^ Leong, Weng Kam (1 September 2015). "Completed China Cultural Centre to boost arts exchange". The Straits Times. Archived from the original on 29 August 2017. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  62. ^ Peter Hartcher (30 October 2012). "Singapore a model for Chinese democracy". The Sydney Morning Herald.
  63. ^ Peter Cai (26 March 2015). "Learning from Singapore: the great Chinese experiment". The Australian Business Review.
  64. ^ "NTU launches the new Mayors' Programme for high-level Chinese officials" (Press release). Nanyang Technological University. 11 April 2012. Archived from the original on 20 September 2017. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  65. ^ Clive Dimmock; Jason Ong Soon Leong (2010). "Studying overseas: mainland Chinese students in Singapore". Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education. 40 (1): 25–42. doi:10.1080/03057920903155666. S2CID 143889588.
  66. ^ Tran Nhi Bach Van; Duong Thi Hoang Yen; Xiao Juan; Sun Chenhui (2016). "The Integration of International Chinese Students Into Local Singaporean Community (pages 81-83)" (PDF). Journal of Tourism and Hospitality Management. 4. James Cook University Singapore. Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 August 2021.
  67. ^ Kor Kian Beng (29 July 2015). "Zaobao.com 'a symbol of Singapore's soft power'". The Straits Times.
  68. ^ "China Blocks Singapore Site". Radio Free Asia. 15 December 2009. Archived from the original on 29 June 2017. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  69. ^ Mahtani, Shibani; Chandradas, Amrita (24 July 2023). "In Singapore, loud echoes of Beijing's positions generate anxiety". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 24 July 2023. Retrieved 25 July 2023.
  70. ^ Liu, Hong (June 2012). "Transnational Chinese Sphere in Singapore: Dynamics, Transformations and Characteristics". Journal of Current Chinese Affairs. 41 (2): 37–60. doi:10.1177/186810261204100203. Retrieved 21 July 2025.
  71. ^ "Statistics Singapore – Population Trends" (PDF). SingStat. Archived (PDF) from the original on 28 March 2015. Retrieved 1 March 2015.
  72. ^ Chua Mui Hoong (21 May 2017). "3 myths about Singapore-China ties". The Straits Times. Archived from the original on 26 July 2017. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  73. ^ "China's perception of Singapore: 4 areas of misunderstanding". The Straits Times. 21 October 2016. Archived from the original on 24 July 2017. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  74. ^ Ng, Ashton (December 2021). "The divisiveness of Chinese identities in Singapore". International Communication of Chinese Culture. 8 (4): 465–481. doi:10.1007/s40636-021-00235-z. Retrieved 21 July 2025.
  75. ^ a b Philip Liu Hsiao-pong (4 November 2019). "China, friend or foe to Singapore? How a wily Lee Kuan Yew made it both". South China Morning Post. Retrieved 21 July 2025.
  76. ^ a b Xu Xin (13 August 2012). "称新加坡为"坡县" 是昵称还是含贬义". Lianhe Zaobao (in Chinese (Singapore)). Archived from the original on 29 April 2013. 由于文化背景差异， 一些网民认为"坡县"完全是对新加坡的昵称，"坡县"一词有修辞上的审美，不仅没有贬义，使用这词的人往往是跟新加坡较亲密的中国人或新移民。另一些人则认为"坡县"一词含有贬义，不应使用。
  77. ^ "胡天培："坡县"争议原则和心理". www.zaobao.com.sg (in Chinese (Singapore)). 10 October 2023. Retrieved 21 July 2025.
  78. ^ Ng, Ashton (1 December 2021). "The divisiveness of Chinese identities in Singapore". International Communication of Chinese Culture. 8 (4): 465–481. doi:10.1007/s40636-021-00235-z. ISSN 2197-4241. S2CID 244651857.
  79. ^ Walter Sim (5 October 2015). "Racial, religious integration in Singapore an ongoing work: PM Lee Hsien Loong". The Straits Times. Archived from the original on 28 July 2017. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  80. ^ Lian Kwen Fee (1997). "Introduction: Ethnic Identity in Malaysia and Singapore". Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science. 25 (2): 1–6. doi:10.1163/030382497X00130. JSTOR 24492393.
  81. ^ "Curry dispute". Singapore Infopedia. National Library Board. 11 May 2015. Archived from the original on 23 July 2017. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  82. ^ "The Chinese Migrants Who Shocked Singapore: A WSJ Investigation". The Wall Street Journal. 26 August 2013. Archived from the original on 15 August 2021. Retrieved 16 July 2017.
  83. ^ Andrew Jacobs (26 July 2012). "In Singapore, Vitriol Against Chinese Newcomers". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 2 September 2017. Retrieved 25 August 2017.
  84. ^ Anthony Kuhn (26 July 2012). "Millions of Immigrants Cause Tension in Singapore". NPR. Archived from the original on 19 September 2017. Retrieved 5 April 2018.
  85. ^ Jonathan Roberts (14 August 2012). "Anti-foreigner sentiments can't be ignored". AsiaOne, The New Paper. Archived from the original on 18 August 2021.
  86. ^ a b Leo Suryadinata (21 November 2014). Making Of Southeast Asian Nations, The: State, Ethnicity, Indigenism And Citizenship. World Scientific. pp. 108–109. ISBN 978-981-4612-98-2. Archived from the original on 20 July 2024.
  87. ^ a b Parameswaran, Prashanth. "China-Singapore Military Ties in Focus With Army Exercise". thediplomat.com. Retrieved 11 October 2023.
  88. ^ a b "China and Singapore to resume military drills, cooperate on defence education". South China Morning Post. 9 June 2022. Retrieved 11 October 2023.
  89. ^ "Singapore Calls in Military as Alleged China-Linked Hackers Target Critical Systems". The China-Global South Project. 20 July 2025. Retrieved 20 July 2025.
  90. ^ "Singapore military helps battle cyberattack: minister". RTL Lëtzebuerg. Agence France-Presse. Retrieved 20 July 2025.
  91. ^ "Maria Siow | NK News". NK News.
  92. ^ Maria Siow (6 July 2020). "On Chinese social media, Singapore elections amuse and confuse". South China Morning Post.
  93. ^ Qiang, Kwek Jian; Xiaojun, Li; Liu, Adam Y. (2 February 2021). "Survey shows 70% Chinese have favourable view of Singapore". ThinkChina Magazine. Lianhe Zaobao. Archived from the original on 2 February 2021.
  94. ^ Kristína Kironská, Richard Q. Turcsányi, Rong Chen, Yiju Chen, Andrew Chubb, James Iocovozzi, Matej Šimalčík (November 2022). "Destined for conflict? Taiwanese and Chinese public opinions on Cross-Strait relations" (PDF). Central European Institute of Asian Studies. pages 18 and 20.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  95. ^ Vernon Lee (13 May 2022). "Singapore is most appealing Asean member to people in China: survey". Yahoo! News. Singapore. Archived from the original on 27 January 2023.
  96. ^ Maria Siow and Joseph Sipalan (23 July 2022). "Why do Singapore and Malaysia have a more favourable view of China than the US?". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 23 July 2022.
  97. ^ Richard Q. Turcsanyi; Esther E. Song (24 December 2022). "South Koreans Have the World's Most Negative Views of China. Why?". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 23 January 2023.
  98. ^ Hsiao, Russell (16 July 2019). "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Singapore". Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 20 July 2024.
  99. ^ Embassy of China in Singapore
  100. ^ Embassy of Singapore in Beijing

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]