Unified power

  1. Home
  2. Wiki
Part of a series on
Marxism–Leninism
Concepts
Variants
Politicians
Intellectuals
Theoretical works
History
By country
Organizations
Related topics

Unified power[I] is a Marxist–Leninist principle on communist state power. It originates from Jean-Jacques Rousseau's idea of indivisible sovereignty and was expanded by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Vladimir Lenin. It was institutionalised in the Soviet Union following the October Revolution and has influenced the constitutional design of communist states such as China, Vietnam, and Cuba. Supporters argue that unified power ensures direct popular control of the state and coordination of its functions, while critics argue that the principle is illegitimate, pointing out that the real centre of power in communist states is the highest organs of the communist party.

The principle assumes that all power emanates from the people, and that the people gain popular sovereignty through the state organs of power. All state power is centralised in the supreme state organ of power (SSOP), which holds unlimited state power except for the limits it sets on itself through the constitution, laws, and other legal documents. By extension, unified power rejects the principle of separation of powers, instead placing legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the SSOP. The SSOP, per the principle of the division of labour and the integration of executive and legislative powers, delegates powers to the supreme executive and administrative organ, the government in communist terminology, and other specialised organs, like the supreme judicial organ, that make up the unified state apparatus are completely subservient to the SSOP. This system is designed to embody popular sovereignty, with power flowing from the people to the state through elected assemblies at various levels.

Unified power is still practised by the existing communist states, with China and Vietnam having instituted some modifications. In these two states, unified power has evolved to emphasise a clearer division of labour and decentralisation within a centralised framework. China describes this model as the "unity of deliberation and action", with the National People's Congress as the SSOP. Vietnam's constitution similarly defines the National Assembly of Vietnam as the SSOP while stressing delegation, coordination, and control to prevent arbitrary and unlawful exercise of state power. Both variations reject the separation of powers but incorporate elements of delegation and local autonomy within a unified state framework.

[edit]

Theoretical origins

[edit]
.
The works of Rousseau, Marx, Engels and Lenin influenced the Marxist–Leninist conception of popular sovereignty.

In Marxist−Leninist theory, it is believed that the supreme state organ of power represents popular sovereignty. The state organs of power are elected in popular elections.[1] The highest state organ of power in a given state—the supreme state organ of power—is supposed to embody the will of the people.[2] As the popular embodiment of state power, the supreme state organ of power is the holder of the unified powers of the state.[3]

Communist theorists contend that the Marxist–Leninist theory of popular sovereignty was "developed by" Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who believed the people acted as the foundation for legitimate state power. It was further refined by the two principal founders of Marxism, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.[4] In his The Social Contract, Rousseau formulated a theory of popular sovereignty in which he argued all state power legitimately resided in the people alone, what he termed the general will.[5] Rousseau posits that the general will is inherently just and directed towards the public good. He asserts that the resolutions made by the people are always correct, as they are immune to corruption, although they can be misled.[6]

In another work, Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau argues the case for establishing a supreme power: "In short, instead of turning our forces against ourselves, let us gather them into one supreme power that governs us according to wise laws".[7] Marxist–Leninist theoretician Đào Trí Úc interprets this to mean that Rousseau believed that "power cannot be divided [separated], but state power and supreme sovereignty must belong to the people; legislative, executive and judicial powers are only concrete manifestations of the supreme power of the people."[8]

Rousseau's idea of popular sovereignty influenced Marx and Engels' conception of historical materialism. Through this concept, Marx and Engels argue that the common people are the creators of history. That is, humans can enforce changes on the material base. The material base means nature, or more specifically, that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and all things are results of material interactions. Human beings interact with nature through labour, and the process produces technology (productive forces) that establishes specific human relations with nature (relations of production) that either introduce changes to our material existence or create radical rupture with it (mode of production).[9]

That means that, by extension, the state is something created by the people, according to them: "just as it is not religion that creates people but people create religion, it is not the state system that creates the people, but the people create the state system."[9] The political aim of Marx and Engels' project was to ensure that the people reclaim state power from oppressive material forces, which in this instance means the ruling class that had oppressed them.[9]

Another source of inspiration to Marxist–Leninist practitioners was the soviets created during the Russian Revolution of 1905. Marxist–Leninists believed the soviets played a dual function, both as a possible decision-making organ and a mass organisation.[10] Lenin claimed that the soviets formed during the 1905 revolution were a power accessible to all, arising directly from the masses and representing their will. Bihari explains that in 1905, the Soviets operated in only a few areas and for a very short time. During this time, they took on all state functions in those areas and served in accordance with the interests of he working people.[11]

The soviets reappeared during the Russian Revolution of 1917. The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) allied themselves with the soviets, and Lenin began to theorise that they could make up the foundation of a new state.[12] However, Lenin believed the soviets were a weak and primitive form of state organisation alone if powers were not centralised. In a bid to centralise state power, the Bolsheviks began campaigning under the slogan, "All Power to the Soviets". The communists were planning to create a nationwide network of soviets that would collectively establish a supreme state organ of power.[13] In his work, Can the Bolsheviks Retain the State Power?, Lenin claimed that the soviets represented a new form of state of revolutionary significance since their elected representatives held both executive and legislative powers. From Lenin's standpoint, this was a form of anti-parliamentarism in practice.[14]

In institutionalised form

[edit]
A picture from the 1952 elections of the supreme state organ of power of the Polish People's Republic.

After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks moved to make the world's first attempt to institutionalise this blend of Rousseauian and Marxian theory of popular sovereignty in Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union. The end result was the establishment of a new state form that became the world's first communist state. One of the first decrees instituted by the new Bolshevik regime, titled "All Power to the Soviets", on 8 November 1917, conferred all state powers on the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Russian SFSR). This decree put an end to dual power, a situation in which the institutions of the soviets and the Russian Provisional Government were competing for state power.[15] The All-Russian Congress of Soviets then adopted a decree that established a Workers' and Peasants' Government that was fully accountable to itself and to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (All-Russian CEC), an internal organ of the All-Russian Congress.[16] In a bid to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the soviets, the All-Russian CEC instituted imperative mandates on 7 December 1917 that made all elected representatives recallable.[17]

In this system, the soviets became known as state organs of power, with the highest one being referred to as the supreme state organ of power, and all other organs became accountable to them. For example, an appeal of the People's Commissariat for the Interior stated, "in the communities the agencies of the local power, the soviets, are the administrative agencies, to which all institutions, irrespective of whether economic, financial, or cultural-educational, have to be subordinated."[17] However, the first formal regulation that categorised each state organ was adopted on 30 April 1918 at the Fifth Congress of the Frontier Region of the Turkestan Soviet Federative Republic. This regulation stated that the state form in Turkestan was based on the following four organs: firstly, the supreme state organ of power, secondly, the permanent organ of the supreme state organ of power, thirdly, the supreme executive and administrative organ, and lastly, the local state organs of power.[18]

The system outlined in the Turkestan republic was more or less adopted, with slight modifications, in the world's first communist constitution, the Russian Constitution of 10 July 1918. According to Otto Bihari, this constitution outlined in its tenth article "the principle of unity and the uniform exercise of power", and that all state powers were conferred on the soviets.[19] This constitution conferred on the All-Russian Congress of Soviets the status of SSOP, which meant that it held unlimited state power unless constrained by itself through the state constitution, laws, or other legal documents. Despite its formal powers, it delegated most tasks to its internal state organs or the constitutive organs of the state apparatus. It did so by either electing, removing, or dismissing state organs, electing, removing, or dismissing individuals from positions within state organs, or by establishing or abolishing state organs.[20] The fundamental principles instituted in 1918 were exported to other communist states, and remain fundamentally unchanged. Therefore, in communist states, all state organs are accountable to and function according to the directives of the SSOP and lower-level state organs of power.[21]

"Under the accepted classification, elective and representative organs of the people, the Soviets of Working People’s Deputies, from top to bottom, and also the Presidiums of Supreme Soviets of the USSR, and the Union and Autonomous Republics, are the organs of state power. They are at the centre of the whole state apparatus, and constitute its only and abiding foundation. All other state organs are set up by them and are ultimately accountable to them."

— Soviet academics Yuri Dolgopolov and Leonid Grigoryan, in their book, Fundamentals of Soviet State Laws, on the role of the state organs of power in the Soviet Union.[22]

In the 1918 constitution, the people elected the lowest-level organ of state power, and the members of the elected state organ would elect the one at the next hierarchical level. This process would continue until the supreme state organ of power, meaning the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, was elected.[23] The system was eventually amended in the Soviet Union, in which half of the supreme state organ of power was directly elected by the population and the other half indirectly.[24] Other communist states, such as present-day Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam, have an electoral system where all members of the supreme state organ of power are directly elected. In China, the entire supreme state organ of power is elected indirectly. In states like the Soviet Union, the people were empowered to elect candidates; in most cases, the citizen could either vote for or against the candidate or for or against a given list, to the state organs of power, which collectively form the basis of the unified state apparatus.[25] The manner in which these state organs are elected varies from state to state.[26]

The 1936 Soviet constitution moved to reaffirm the role of the SSOP and lower-level state organs of power by clarifying the division of labour between state organs. It did so by creating an unbalanced relationship between the SSOP and other state organs of power: the SSOP was clearly labelled as superior and the other state organs inferior to it. All other state organs were to be created by it. In other cases, as with the supreme judicial organ, the SSOP was empowered to elect individuals to head them.[27] The constitution formally strengthened this unbalanced relationship by conferring on the SSOP a monopoly on legislative powers.[28] It also clarified, categorised and labelled three constitutive organs of the unified state apparatus: the administrative organ, the supreme judicial organ and the supreme procuratorial organ. These organs have been exported to all the world's communist states.[29]

Soviet theoreticians Yuri Dolgopolov and Leonid Grigoryan legitimised this system by stating that state power in communist states represented the primary means of popular governance and, therefore, reflects the will and sovereignty of the people. They believed that state power—and, by extension, the supreme organ of state power—operated on behalf of the people and served as the primary instrument of their will. This unified power allowed the state to achieve a characteristic known as state sovereignty. State sovereignty, they contended, ensures that the communist states are independent of any other state or societal power in the exercise of their functions, both domestically and in their relations with other states. Therefore, they believed, the sovereignty of communist states strengthened their internal popular sovereignty. [30] They also asserted that the laws and resolutions passed by the state organs of power represented the will of the people, dictated state policy, and guided the actions of the unified state apparatus. Due to their formal function, the state organs of power were widely believed, according to Dolgopolov and Grigoryan, to form the core of the future stateless and pure communist system of public self-administration that communist states purportedly try to establish.[21]

The communist theory of popular sovereignty has met with criticism. Scholar George C. Guins concludes, when writing about the Soviet Union, "there is no popular sovereignty in the Soviet Union because the people cannot either freely form opinion or express it by free elections."[31] So, while the formal powers of the supreme state organ of power state that the people are the holders of the unlimited political powers of the state, Guins believes this to be a disguise for the communist party's monopoly on state power.[32] Academic Ivan Volgyes concurs with Guins, noting, "[Unified power] is thus based on both the mandate derived from controlled elections and from Marxist ideology. A vote of no confidence, which would topple the government elsewhere, is simply unthinkable under the Communist system."[33] Scholar Hans Peters believed the Marxist–Leninist conception of popular sovereignty to be outdated, arguing, "The identification of the people with the [SSOP] practised in [communist] Eastern Europe as a senseless interpretation the Rousseauist concept of democracy [...] is not of progressive nature, but feeds on the ideas of the 19th century."[34]

Administrative extension of state power

[edit]

According to political scientist Alfred G. Meyer, "Theoretically, all Soviets are the supreme organs of self-government on their respective level, with the proviso that this self-government is subject to the overriding authority of higher Soviets."[35] Lower-level state organs of power would, like their federal or national counterpart, elect from amongst their members a permanent organ and an executive organ. While the Soviets were formally granted real powers, higher state organs, as in the Soviet Union, could often bypass them, and they were often treated as advisory organs.[36] This subordination of the lower-level state organs to the highest organs produced the governing principle known as dual subordination, which holds that lower-level state organs are subordinate to both the populace and the higher-level state organs of power.[37]


Constitution and laws

[edit]
Marxist–Leninists believe that the state is an instrument of the ruling class, which means, by extension, that the constitution and the legal systems are tools to strengthen its powers over the ruled.

Lenin prominently argued that every state formation was under the control of a ruling class that used it for its own material benefits.[38] In the early years of communist governance, a debate emerged over whether the law would entirely diminish as socialism progressed or if a robust legal system would be maintained. Ultimately, the theoretical contributions of Andrey Vyshinsky, a prominent Soviet legal scholar, became the prevailing interpretation of the role of law within communist states.[39]

Vyshinsky asserted that the laws of a communist state consist of a collection of rules of conduct that reflect the will of the ruling class.[40] These laws are instituted through legislation by the supreme state organ of power, as well as through customs and community norms that are sanctioned by the organs of state power. The enforcement of these laws is upheld by the coercive force of the state, with the aim of protecting, reinforcing, and advancing the material base of the communist state and the political order crafted by its ruling class.[41]

Since the constitution is adopted by the supreme state organ of power—the embodiment of the popular will—it is officially treated as the highest expression of it, in Marxist−Leninist theory.[42] However, the SSOP works under the leading role of the communist party and implements its guidance, meaning that the party's will has a sizable impact on the constitution.[43] Ever since the 8th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), communists have stressed the importance of the party respecting the constitution and laws: "The Party must put its decisions into practice through the Soviet organs, within the bounds of the Soviet Constitution. The Party seeks to direct the activity of the Soviets".[44] Meaning that, according to Marxist–Leninist theory, the laws are made in the interests of the ruling class, but it is in the ruling class' own interest to suppress arbitrariness and lawlessness.[45]

The first communist constitution, adopted in 1918, bestowed the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and its All-Russian Central Executive Committee the power to adopt and amend the state constitution.[46] This was reaffirmed in the 1936 Soviet constitution, which outlined that the All-Union Supreme Soviet alone had the powers to adopt and amend the constitution. [47] This model was diffused to the communist world.For example, the 1976 constitution of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania stated that the People's Assembly was empowered to approve and amend the constitution.[47] The 1960 constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic reaffirmed these rights and added that its supreme state organ of power could supervise their implementation. Similar statements were made in the constitutions of East Germany, communist Romania, and communist Hungary.[48]

In the existing communist states, popular ratification has been stressed more. The constitutions of Laos and Vietnam affirm the importance of public consultation during the adoption and amendment process of the constitution, while the Cuban constitution states that a new constitution (or a constitutional amendment) has to be approved by the supreme state organ of power and adopted by the populace in a national referendum.[49]

Zhang Wenxian, a director of the Academic Committee of the China Law Society and a deputy director of the Xi Jinping Thought Research Center for the Rule of Law, argued in 2023, that the system of state organs of power ensured the organic unity of "the party's leadership, the people's mastery, and the rule of law."[50] He does not see a contradiction between the communist party coordinating and leading state and public affairs, and the state organs simultaneously representing the highest form of realisation of the popular will.[50] The constitution in communist states also has a different function than liberal democratic constitutions since, according to Zhang, it's a reflection of the material base that exists in that given state. He further notes that the legal system of a communist state are instruments of the ruling class, but that the communist ruling class uses them as tools to the benefit of the people because of the Marxist–Leninist worldview.[50]

The unified powers of the supreme state organ of power

[edit]

Theoretical origins

[edit]

The idea of unified power has its theoretical origins in the Marxist–Leninist rejection of the separation of powers, checks and balances and parliamentarism. Karl Marx, the founder of Marxism, was sceptical of the state more generally, and the executive powers of the state more specifically, throughout his life.[51] According to Marxist–Leninists, in their self-perceived bid to stop the abuse of power, the bourgeoisie, according to Otto Bihari, "cast down parliament from the summit of power and, degraded it to the rank of a simple legislative machinery, often radically curtailing even these powers following the American example."[34] In the classical Marxist interpretation, the strengthening of boundaries between the executive government and the parliamentary legislature had the unintended consequence of making the former independent and uncontrolled by the latter. It did not help either that the legislatures of the nineteenth century often instituted rules to prevent working-class representation.[34]

Marx believed what he perceived as the modern constitutions of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie invested too much power in the executive at the expense of the legislature. For example, he criticised the French Constitution of 1848 for replacing the hereditary monarchy with an elected monarch in the form of the president of the republic.[52] That is, Marx believed the separation of powers increased the president's power at the expense of the popularly elected legislature, concluding that the 1848 constitution had created a system with "two heads [...] the Legislative Assembly, on the one hand, the President, on the other."[52]

.
Marx's The Civil War in France and Lenin's State and Revolution made a sizable impact on the Marxist–Leninist conception of the communist state.

While Marx and his longtime collaborator, Friedrich Engels, never theorised on the future form of the modern post-capitalist state, they were positively inclined towards the Paris Commune. In later years, after their deaths, Marxist–Leninists began perceiving the Paris Commune as a prototype communist state.[34] The commune instituted a governance system in which legislative and executive powers were unified in the Commune Council. Marx, in his pamphlet The Civil War in France, considered this a positive trait, noting that the Commune Council was a "working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time."[53] He also noted, with praise, that "Not only municipal administration, but the whole initiative hitherto exercised by the state was laid into the hands of the Commune [Council]."[54]

The term to note in Marx's praise of the Paris Commune is, according to Otto Bihari, "working organ". Marx rejected the classical liberal understanding of the separation of executive and legislative powers, a view also shared by Rousseau. The Commune Council, unlike the liberal legislatures, was a working organ since it held executive and legislative powers. However, it is also clear that executive powers also entail the administrative powers of the state more generally. Marx also noted that the Commune Council had "stripped" [the police] of its political attributes, and turned into the responsible and at all times revocable agent of the Commune."[54] Marxist–Leninist theorists interpreted this as the theoretical origins of the idea of the unified state apparatus headed by the SSOP. According to Marx, the Commune Council was a positive model of representation since, firstly, it was directly accountable to the populace, and secondly, the people held unlimited state power through their elected representatives.[54]

In his book, The State and Revolution, Vladimir Lenin tries to develop Marx's ideas. In it, Lenin claimed, similarly to Marx, that the Paris Commune offered a more effective form of representation than the corrupt and self-serving parliaments of capitalist societies. He argued that true freedom of opinion and discussion should not lead to deception, as it did under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, which represented, according to himself, a "democracy for an insignificant minority, democracy for the rich—that is the democracy of capitalist society."[55]

Lenin held the view that within the Commune Council, the merging of legislative and executive powers established a framework in which elected officials are required to enact and carry out their own laws, and communicate directly with the constituents who selected them. He concluded that, unlike under parliamentarism, the prototype state form of the Paris Commune created a new state form: "Representative institutions remain, but there is no parliamentarism here as a special system, as the division of labour between the legislative and the executive, as a privileged position for the deputies."[56] In Lenin's view, this system was the opposite of parliamentarism and the separation of powers, since in this system the bureaucrat, elected representative, legislator, and executor were merged into a single individual.[57] Soviet theoreticians Dolgopolov and Grigoryan concurred with Lenin, concluding that "the blend of legislative and executive powers is a most important feature of the socialist organisation of power."[58]

Lenin's anti-parliamentarism was also characterised by an opposition to the separation of powers: he condemns the "con" that is the separation of powers.[59] He championed the unity of state governance, where the state organs of the unified state apparatus would be subordinated to the national elected representative organ, which eventually evolved into the SSOP. From Lenin’s perspective, it was of utmost importance to free the people from an uncontrolled and arbitrary state apparatus. The aim was to create a system that prevented the other state organs, with their specialised powers, from becoming independent branches of state.[60]

This, combined with the fact that Russia completely lacked a parliamentary and liberal democratic tradition, strengthened Lenin’s bid to create a new and unique state form. Theoretician Istvan Kovács admits that the anti-parliamentary policies of Lenin and the Bolsheviks were aided by the total lack of a liberal democratic tradition: "The merger of the legislative and executive functions was appreciably promoted by the almost total lack of a deeply rooted structure of the division of powers attached to the parliamentary system."[61]

Unity of legislative and executive powers

[edit]

The Russian communists established the world's first SSOP, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, when it convened for its first session on 16 June 1917.[62] Lenin, in a speech to the 7th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in March 1918, noted the importance of uniting executive and legislative powers in the SSOP, saying the party needed to abolish "parliamentarism (as the separation of legislative from executive work); [institute] the unifying of legislative and executive State work. The merging of administration and legislation."[63] On presenting the draft for the world's first communist constitution to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in July that same year, Yuri Steklov, a member of the constitutional drafting committee, stated that unlike bourgeois constitution that set up an artificial separation of state powers this constitution aimed to concentrate state powers ("legislative, executive, judicial") into one organ: the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and its internal organs, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.[64]

Initially, the Russian communists made several attempts to strengthen the unity of legislative and executive powers within the soviets. The Bolsheviks actively tried to increase the activities of elected representatives in the state organs, strengthening accountability and clarifying their executive powers. For example, the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets, held in December 1919, made it clear that elected representatives were required to report on their work to their electors every two weeks. If they failed to do so, they would lose their mandates. Three years later, in 1922, the All-Armenian Congress of Soviets, the SSOP of the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic, sought to clarify Articles 67 and 68 of its republican constitution.[65]

The Armenian SSOP sought to outline the responsibilities of the lower-level state organs of power, specifically detailing the obligations of elected representatives within the executive committees of these same state organs of power. These responsibilities comprised: (a) being present at meetings, (b) engaging in committees and sections, (c) carrying out resolutions from meetings and presidiums, (d) submitting regular updates on their work and the activities of the relevant organs, and (e) promptly fulfilling higher-level directives.[65] After the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922, these same processes were attempted enacted at the All-Union level. The 1924 Soviet constitution clarified further the unity of legislative and executive powers, bestowing the All-Union Congress of Soviets and its Central Executive Committee to decide on "all questions which they deem to be subject to their determination".[66]

The Marxist–Leninist critique, according to Dolgopolov and Grigoryan, states that the separation of powers attempts to separate the state from class by claiming the state stands above and outside the class issue. Montesquieu, the prime formulator of the separation of powers, falsely concluded, they charged, that the state should be separated into separate branches so as to ensure the fair and proper administration of state affairs. In such a society, Dolgopolov and Grigoryan conclude, the state can be nothing more than a tool of the ruling class. In contrast, Marxist–Leninists believe that capitalist society is centred on antagonistic classes that struggle for their own material interests and that, by extension, it makes no sense to talk about a state above class interests or a state without a ruling class.[67]

Unity of state power through the division of labour

[edit]

"One of the basic principles of the constitutional systems of the socialist countries, principally derived from the influence of Soviet constitutionalism, is the principle of the unity of state powers based on the assignment of all legislative and executive powers of state to its representative democratic body. This representative political organ is the supreme organ of state power and the only one able to create law and control the activities of all other state organs."

— Venezuelan academic Allan R. Brewer-Carías on the unity of state power and the integration of executive and legislative powers in communist states.[68]

However, with the 1936 constitution, Soviet ideologues began stressing the unified power of the SSOP as well as the need for a clear division of labour for state organs. This constitution granted the All-Union Supreme Soviet, the Soviet SSOP, a monopoly on legislative powers.[69] The official reason for this change was that the Soviet economy had become more complex and state organs needed, therefore, clearer boundaries. Despite this change, the constitution still stressed that the All-Union Supreme Soviet was the source of all state power, and all the powers of the state, formally speaking, emanated from it.[70] Meaning that the other central state organs remained inferior and subordinate to the All-Union Supreme Soviet and its permanent organ, the Presidium.[71] The division of labour, however, should not be confused with the separation of powers, which was still opposed.[72]

The division of labour meant that communist states created a system of clear demarcation of jurisdiction and an allocation of practical work between the different state organs. For example, Article 31 of the 1936 Soviet Constitution stated that the Soviet SSOP was vested with the exercise of all the rights of the Soviet state. However, it also clearly specifies that the All-Union Supreme Soviet could not interfere in the work of other state organs if they were specified in law.[73] It also meant that, for example, the supreme executive and administrative organ, could not interfere in the work of the supreme procuratorial organ.[74]

Coordination of the SSOP and the organs of the unified state apparatus

[edit]
Further information: Leading role of the party and Unified state apparatus
The politburo of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the ruling party of East Germany. The party is responsible for guiding the activities of the SSOP in communist states.

Formally, in accordance with unified power, the supreme state organ of power holds the unlimited powers of the state, and by extension, coordinates, controls and leads the work of the other state organs. However, the SSOP and the other state organs of the unified state apparatus also work under the guidance of the communist party, which according to Marxist−Leninist thought, acts as the vanguard party of the proletariat and the working masses in a communist state. Due to its position, it coordinates the work of the state organs within the unified state apparatus. It has two methods of doing it. Formally, it does so by controlling the SSOP and the lower-level state organs of power. Informally, it does so by colonising the state apparatus by creating party groups within it, which report to the highest organs of the communist party. This system evolved gradually and was formalised for the first time in communist history with the 1936 Soviet constitution.[75]

The communist party tries to actively involve itself in the decision-making process of the SSOP and other state organs. For example, according to Stalin, the SSOP did not make a single decision on questions of political and organisational importance without the communist party's involvement. He believed this system ensured the "highest expression" of the party's leading role in Soviet society.[76]

Soviet academics Mikhail Kirichenko and Andrey Denisov, in their book Soviet State Law, claimed, "The efficient and well-coordinated work of the Soviet state organs would be impossible without a single guiding and organizing force. This guiding force is the Communist Party and its militant headquarters, the Central Committee."[43] They stressed that this did not mean that the party replaced the state organs, but rather that they formed the leading group within these state organs. From their perspective, this was ensured by the party getting the most qualified party members to serve in key state positions. These members then lead the state organs in question and ensure that the state adopts and implements the party's guidance. However, they also stressed in the book that "every state organ is guided by the directives of the Party when planning its work."[43]

The party guides the state through internal congresses, conferences, central committee sessions, and meetings by the central leading organs of the party. At these conventions, the party figures discuss questions on state affairs and governance. Kirichenko and Denisov claim that this working method ensures that "the Party guides the work of the state organs without supplanting them."[43] The official intention is to ensure that the party guides the state, but does not supplant the state organs in the process. The decisions adopted by this convention are sent to the state organs for execution. The party's involvement does not stop there, as it also participates in controlling the implementation of the policy. To exemplify, Kirichenko and Denisov point to the joint decision of the Soviet permanent organ of the supreme state organ of power and the supreme executive and administrative organ on 25 June 1932 on legality. In that case, the party issued a separate directive to all party organisations, calling for all party members to assist the state in implementing the decision in question.[44]

Evolution

[edit]

Unity of deliberation and action, and the unified exercise of state power

[edit]

"In our country, the National People's Congress is the supreme state organ of power, which embodies the will of the people of the whole country and exercises national sovereignty on behalf of the people of the whole country. It is above other central organs, neither on an equal footing nor constrained by them. On the contrary, other central organs are organised by it, and must implement the laws and resolutions it makes, and are accountable to and supervised by it in the process of implementing laws and resolutions."

— Chinese academic Xu Chongde, who served as one of the key drafters of China's 1982 constitution.[77]

In Chinese political terminology, what other communist states called unified power has been commonly coined "the unity of deliberation and action". In other cases, it has been subsumed into the more general term, democratic centralism, which is directly stipulated in the constitution. Others, such as academic Wang Xu, contend that "the essence of democratic centralism is the unity of deliberation and action".[78] According to scholar Huang Guozheng, unified power combines centralisation with democracy, unlike the separation of powers, which is a combination of decentralisation and democracy.[79] When the SSOP and lower-level state organs (called the system of people's congress in China) implement unified policies, it is referred to as the "unified exercise of state power".[77]

Dong Biwu, a leading communist figure who served as president of the Supreme People's Court, surmised the Chinese approach to unified power as follows, "our system is unified in deliberation and action, and the organs exercising state power are the people's congresses at all levels and the people's governments at all levels that they produce."[77] Scholar Du Qiangqiang surmises the Chinese state system as follows: "In our country's state power allocation system, the National People's Congress [the Chinese SSOP] occupies a superior position as the supreme state organ of power, implementing unified exercise of state power on behalf of the people."[77]

Since the SSOP acts as the embodiment of the popular will, some scholars, such as Zhai Xiaobo, when writing on the Chinese SSOP, have concluded that the SSOP cannot act unconstitutionally. The reason is that the SSOP is entrusted with the state's unlimited power and stands above all other state organs; no other organs supervise it. Academic Huang Mingtao disagrees, noting that as the holder of unlimited state power, it cannot itself threaten the constitutional order it creates. Moreover, its powers are delegated by the people, and so the people have the right to call out unconstitutional acts, he opines.[80]

Upon presenting the draft constitution of the 1954 constitution, Liu Shaoqi, as the Vice Chairman of the People's Republic of China, stated, "The National People's Congress of our country exercises the highest state power in complete unity."[77] Researchers Zhang Mingshu and Tong Dezhi echoed the same line in 2022, "The organs of state power are the representative organs of the people, and their powers are supreme, unified and indivisible."[81] However, while the 1954 line remains more-or-less unchanged, the 1982 constitution did seek to give more emphasis on the division of labour and power deconcentration.[78]

However, the clarification of the division of labour did not reduce China's SSOP formal role, according to Peng Zhen, one of the drafters of the constitution and the chair of the permanent organ of the supreme state organ of power: "In our country power can and must be uniformly exercised by the people's congress: At the same time, under this premise, there is also a clear division of the state's executive, adjudicatorial power, procuratorial power, and leadership of the armed forces, so that the organs of state power and other state organs such as administrative, judicial, and procuratorial organs can work in a coordinated manner."[77]

Du Qiangqiang stresses that, unlike the separation of powers, the division of labour is not about establishing a balanced relationship between state institutions. For example, in classical separation of powers models, the constitution seeks to create a balance among executive, legislative, and judicial powers to promote stability and prevent the abuse of power. The division of labour principle refers to how the supreme state organ of power allocates powers among state organs. Meaning that the state organs elected by the SSOP are inferior to it, which stands in complete opposition to the principles of checks and balances.[77]

This is stressed til this day, for example by Xi Jinping, the sitting general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee: "We must adhere to and improve the system and principles of democratic centralism, promote all kinds of state organs to improve their capabilities and efficiency, enhance coordination and cooperation, form a strong joint force in governing the country, and effectively prevent the phenomenon of mutual constraints and serious internal friction."[78] By mutual constraints and serious internal friction, Xi indirectly criticised the separation of powers.[78]

State power is unified, delegated, coordinated, and controlled

[edit]

The Vietnamese unified power tradition stresses that state power emanates from the sovereign people and is delegated by them to the Vietnamese SSOP.[82] This is why, according to Vietnamese academic Nguyễn Anh Phương, Vietnam's constitution designates the SSOP, the National Assembly of Vietnam, as "the highest representative body of the People" and as the state's supreme state organ of power.[83] Because of the role granted to the SSOP and the lower-level state organs of power, the constitution makes clear that "The People shall exercise the state power in the form of direct democracy and of representative democracy through the National Assembly, People’s Councils and other state agencies."[83]

Nguyễn Văn Đáng, a party researcher, argues that unified power means that Vietnam does not practice the separation of powers as observed in Western liberal democracies. He further explains that in Vietnam, state organs operate based on the principle of division of labour, where each organ is assigned distinct functions and jurisdiction. However, these organs do not function independently; instead, they collaborate with one another, ensuring that each organ fulfills its role while also monitoring the activities of the others.[84]

Unlike the separation of powers model, Nguyễn Văn Đáng argues, state organs within a unified power framework coordinate and collaborate with one another. Rather than functioning as counterweights that restrict each other, they act as partners. This contrasts with the traditional separation of power model, he argues, where independent state branches maintain checks and balances over each other.[84]

Vietnamese legal theorist Nguyễn Anh Phương posits that the mechanisms of delegation, coordination, and control are established through several factors. First, power is delegated to the SSOP by the people. Second, the SSOP, by codifying a constitution and adopting laws, establishes the framework of delegation, coordination, and control of the other state organs. Third, there is a focus on the SSOP’s coordination and control over these state organs. Lastly, the process includes a balanced and effective examination and restraint of mutual power, carried out during the execution of specific tasks and powers as prescribed by law.[83] All this ensures that the disparate state organs, unlike in separation of powers system, work with the same end in mind, according "Although the three powers of the legislature, executive and judiciary have different functions, tasks and powers, they are all unified in the common political goal of building a state of rich people, strong country, democratic, fair and civilized society as our Party has pointed out."[85]

Historically, Vietnam had followed the traditional path drawn by the Soviets, in which utmost centralisation was seen as a public good. However, by the 1992 constitution, Vietnamese leaders had concluded unified power was not synonymous with centralisation.[86] Presently, several theorists claim that one has to create a balance between centralisation and decentralisation, while others, legal scholar Nguyễn Đăng Dung, contend that to build a socialist rule of law state, "the State that must be organized according to the principle of decentralisation of power".[86] This represents a radical departure from the path, as earlier decentralization was considered synonymous with the separation of powers. Another scholar, Lê Tuấn Huy, also argued for a socialist form of decentralisation, believing it to be a state mechanism that could be used to safeguard against arbitrariness and lawlessness.[86]

The current constitution of Vietnam declares it to be a "socialist state ruled by law and of the People, by the People and for the People." After a long national debate, a consensus has developed within Vietnam that "the rule of law state is not a type of state but a mode of organising the exercise of state power." A state type, from a Marxist–Leninist vantage point, is a state with a specific class character, such as socialist state, people's democratic state, and bourgeois state. A mode of organising means, in this instance, that it does not have a specific class character.[87]

Trần Đình Hoan, a member of the 9th Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), designated the rule of law as a "centralised manifestation of democracy".[87] Nguyễn Duy Quý, a member of the 8th CPV Central Committee, and Nguyễn Tất Viễn, a legal scholar, therefore defined the rule of law as follows: "a mode of exercising power, a way of organising democracy, a way of organising the state and society on a democratic basis. That means that the rule of law is associated with a democracy, although not a type of state defined according to the theory of socio-economic form, but cannot appear in a society without democracy".[87] As a result, the 13th National Congress of the CPV, held in 2021, emphasised the need to "more clearly define the roles, positions, functions, tasks, and powers of state organs in exercising legislative, executive, and judicial authority in accordance with the principles of the rule of law."[87]

Explanatory notes

[edit]
  1. ^ This designation, unified power, has been given different names across the communist world. Some of the most common designations are:
    • unity of power
    • unity of state power
    • unitary power
    • unified power
    • unified state power
    • state power is unified
    • unification of state power
    • unity of deliberation and action
    • unity of discussion and action
    • democratic centralism..

References

[edit]

Books

[edit]
  • Bihari, Otto (1970). Socialist Representative Institutions. Translated by Desényi, Józef; Móra, Imre. Akadémiai Kiadó.
  • Bihari, Otto (1979). The Constitutional Models of Socialist State Organization. Translated by Balás, Kornél. Akadémiai Kiadó. ISBN 963-05-2077-X.
  • Callinicos, Alex (2012). The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx. Haymarket Books. ISBN 9781608461653.
  • Chkhikvadze, Viktor Mikhailovich (1969). The Soviet State and Law. Progress Publishers.
  • Conquest, Robert (1968). The Soviet Political System. Frederick A. Praeger.
  • Denisov, Andrey; Kirichenko, Mikhail (1960). Soviet State Law. Foreign Languages Publishing House.
  • Dolgopolov, Yuri; Grigoryan, Leonid (1971). Fundamentals of Soviet State Laws. Progress Publishers.
  • Douds, Lara (2018). Inside Lenin's Government: Ideology, Power and Practice in the Early Soviet State. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 9781474286718.
  • Guins, George C. (1954). Soviet Law and Soviet Society. Martinus Nijhoff.
  • Levine, Andrew (1993). The General Will: Rousseau, Marx, Communism. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-44322-9.
  • Meyer, Alfred G. (1965). The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation. Random House.
  • Towster, Julian (1948). Political Power in the U.S.S.R.: 1917−1947. Oxford University Press.
  • Vanneman, Peter (1977). The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Political System. Duke University Press. ISBN 0-8223-0357-4.
  • Volgyes, Ivan (1986). Politics in Eastern Europe. University of Nebraska. ISBN 0-256-03144-4.

Book chapters

[edit]

Journal entries

[edit]

Web articles

[edit]

Footnotes

[edit]
  1. ^ Vanneman 1977, p. 42.
  2. ^ Vanneman 1977, p. 38.
  3. ^ Vanneman 1977, p. 44.
  4. ^ Levine 1993, p. 53; Xu & Zhang 2023.
  5. ^ Levine 1993, pp. 3–4.
  6. ^ Bihari 1970, p. 17.
  7. ^ Levine 1993, p. 53.
  8. ^ Đào 2014.
  9. ^ a b c Xu & Zhang 2023.
  10. ^ Bihari 1970, p. 63.
  11. ^ Bihari 1970, p. 64.
  12. ^ Bihari 1970, p. 65.
  13. ^ Bihari 1970, p. 66.
  14. ^ Bihari 1970, pp. 67–68.
  15. ^ Bihari 1970, p. 68.
  16. ^ Bihari 1970, pp. 68–69.
  17. ^ a b Bihari 1970, p. 70.
  18. ^ Bihari 1970, pp. 71–72.
  19. ^ Bihari 1970, p. 73.
  20. ^ Denisov & Kirichenko 1960, pp. 213–214.
  21. ^ a b Dolgopolov & Grigoryan 1971, p. 119.
  22. ^ Dolgopolov & Grigoryan 1971, pp. 237–238.
  23. ^ Bihari 1970, pp. 75–76; Vanneman 1977, p. 23.
  24. ^ Bihari 1970, p. 85.
  25. ^ Dolgopolov & Grigoryan 1971, p. 66.
  26. ^ Vanneman 1977, p. 23.
  27. ^ Bihari 1970, pp. 84–86.
  28. ^ Bihari 1970, pp. 85–86.
  29. ^ Bihari 1970, p. 91.
  30. ^ Dolgopolov & Grigoryan 1971, p. 62.
  31. ^ Guins 1954, p. 252.
  32. ^ Guins 1954, pp. 252–253.
  33. ^ Volgyes 1986, p. 172.
  34. ^ a b c d Bihari 1979, p. 159.
  35. ^ Meyer 1965, p. 274.
  36. ^ Vanneman 1977, pp. 278–279.
  37. ^ Meyer 1965, p. 34.
  38. ^ Guins 1954, pp. 36–39.
  39. ^ Guins 1954, p. 41.
  40. ^ Guins 1954, pp. 41–42.
  41. ^ Guins 1954, p. 43.
  42. ^ Vanneman 1977, p. 43.
  43. ^ a b c d Denisov & Kirichenko 1960, p. 205.
  44. ^ a b Denisov & Kirichenko 1960, p. 206.
  45. ^ Denisov & Kirichenko 1960, pp. 205–206.
  46. ^ Bui 2025, p. 4.
  47. ^ a b Bui 2025, p. 5.
  48. ^ Bui 2025, pp. 5–6.
  49. ^ Bui 2025, pp. 6–7.
  50. ^ a b c Zhang 2023.
  51. ^ Callinicos 2012, p. 191; Leipold 2020, p. 182.
  52. ^ a b Leipold 2020, p. 182.
  53. ^ Bihari 1970, pp. 61–63; Dolgopolov & Grigoryan 1971, p. 112; Bihari 1979, p. 159; Leipold 2020, p. 182.
  54. ^ a b c Bihari 1979, p. 160.
  55. ^ Douds 2018, p. 12.
  56. ^ Dolgopolov & Grigoryan 1971, p. 114; Bihari 1979, p. 160; Douds 2018, pp. 11−20.
  57. ^ Douds 2018, p. 17.
  58. ^ Dolgopolov & Grigoryan 1971, pp. 113–114.
  59. ^ Douds 2018, pp. 12−13.
  60. ^ Bihari 1970, p. 63; Bihari 1979, p. 161.
  61. ^ Bihari 1979, p. 161.
  62. ^ Macfarlane 2018, pp. 179−180.
  63. ^ Conquest 1968, p. 15.
  64. ^ Towster 1948, pp. 184−185.
  65. ^ a b Bihari 1979, p. 162.
  66. ^ Towster 1948, p. 212; Bihari 1979, p. 162.
  67. ^ Dolgopolov & Grigoryan 1971, p. 112.
  68. ^ Wise 2013, p. 479.
  69. ^ Towster 1948, pp. 185−186.
  70. ^ Towster 1948, p. 251.
  71. ^ Towster 1948, pp. 185−186 & 251; Little 1971, p. 57.
  72. ^ Guins 1954, p. 197.
  73. ^ Chkhikvadze 1969, p. 126.
  74. ^ Chkhikvadze 1969, p. 114.
  75. ^ Towster 1948, p. 119; Denisov & Kirichenko 1960, p. 207.
  76. ^ Towster 1948, pp. 119−120.
  77. ^ a b c d e f g Du 2019.
  78. ^ a b c d Wang 2020.
  79. ^ Huang 2013.
  80. ^ Huang 2019.
  81. ^ Zhang & Tong 2022.
  82. ^ Nguyễn 2019.
  83. ^ a b c Nguyễn 2024.
  84. ^ a b Hiền 2022.
  85. ^ Ðinh 2013.
  86. ^ a b c Hồ 2010.
  87. ^ a b c d Trương 2023.
Wikiquote has quotations related to Unified power.