Not really, the whole point is that Deflationism is a theory of truth, you need to get agreement to overturn a previous community decision - raise it at the Philosophy working group page and see what people think. ----SnowdedTALK18:32, 25 April 2013 (UTC)[reply]
The suggestion has been made that this proposal be converted to a subsection of Deflationary theory of truth. I have therefore moved the RfC to that talk page
As the sources and quotations in this article show, the term 'deflationism' has a wider meaning than simply its application to 'truth' and today is used in a sense more general than that. For that reason, a redirect to Deflationary theory of truth places too narrow an interpretation upon this term. Brews ohare (talk) 18:50, 25 April 2013 (UTC)[reply]
I'm not so sure of that. What seems like a wider meaning actually comes from truth being a part of all knowledge. So what seems like a wider meaning is still an application of the deflationary theory of truth, even though "deflationary theory of truth" appears to be referring only to the specific topic of truth. --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:01, 25 April 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Bob: You may have hit the nub of the matter here. I'm inclined to think two articles are needed because the cited authors refer to 'deflationism' and never to 'deflationary theory of truth', and in doing so appear to address ontology in general and the topic of existence quite generally. To me, 'truth' appears to be an aspect of some assertions (the Stanford article says "Truth and falsity are ascribed primarily to propositions"), and that does not seem to me to be the more general topic the cited authors are discussing. Brews ohare (talk) 19:48, 25 April 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded: I guess this loose talk about 'recycling' is a suggestion that this proposal has no merit. The other suggestion about 'redirection as a duplicate' has no links for me to look at to make a judgment. Can you provide some specifics about content, Snowded, that might suggest improvement of this proposal? Brews ohare (talk) 19:48, 25 April 2013 (UTC)[reply]
I'm opposed Brews so I'm not in favour of content here. Please don't do your normal thing of extended arguments with people who oppose you on a RfC, the idea is you leave people to comment ----SnowdedTALK19:50, 25 April 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Have you anything to advance beyond your personal pronouncements to shore up your opinion? Have you some suggestions, perhaps, that would make this proposal a more substantial contribution to WP? Brews ohare (talk) 23:50, 25 April 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Oppose I will agree that the term 'deflationism' has gained somewhat wider cachet than just referring to the (family of) deflationary theories of truth; but I think at most a section or paragraph in Deflationary_theory_of_truth mentioning other analogical uses of the term is warranted. It might be better if that article as it currently is (possibly with the additional short section) was renamed to simply 'Deflationism' to make it more neutral with regards the meaning of the term, but I haven't looked into how it came to be at its current title (And anyway that would be a separate discussion from this one. Cheers. BrideOfKripkenstein (talk) 13:31, 26 April 2013 (UTC)[reply]
In philosophy the term deflationism refers to views of ontology that demote questions of existence to pragmatic questions about the appropriate use of language, and opposes the view that there are 'deeper' philosophical issues buried in existence questions. A particular application of 'deflation' is to the concept of truth, the deflationary theory of truth, which asserts that the word 'truth' in an assertion like 'it is true that snow is white' is a useless appendage inasmuch as this sentence means exactly the same thing as the assertion 'snow is white'.[1] The 'deflationary theories of truth' are not about what 'truth' is; rather, they are theories of what we are saying when we make utterances like: ‘"Routledge editors are fine folks" is true.’[2]
Deflationism in the broader context of existence issues is often traced back to William James and Rudolf Carnap.[3] Carnap's view holds that ontology, like all metaphysics, is meaningless. Carnap argues that ontological sentences are trivial within a 'framework' and meaningless outside of it.[4] In this connection Thomasson says:
"But while the easy method yields answers to existence questions, it also deflates those questions so that there is nothing particularly deep or philosophical about them: they are to be answered simply by a combination of conceptual and empirical enquiry. While the conceptual work may be difficult and controversial, it is there (and not in making discoveries about what exists) that the real philosophical work lies. The result is a sort of Carnapian deflationism about existence claims: Existence claims must be made using a language, and (if they are to be meaningful and truth-evaluable) must involve using the meaningful terms of that language with their extant application conditions. Provided we approach existence questions using well-formed meaningful terms with application conditions, they are easy (internal) questions. Beyond that, the questions that remain are those of what language we should adopt—what terms, with what application conditions—and that, it seems, must be a pragmatic issue."[5]
— Amie L. Thomasson, The Easy Approach to Ontology
Two main claims are defended in this paper: first that typical disputes in the literature about the ontology of physical objects are merely verbal; second, that the proper way to resolve these disputes is by appealing to common sense or ordinary language.[7]
— Eli Hirsch, Physical-object ontology, verbal disputes and common sense
Hirsch holds that for any ontological position a language exists whose ontological vocabulary possesses such a meaning that the claims of this ontological position come out true in this language.[9][10] Hirsch's position is called a 'deflationary view' by Kriegel[10] and by Eklund:
I will focus on the deflationary conception of ontology. Specifically, I will be concerned with what form an acceptable deflationism about ontology might take. The most well-known and important form of deflationism about ontology has historically been associated with William James and Rudolf Carnap, and among its most important current proponents are Hilary Putnam and Eli Hirsch.[3]
— Matti Eklund, The Picture of Reality as an Amorphous Lump
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Stoljar, Daniel and Damnjanovic, Nic (Oct 4, 2010). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "The Deflationary Theory of Truth". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition). {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
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Amie L Thomasson. "The Easy Approach to Ontology". Retrieved 04-28-2013. The easy view also enables us to diagnose where others have gone wrong in thinking that there was something deeper, more difficult to do in the name of ontology.{{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help) To be published in Ontology after Carnap Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.)}}