Peace discourse in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

A 2023 pro-Israel march, with a sign blaming Hamas for the lack of peace.

A 2009 pro-Palestinian satirical cartoon regarding different interpretations of "peace".

Peace discourse in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the study of Israeli and Palestinian desires for "peace" and the underlying intentions of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. The peace narrative serves core strategic and ideological functions, including legitimacy, blame, and justification. Scholars have shown that references to peace often conceal or rationalize ongoing violence, shifting responsibility onto one party while reinforcing positive self-representations for the other.^[1]

Both sides frequently claim to have done everything they can to achieve peace, remaining dependant on the other side to match their commitment.^[2]

Meaning of peace

A sign connecting peace with justice.

A sign connecting peace with security.

Positive and negative peace

The term peace is used in different ways by supporters of Israel and supporters of Palestine. Supporters of Israel, particularly those on the right-wing, primarily advocate for a negative peace or oppressive peace, where peace means security for Israelis with continuing control over, oppression of, or subjugation of Palestinians. Supporters of Palestinians primarily advocate for a "just and lasting peace"; some pro-Palestinian actors have employed this language while avoiding substantive concessions, framing peace as achievable only through full Israeli withdrawal or restitution, placing the majority of the burden of change on Israel.^[3] This use of different definitions of the word peace by the two sides results in negotiators talking past each other.^[4]

Peace as justification for war

“Peace” language does not always reflect intent for reconciliation, but may serve to justify violence or deflect responsibility. For instance, during the 2014 Gaza War, Israeli officials reframed ceasefires as less desirable than continuing to fight in order to achieve “sustainable peace,” allowing ongoing military operations while claiming a peace-oriented stance.^[5] The use of peace rhetoric often supports what Dalia Gavriely-Nuri calls “Peace in the Service of War” (PSW), where peace becomes an integral part of Israeli just war rhetoric at the start of Israeli invasions, not specific to any particular leader or period of time. This strategy legitimizes such military actions as necessary for peace and national survival. On the Palestinian side, peace rhetoric can be used to frame resistance, or even acts of terrorism, as necessary steps toward liberation and eventual peace, and as justified responses to occupation couched in the language of justice-based peace.^[6] Use of the term peace in this way constructs a moral identity for the speaker, helping build a “positive self-image as a peace-seeker together with delegitimation of rivals”.^[7]

History

Since the 1948 Palestine war, political language around peace has been shaped by ongoing violence, territorial disputes, and the failed Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Israeli narratives have consistently framed peace as conditional on security, while Palestinians have framed peace as conditional on justice. This framing persisted throughout the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. In more recent decades, peace has become a discursive tool used in justifying preemptive or retaliatory warfare. Israeli Professor Dalia Gavriely-Nuri notes that Israeli leaders have used the word “peace” extensively in speeches preceding wars, for example, Menachem Begin referred to ‘peace’ 15 times but to ‘war’ only 2 times” in a 1982 speech preceding the 1982 Lebanon War. Palestinian peace discourse has also shifted over time, with the framing of peace as contingent on the realization of historical rights, emphasizing different elements over time, such as the right of return and recognition of statehood.^[8]

Media analyses

Media discourses reinforce these rhetorical frameworks. Mahmood and Alvi found that U.S. newspaper editorials often supported military action as a pathway to peace (see Just war theory), while Arab media like Al Jazeera depicted Israeli peace rhetoric as deceptive and colonial. Both media groups typically excluded acknowledgment of the other side’s positive actions.^[9] Peace discourse in US media often advocates "oppressive peace" or "negative peace".^[10]

In a January 2020 study of Twitter, Associate Professor Simon Goodman found that supporters of one side will reject peace by making the circular argument that the other side inherently does not want peace themselves. This argument is primarily made by supporters of Israel against Palestinians, casting peace as an offer previously extended by Israel and rejected by Palestinians in order to justify Israel continuing the conflict. While this circular logic is more frequently observed among pro-Israel users, pro-Palestinian voices have similarly dismissed Israeli peace initiatives as disingenuous or strategically manipulative, overlooking transgressions on their side.^[11]

Bibliography

Mahmood, Afia; Alvi, Dr. Urooj Fatima (2025-01-08). "The Echoes of Peace in Newspapers Editorials: A Corpus Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis of Israel Palestine Conflict". Dialogue Social Science Review (DSSR). 2 (4): 638–657. ISSN 3007-3154. Retrieved 2025-06-07.
Goodman, Simon; Tiripelli, Giuliana; Kambashi, Ngosa (2025). "Uses and Abuses of 'Not Wanting Peace' in the Context of the Israel/Palestine Conflict". Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology. 35 (1). doi:10.1002/casp.70016. ISSN 1052-9284. Retrieved 2025-06-07.
Sambaraju, Rahul; McVittie, Chris (2024-11-08). "'Well, our goal is to achieve sustainable quiet and security for our people': Negotiating calls for ceasefires in the Gaza war of 2014 in mainstream English news media by Israeli spokespersons". Journal of Social and Political Psychology. 12 (2): 247–264. doi:10.5964/jspp.14039. ISSN 2195-3325.
Sambaraju, Rahul; McVittie, Chris (2018-11-29). "Constructing Peace and Violence in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict". In Gibson, Stephen (ed.). Discourse, Peace, and Conflict: Discursive Psychology Perspectives. Springer. ISBN 978-3-319-99094-1. Retrieved 2025-06-07.
Gavriely-Nuri, Dalia (2014-01-02). "'TALKING PEACE – GOING TO WAR': Peace in the service of the Israeli just war rhetoric". Critical Discourse Studies. 11 (1): 1–18. doi:10.1080/17405904.2013.835979. ISSN 1740-5904. Retrieved 2025-06-07.
Gavriely-Nuri, Dalia (2010). "The idiosyncratic language of Israeli 'peace': A Cultural Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (CCDA)". Discourse & Society. 21 (5). Sage Publications, Ltd.: 565–585. doi:10.1177/0957926510375934. ISSN 0957-9265. JSTOR 42889695. Retrieved 2025-06-07.
Gavriely-Nuri, Dalia (2010b). "If both opponents "extend hands in peace" — Why don't they meet?: Mythic metaphors and cultural codes in the Israeli peace discourse". Journal of Language and Politics. 9 (3): 449–468. doi:10.1075/jlp.9.3.06gav. ISSN 1569-2159. Retrieved 2025-06-07.

References

^ Gavriely-Nuri 2010, p. 566: "…challenge two intuitive assumptions: first, that peace has a single, clear-cut and universal meaning; and second, that this meaning is, of necessity, a positive one. The main claim is that these presuppositions create the semantic vagueness surrounding the term peace, transforming it into a black box or, more precisely, into an attractive but empty box. This semantic void facilitates the loading of the concept with semantic, cultural and political cargoes that are sometimes bereft of the universally positive aura enveloping this concept. For example, as we will see, talking about peace within the Israeli peace discourse often serves as a fig leaf to hide or legitimate the initiation of military actions, including wars. Thus, when Israeli politicians talk about peace, they may paradoxically be participating in a Just War discourse. The need to examine the key role of the peace discourse and its lexicon is crucial when peace has not been achieved and peace negotiations have repeatedly failed."
^ Sambaraju & McVittie 2018, p. 111: “Netanyahu… constructs himself as having taking unprecedented steps towards peace by having ‘frozen the settlements’, but as unable to proceed further without moves on the Palestinian side to demonstrate that they are ‘ready’ for peace… Abbas… argues that the Palestinians remain committed to peace as envisaged in the Oslo Accords but that Israel fails to demonstrate a similar commitment... For each, then, it is the in-group who have done all that could reasonably be expected of them towards arriving at peace with further progress being dependant on the actions (or cessation of actions) of the other party.”
^ Sambaraju & McVittie 2018, p. 103-115: “Taking peace to comprise the absence of violence, the absence of direct violence is taken to constitute peace in a narrow sense, or negative peace, while the absence of structural violence is bound up with moves towards broader social justice, or positive peace. These distinctions, based upon categorisations of forms of violence on the one hand, and categorisations of forms of peace on the other, provide the basis for peace psychology’s search for a more differentiated understanding of types of peace and violence… Indeed, the form that peace should take is equally contested, involving either ‘a peace that Israel can defend’ or resolution of ‘all of the final status issues’ depending on the perspective adopted.
^ Sambaraju & McVittie 2018, p. 116: “There remains the question of what is to be, or indeed can be, done about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. One useful starting point would be to reconsider the use of talk of peace and violence in this context. If the term ‘peace’ is indeed nothing more than ‘an attractive but empty box’ (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010, p. 566), into which anyone can place and argue for what is to count as peace, then it can achieve little to retain this as the most desirable description of an outcome. Equally, where it becomes bound up with expectations (or lack of expectations) of international actors, then ‘peace’ potentially does little more than add layers of misunderstanding to existing complexities and to obscure what is at issue.”
^ Sambaraju & McVittie 2024, p. 247: "Findings show that the desirability of ceasefires and their negotiation is closely bound to the management of stake and interest by both media persons and Israeli spokespersons. The latter neither explicitly rejected nor accepted calls for ceasefires. Instead, they downgraded ceasefires in favour of other versions of cessation of conflict, framed as ‘sustainable peace’. This allowed for the non-acceptance of ceasefires while, paradoxically, justifying ongoing and further military actions in Gaza."
^ Gavriely-Nuri 2014, p. 7-8: “The current corpus includes six major speeches, arguably the most important speeches made by any Israeli PMs or ministers representing the Israeli government before or parallel to the initiation of new wars and major campaigns: the speeches made by PM Menachem Begin and Deputy Minister Dov Shilansky on 7 June 1982, the third day of the 1982 Lebanon War; the speech PM Ariel Sharon made on 29 March 2002 and that of Minister without Portfolio Danny Naveh on 4 April 2002, at the onset of Mivtza Chomat Magen, 2002; the speech delivered by PM Ehud Olmert on 17 July 2006, at the beginning of the 2006 Second Lebanon War; the speech by Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Tzipi Livni, made on 29 December 2008. The corpus encompasses war speeches covering almost three decades. It shows that the main phenomenon discussed here, the PSW discourse, is neither typical of nor unique to any specific leader or period of time. Rather, the PSW discourse is a major resource within the fund of Israel’s discursive capital, integral to its just war rhetoric.”
^ Gavriely-Nuri 2010, p. 565: "Application of the CCDA to Israel’s political peace discourse revealed that use of the term in this discourse served two purposes: first, the construction of the Israeli speaker’s positive self-image as a peace-seeker together with delegitimation of rivals; and second, the facilitation of public acceptance of strategically problematic actions, primarily use of military violence, by their presentation as part of the peace discourse."
^ Gavriely-Nuri 2014, p. 1: "In all these speeches, leaders use the word ‘peace’ much more often than they use the word ‘war’: in his speech prior to the 1982 Lebanon War, Prime Minister (PM) Menachem Begin referred to ‘peace’ 15 times but to ‘war’ only 2 times; in his address made before announcing Operation Chomat Magen in 2002 (the largest military operation initiated by Israel since 1982), Minister without Portfolio Danny Naveh, who represented the government in the Knesset (Israel’s parliament), mentioned the word ‘peace’ 17 times and the word ‘war’ only 3 times; Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni continued this trend in a speech delivered at the beginning of the 2008 Gaza War, during which she cited ‘peace’ 10 times and ‘war’ only 4 times. On 17 July 2006, in a pivotal sentence during his speech at the opening of the Second Lebanon War, PM Ehud Olmert said: ‘There is nothing we want more than peace and good neighborly relations – in the east, north and south. We seek peace, we pursue peace and we yearn for peace.’ It should therefore come as no surprise that the official name of the 1982 (or First) Lebanon War, declared by the Israeli government on 6 June, was ‘Peace for the Galilee’."
^ Mahmood & Alvi 2025, p. 638: "The US news editorials advocate that violent means are a legitimate pathway for a peaceful reconciliation. Hamas actions have been overwhelmingly criticised and it has been portrayed as criminal. In Al Jazeera the Israeli government is depicted as aggressive, deceitful, and colonial. Both the newspapers editorials do not mention any positive actions of the "other" group and highlight only the negative ones."
^ Mahmood & Alvi 2025, p. 654-655: "Findings reveal that most of peace discourse in the selected news editorials is oppressive peace discourse which is not paving a way towards conflict resolution and peace negotiations. The peace discourse analysed here is mostly negative focusing on stable, lasting, future, and secure peace with no intention of cease-fire, focusing on the unilateral benefits, and using abstract instead of concrete language to show interest in conflict resolution and commitment to peace."
^ Goodman, Tiripelli & Kambashi 2025, p. 12-13: "…Palestinians and, to a lesser extent, Israelis, can be presented as too hateful to want or allow peace and are therefore not people that peace can be sought with… The next logical step following this is that because of the Palestinians' lack of desire for peace, that attempts at making peace with them are futile and dangerous to Israel, and by extension Jewish people. In this argument, any attempts at making peace by (peace-wanting) Israel will be exploited by (peace-hating) Palestine. This provides the justification for opposing peace with Palestinians and allows supporters of Israel to oppose peace while attributing the responsibility for not wanting peace with the Palestinian out group. Because Palestinians are presented as immorally inclined towards violence and exploiting any peace offer that they may be made, the next logical step is that peace comes to be presented as something for Israel (not Palestine) to dictate, with Palestine bearing the responsibility for accepting (or rejecting) peace offers that are made. There is a clearly identifiable narrative that Israel has made multiple peace offers that have all been turned down (e.g., extract nine). This further strengthens the distinction that is made between the two groups and enforces the peace wanting (Israel) and peace hating (Palestine) distinction so prevalent in the data. It also makes for a somewhat circular argument on the lines of ‘they (Palestinians) do not want peace, therefore we (Israel) do not want peace with them’ as a way of criticising the outgroup and managing the requirement to be in favour of peace, while simultaneously arguing against it. All of these identified strategies are examples of peace in the service of war (Gavriely-Nuri 2014)"

[FOOTNOTEGavriely-Nuri2010566-1] Gavriely-Nuri 2010, p. 566: "…challenge two intuitive assumptions: first, that peace has a single, clear-cut and universal meaning; and second, that this meaning is, of necessity, a positive one. The main claim is that these presuppositions create the semantic vagueness surrounding the term peace, transforming it into a black box or, more precisely, into an attractive but empty box. This semantic void facilitates the loading of the concept with semantic, cultural and political cargoes that are sometimes bereft of the universally positive aura enveloping this concept. For example, as we will see, talking about peace within the Israeli peace discourse often serves as a fig leaf to hide or legitimate the initiation of military actions, including wars. Thus, when Israeli politicians talk about peace, they may paradoxically be participating in a Just War discourse. The need to examine the key role of the peace discourse and its lexicon is crucial when peace has not been achieved and peace negotiations have repeatedly failed."

[FOOTNOTESambarajuMcVittie2018111-2] Sambaraju & McVittie 2018, p. 111: “Netanyahu… constructs himself as having taking unprecedented steps towards peace by having ‘frozen the settlements’, but as unable to proceed further without moves on the Palestinian side to demonstrate that they are ‘ready’ for peace… Abbas… argues that the Palestinians remain committed to peace as envisaged in the Oslo Accords but that Israel fails to demonstrate a similar commitment... For each, then, it is the in-group who have done all that could reasonably be expected of them towards arriving at peace with further progress being dependant on the actions (or cessation of actions) of the other party.”

[FOOTNOTESambarajuMcVittie2018103-115-3] Sambaraju & McVittie 2018, p. 103-115: “Taking peace to comprise the absence of violence, the absence of direct violence is taken to constitute peace in a narrow sense, or negative peace, while the absence of structural violence is bound up with moves towards broader social justice, or positive peace. These distinctions, based upon categorisations of forms of violence on the one hand, and categorisations of forms of peace on the other, provide the basis for peace psychology’s search for a more differentiated understanding of types of peace and violence… Indeed, the form that peace should take is equally contested, involving either ‘a peace that Israel can defend’ or resolution of ‘all of the final status issues’ depending on the perspective adopted.

[FOOTNOTESambarajuMcVittie2018116-4] Sambaraju & McVittie 2018, p. 116: “There remains the question of what is to be, or indeed can be, done about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. One useful starting point would be to reconsider the use of talk of peace and violence in this context. If the term ‘peace’ is indeed nothing more than ‘an attractive but empty box’ (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010, p. 566), into which anyone can place and argue for what is to count as peace, then it can achieve little to retain this as the most desirable description of an outcome. Equally, where it becomes bound up with expectations (or lack of expectations) of international actors, then ‘peace’ potentially does little more than add layers of misunderstanding to existing complexities and to obscure what is at issue.”

[FOOTNOTESambarajuMcVittie2024247-5] Sambaraju & McVittie 2024, p. 247: "Findings show that the desirability of ceasefires and their negotiation is closely bound to the management of stake and interest by both media persons and Israeli spokespersons. The latter neither explicitly rejected nor accepted calls for ceasefires. Instead, they downgraded ceasefires in favour of other versions of cessation of conflict, framed as ‘sustainable peace’. This allowed for the non-acceptance of ceasefires while, paradoxically, justifying ongoing and further military actions in Gaza."

[FOOTNOTEGavriely-Nuri20147-8-6] Gavriely-Nuri 2014, p. 7-8: “The current corpus includes six major speeches, arguably the most important speeches made by any Israeli PMs or ministers representing the Israeli government before or parallel to the initiation of new wars and major campaigns: the speeches made by PM Menachem Begin and Deputy Minister Dov Shilansky on 7 June 1982, the third day of the 1982 Lebanon War; the speech PM Ariel Sharon made on 29 March 2002 and that of Minister without Portfolio Danny Naveh on 4 April 2002, at the onset of Mivtza Chomat Magen, 2002; the speech delivered by PM Ehud Olmert on 17 July 2006, at the beginning of the 2006 Second Lebanon War; the speech by Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Tzipi Livni, made on 29 December 2008. The corpus encompasses war speeches covering almost three decades. It shows that the main phenomenon discussed here, the PSW discourse, is neither typical of nor unique to any specific leader or period of time. Rather, the PSW discourse is a major resource within the fund of Israel’s discursive capital, integral to its just war rhetoric.”

[FOOTNOTEGavriely-Nuri2010565-7] Gavriely-Nuri 2010, p. 565: "Application of the CCDA to Israel’s political peace discourse revealed that use of the term in this discourse served two purposes: first, the construction of the Israeli speaker’s positive self-image as a peace-seeker together with delegitimation of rivals; and second, the facilitation of public acceptance of strategically problematic actions, primarily use of military violence, by their presentation as part of the peace discourse."

[FOOTNOTEGavriely-Nuri20141-8] Gavriely-Nuri 2014, p. 1: "In all these speeches, leaders use the word ‘peace’ much more often than they use the word ‘war’: in his speech prior to the 1982 Lebanon War, Prime Minister (PM) Menachem Begin referred to ‘peace’ 15 times but to ‘war’ only 2 times; in his address made before announcing Operation Chomat Magen in 2002 (the largest military operation initiated by Israel since 1982), Minister without Portfolio Danny Naveh, who represented the government in the Knesset (Israel’s parliament), mentioned the word ‘peace’ 17 times and the word ‘war’ only 3 times; Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni continued this trend in a speech delivered at the beginning of the 2008 Gaza War, during which she cited ‘peace’ 10 times and ‘war’ only 4 times. On 17 July 2006, in a pivotal sentence during his speech at the opening of the Second Lebanon War, PM Ehud Olmert said: ‘There is nothing we want more than peace and good neighborly relations – in the east, north and south. We seek peace, we pursue peace and we yearn for peace.’ It should therefore come as no surprise that the official name of the 1982 (or First) Lebanon War, declared by the Israeli government on 6 June, was ‘Peace for the Galilee’."

[FOOTNOTEMahmoodAlvi2025638-9] Mahmood & Alvi 2025, p. 638: "The US news editorials advocate that violent means are a legitimate pathway for a peaceful reconciliation. Hamas actions have been overwhelmingly criticised and it has been portrayed as criminal. In Al Jazeera the Israeli government is depicted as aggressive, deceitful, and colonial. Both the newspapers editorials do not mention any positive actions of the "other" group and highlight only the negative ones."

[FOOTNOTEMahmoodAlvi2025654-655-10] Mahmood & Alvi 2025, p. 654-655: "Findings reveal that most of peace discourse in the selected news editorials is oppressive peace discourse which is not paving a way towards conflict resolution and peace negotiations. The peace discourse analysed here is mostly negative focusing on stable, lasting, future, and secure peace with no intention of cease-fire, focusing on the unilateral benefits, and using abstract instead of concrete language to show interest in conflict resolution and commitment to peace."

[FOOTNOTEGoodmanTiripelliKambashi202512-13-11] Goodman, Tiripelli & Kambashi 2025, p. 12-13: "…Palestinians and, to a lesser extent, Israelis, can be presented as too hateful to want or allow peace and are therefore not people that peace can be sought with… The next logical step following this is that because of the Palestinians' lack of desire for peace, that attempts at making peace with them are futile and dangerous to Israel, and by extension Jewish people. In this argument, any attempts at making peace by (peace-wanting) Israel will be exploited by (peace-hating) Palestine. This provides the justification for opposing peace with Palestinians and allows supporters of Israel to oppose peace while attributing the responsibility for not wanting peace with the Palestinian out group. Because Palestinians are presented as immorally inclined towards violence and exploiting any peace offer that they may be made, the next logical step is that peace comes to be presented as something for Israel (not Palestine) to dictate, with Palestine bearing the responsibility for accepting (or rejecting) peace offers that are made. There is a clearly identifiable narrative that Israel has made multiple peace offers that have all been turned down (e.g., extract nine). This further strengthens the distinction that is made between the two groups and enforces the peace wanting (Israel) and peace hating (Palestine) distinction so prevalent in the data. It also makes for a somewhat circular argument on the lines of ‘they (Palestinians) do not want peace, therefore we (Israel) do not want peace with them’ as a way of criticising the outgroup and managing the requirement to be in favour of peace, while simultaneously arguing against it. All of these identified strategies are examples of peace in the service of war (Gavriely-Nuri 2014)"

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