Hungary under the Orbán regime

Viktor Orbán
Orbán in 2019
Orbán regime
Second premiership of Viktor Orbán

29 May 2010 – present
President
CabinetSecond Orbán Government
Third Orbán Government
Fourth Orbán Government
Fifth Orbán Government
PartyFidesz
Election2010 · 2014 · 2018 · 2022
SeatCarmelite Monastery of Buda

Official website

The Orbán regime (Hungarian: Orbán-rendszer), also known as Orbán era (Hungarian: Orbán-korszak), or the System of National Cooperation (Hungarian: Nemzeti Együttműködés Rendszere) refers to the period of governance in Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, leader of the Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance party, beginning with his return to power in 2010. Since then, Hungary has undergone major constitutional, political, and institutional changes that have led many observers to describe it as an "illiberal democracy" or a hybrid regime blending formal democratic processes with authoritarian practices.[1][2]

Background

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Viktor Orbán first served as Hungary's Prime Minister between 1998 and 2002, and returned to office in 2010 after a landslide victory by his party, Fidesz, which, formally in coalition with the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), secured a supermajority in the National Assembly.[3] This supermajority allowed Orbán's government to amend or replace key laws, restructure institutions, and redefine Hungary's political and economic framework.

In July 2014, Orbán declared that Hungary was building an "illiberal state", inspired by countries such as Turkey and Russia, arguing that liberal democracy had failed to protect national sovereignty and Christian identity.

Ideology and political model

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The Orbán regime defines itself as a form of national conservatism and Christian democracy, rejecting liberalism and promoting Hungarian sovereignty. Orbán and his supporters describe it as a "Christian democratic alternative" to Western liberalism.[4]

Scholars commonly refer to it as competitive authoritarianism or electoral autocracy, where democratic institutions formally exist but are subverted to maintain power.[5]

The regime emphasises:

Constitutional and institutional reforms

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Following the 2010 election, Fidesz adopted a new constitution, which entered into force on 1 January 2012.[7] The reform restructured Hungary's state institutions:

The European Parliament and international watchdogs have stated that these changes weakened checks and balances and concentrated power in the executive.[11]

Media and civil society

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Hungary's media landscape has become increasingly concentrated. Pro-government businessmen acquired most private outlets, later merging into the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA) in 2018.[12] Independent outlets and NGOs report censorship, advertising boycotts, and political pressure.[13]

The government also passed a "Transparency Law" in 2017 requiring foreign-funded NGOs to register as "foreign-supported," drawing comparisons to Russian foreign agent law. The Central European University relocated from Budapest to Vienna in 2019 after legal restrictions made its operation in Hungary impossible.[14]

Domestic policy

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The Orbán government promotes an economic strategy known as Orbanomics, combining selective state intervention, tax cuts, and nationalist rhetoric. The key measures include a flat income tax and nationalisation of private pension funds, price controls on utilities and state oversight of key industries, extensive family policy, such as tax exemptions and loans to encourage childbirth and the controversial "slave law" of 2018, allowing up to 400 hours of annual overtime.[15]

Supporters credit these policies for low unemployment and relative stability; critics argue they entrench clientelism and reward political loyalty.[16]

Foreign policy and EU relations

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Hungary remains a member of the European Union and NATO, but Orbán has pursued a sovereigntist and Eurosceptic foreign policy.[17] His government frequently clashes with the EU over judicial independence, migration, and LGBTQ+ rights.

Budapest's relations with Brussels have been strained by the suspension of billions in EU funds under the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism.[18] At the same time, Orbán has deepened economic ties with China and Russia, including Chinese investment in battery and electric vehicle plants and the Budapest–Belgrade railway.[19]

During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Hungary condemned the attack but opposed energy sanctions and arms transfers, citing national interests.[20]

Leadership

[edit]
No. Portrait Name
(Birth–Death)
Term of office Party
Took office Left office Tenure
1 Viktor Orbán
(born 1963)
29 May 2010 Incumbent 15 years, 184 days Fidesz
No. Portrait Name
(Birth–Death)
Term of office Party
Took office Left office Tenure
1 László Sólyom
(1942–2023)
29 May 2010
[a]
5 August 2010 68 days Independent
2 Pál Schmitt
(born 1942)
6 August 2010 2 April 2012 1 year, 240 days Fidesz
László Kövér
(born 1959)
acting
26 February 2024 5 March 2024 8 days Fidesz
3 János Áder
(born 1959)
10 May 2012 10 May 2022 10 years, 0 days Fidesz
4 Katalin Novák
(born 1977)
10 May 2022 26 February 2024 1 year, 292 days Fidesz
László Kövér
(born 1959)
acting
26 February 2024 5 March 2024 8 days Fidesz
5 Tamás Sulyok
(born 1956)
5 March 2024 Incumbent 1 year, 269 days Independent

Other senior officials

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Portrait Name
(Birth–Death)
Position(s) Party
Antal Rogán
(born 1972)
  • Minister of the Prime Minister's Cabinet Office (2015–)
  • Leader of the Fidesz parliamentary group (2012–2015)
Fidesz
Gergely Gulyás
(born 1981)
  • Minister of the Prime Minister's Office (2018–)
Fidesz
Zsolt Semjén
(born 1962)
KDNP
János Lázár
(born 1975)
  • Minister of Construction and Transport (2022–)
  • Minister of the Prime Minister's Office (2014–2018)
  • Leader of the Fidesz parliamentary group (2010–2012)
Fidesz
Tibor Navracsics
(born 1966)
Fidesz

KDNP

Cabinets

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Cabinet Head
(Prime Minister)
Deputy head(s) Term of office Party(s) Parliamentary
support
Formed Dissolved Tenure
Government of National Cooperation Viktor Orbán Zsolt Semjén
Tibor Navracsics
29 May
2010
6 June
2014
4 years, 8 days Fidesz
KDNP
Supermajority
Third Orbán Government Zsolt Semjén
6 June
2014
18 May
2018
3 years, 346 days
Fourth Orbán Government Zsolt Semjén
Mihály Varga
Sándor Pintér
18 May
2018
24 May
2022
4 years, 6 days
Fifth Orbán Government Zsolt Semjén
24 May
2022
Inbumbent 3 years, 189 days

Criticism and assessments

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International organisations, including Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders, and the European Parliament, have cited Hungary for democratic backsliding and media capture.[21][22]

Critics of the Orbán regime argue that Hungary has experienced a systemic decline in democratic standards and institutional integrity since 2010. Independent observers and international watchdogs have documented the erosion of judicial independence, as court appointments and administrative oversight increasingly fall under political control, limiting checks on executive authority. The government's capture of media and business sectors has also drawn concern, with a vast network of pro-government outlets and loyal business elites dominating public discourse and the economy. Furthermore, analysts note manipulation of electoral rules and campaign resources, including redistricting and the use of state media for partisan advantage, which have contributed to the entrenchment of Fidesz's political dominance. Widespread allegations of corruption and nepotism point to the concentration of public contracts and European Union funds among allies of the ruling party, reinforcing what Transparency International and the European Parliament describe as "state capture." In addition, the Orbán government has been accused of restricting academic freedom and minority rights, including legislative measures targeting universities, NGOs, and the LGBTQ+ community, which critics view as undermining pluralism and human rights protections in Hungary.[23]

Supporters argue that Orbán's policies reflect democratic will, uphold Christian values, and restore order after decades of liberal mismanagement.[24]

Legacy and influence

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The Orbán regime has influenced right-wing populist movements across Europe and the United States, often cited as a prototype of "illiberal democracy."[25]

As of 2025, Orbán remains in power following four consecutive supermajority victories (2010, 2014, 2018, 2022). Despite economic challenges and tensions with the EU, his control over Hungary's institutions and political narrative remains strong.[26]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ Assumed office on 5 August 2005

References

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  1. ^ Nations in Transit 2024: Hungary Country Report (Report). Freedom House. 2024.
  2. ^ "How Viktor Orbán Wins". Journal of Democracy. 2023.
  3. ^ "Hungary Election: Orbán Wins Fourth Term in Power". BBC News. 3 April 2022.
  4. ^ "Orbán's Christian Democracy vs. Liberal Europe". Politico Europe. 2021.
  5. ^ Levitsky, Steven; Way, Lucan (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge University Press.
  6. ^ "Illiberal Democracy in Hungary". CIDOB. 2023.
  7. ^ "Fundamental Law of Hungary". Országgyűlés. Retrieved 2025-11-10.
  8. ^ Rule of Law in Hungary (PDF) (Report). European Parliament. 2022.
  9. ^ "The Man with Viktor Orbán in His Sights". CEPA. 2023.
  10. ^ "Systematic Backsliding of the Rule of Law in Hungary". Netherlands Helsinki Committee. 2022.
  11. ^ "Hungary: Rule-of-Law Erosion Continues". Human Rights Watch. 2024.
  12. ^ "The rise of KESMA: How Orbán's allies bought up Hungary's media". International Press Institute. 2024.
  13. ^ "How Hungary's Orbán Uses Media Control". AP News. 2024.
  14. ^ "CEU Relocates to Vienna" (Press release). Central European University. 2019.
  15. ^ "Hungary's 'Slave Law' Triggers Protests". BBC News. 17 December 2018.
  16. ^ "Orban and the Economy: A Tool for Staying in Power". V-Square. 2024.
  17. ^ "Hungary Country Report 2024". Bertelsmann Transformation Index. 2024. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |url= (help)
  18. ^ "European Commission Freezes EU Funds to Hungary". European Commission. 2024. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |url= (help)
  19. ^ "China's investment push in Europe hits a wall". Financial Times. 2025.
  20. ^ "Orbán's Rebellion Against Europe Gains Momentum". Carnegie Europe. 2024.
  21. ^ Freedom in the World 2024: Hungary (Report). Freedom House. 2024.
  22. ^ World Press Freedom Index 2024 (Report). RSF. 2024.
  23. ^ Freedom in the World 2024: Hungary (Report). Freedom House. 2024.
  24. ^ "Family Protection Action Plan". Government of Hungary. 2020. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |url= (help)
  25. ^ "The Orbánisation of Europe". ECFR. 2024. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |url= (help)
  26. ^ "Inside Viktor Orbán's Worst Political Crisis Yet". New Eastern Europe. 2025.

Sources

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  • Bozóki, András; Hegedűs, Dániel (2020). "An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union". Democratization. 27 (6): 1014–1033. doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1744838.
  • Bátory, Ágnes (2016). "Populists in government? Hungary's 'System of National Cooperation'". Democratization. 23 (2): 283–303. doi:10.1080/13510347.2015.1076214.
  • Enyedi, Zsolt (2020). "Right-wing authoritarian innovations in Central and Eastern Europe". East European Politics. 36 (3): 363–377. doi:10.1080/21599165.2020.1787162.
  • Magyar, Bálint (2016). Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary. Budapest: CEU Press.
  • Lendvai, Paul (2019). Orbán: Europe's New Strongman. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0190075927.
  • Grzymała-Busse, Anna (2019). "How Populists Rule: The Consequences for Democratic Governance". Polity. 51 (4): 707–717. doi:10.1086/705573.
  • Scheiring, Gábor (2020). The Retreat of Liberal Democracy: Authoritarian Capitalism and the Accumulative State in Hungary. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Krekó, Péter; Enyedi, Zsolt (2022). "Orbán's Laboratory of Illiberalism". Journal of Democracy. 33 (3): 45–59. doi:10.1353/jod.2022.0043.
  • Sitter, Nick; Bakke, Elisabeth (2019). "Democratic Backsliding in the European Union: The Role of Hungary and Poland". Perspectives on Politics. 17 (2): 309–323. doi:10.1017/S1537592718003371.