Draft:Potential dangers (military-industrial complex)

  1. Home
  2. Wiki

Potential dangers

[edit]

Whether or not there is a specific thing that can be accurately described as a military-industrial complex is controversial.[1]: 25 [2]: 54 [better source needed][3][4]: 357  However, such an entity would be a direct threat to liberty and thus the possibility has received significant attention.[5]: 18 [6]: 173–176  Numerous specific dangers could arise from a military-industrial complex.

According to Linda Weiss, the U.S. is unique in lacking an industrial policy designed to favor its arms industry.[7]: x  The U.S. is also unique in allowing the armed services to do their own procurement.[8]: 10  The concept of a military-industrial complex is likewise unique to the United States, or at least use of the term with reference to other countries entails significant ambiguity as to the meaning.[9]: 4 

Excessive spending

[edit]
Further information: Military budget of the United States

High levels of military spending may be evidence for the existence of a military-industrial complex,[10]: 187 [11]: 190–191  since it is an interest shared by all parties to the complex.[10]: 187  Concerns over the economic burden of defense feature prominently in American declinism.[7]: 3 

A military-industrial complex uses resources that could instead go towards economically useful products, posing an opportunity cost.[12]: viii  The Soviet Union was an example of this danger where Alexei Kosygin said that underdevelopment of the consumer sector was caused in part by high spending on defense. Andrei Grechko, on the other hand, said that an even larger share of resources should have been devoted to the Soviet military.[13]: 106  Disagreements over the proper level of military spending sometimes escalate into conflicts where patriotism is pitted against fiscal prudence. Those who suggest that a weapons system is not needed may be painted as traitors. During the Cold War, calls for balance and moderation in the United States were often dismissed as being soft on communism.[10]: 40–41 

A high budget deficit during the early 1990s was partially caused by the combination of high defense spending and tax cuts championed by President Ronald Reagan.[14]: 4  These negative economic effects were foreseen at the beginning of the Reagan administration when it was already clear that the economic stimulus provided by peacetime defense spending was outweighed by opportunity costs.[15]: 160 

Conflicts of interest

[edit]

A continuing community of interests between the military and industry creates the potential for an old boy network in control of weapons procurement that threatens the public interest.[16]: 256–257  This may involve a revolving door dynamic were personnel frequently change their employment between government and private industry, thus making their allegiance unclear.[6]: 179 

The benefits of a standing army are distributed unevenly, and so throughout the history of the US, support has varied by region. For example, naval expansion was supported by Northeasterners to further their interests in commercial shipping during the early 1800s. Coastal Southerners also supported naval spending, but those further inland preferred internal improvements such as canals, railways, and roads. Support for naval expansion became more widespread during the 1840s and 1850s with the rise of Manifest Destiny with special interest in the South.[17]: 11–12 

Similarly, the Interstate Highway System was built with federal money partially for national defense, but disproportionately benefited automobile manufacturers, highway contractors, real-estate developers, and highway officials.[18]: 133, 145 

Erosion of democracy

[edit]

The United States Government was designed to avoid tyranny by containing a variety of countervailing forces that check and balance one another. However, concern arose during the Vietnam War that certain segments of society were coming together to dictate national policy. These segments included corporations, military officers, civilian bureaucrats, labor leaders, and scientists.[19]: 1  The Founding Fathers were specifically concerned about militarism, with George Mason saying “once a standing army is established in any country, the people lose their liberty”.[5]: 18  A military-industrial complex would be inherently anti-democratic because it would challenge civilian control of the military. Eisenhower worried that some officers embraced, and even sought out, alliances with industry and Congress.[10]: 40  Political-military decisions could be unduly influenced by jobs and profits and public policy could become captive to a scientific-technological elite.[20]: 15, 20 

A military-industrial complex would be a self-perpetuating system that reinforces its own growth while acting as a force of repression both at home and abroad.[12]: vii [21]: 3  Special interest groups that occupy positions of power within the state could be mutually supporting and together wield more power on matters of defense than any countervailing coalition. These groups could either fool themselves into believing that they are furthering the public good or may deliberately deceive the public to further their own interests.[8]: 5 

A military-industrial complex isn't the only sort of militarism with the potential to erode democracy. The Soviet Union[22]: 255–256 [23]: 1-6 [24]: 130-131 , Nazi Germany[25]: 76 , and the Empire of Japan[6]: 172  each had militarist authoritarian governments in the absence of a military-industrial complex.

Escalation spiral

[edit]

An escalating spiral of tensions is predicted by military-industrial complex theories. The electorate is expected to become increasingly militant and chauvinistic due to rhetoric emanating from business and military leaders. High levels of arms procurement combined with a belligerent public are then predicted to feed an international arms race.[26]: 199 [12]: vii 

Military-industrial complex theories further predict that congressman are pressured to vote for high levels of defense spending and aggressive foreign policies.[26]: 199  However, no correlation was found between defense spending and defense policy voting by Senators during the 1965-1967 period.[26]: 219 

Fomenting war

[edit]

The arms industry may actively encourage strife, lobby against peace and disarmament, and stir up international suspicions.[27]: 94  One strategy that the U.S. has embraced for maintaining its defense industrial base without direct subsidies has been to encourage the export of weapons.[28]: 7, 11  This has led to large flows of US-made arms into volatile regions such as the Middle East.[14]: 61  Nations with large stores of arms may be inclined to use them, and the stores themselves may cause friction with neighbors. This danger was noted by Immanuel Kant in Perpetual Peace.[6]: 174 

Further distortions

[edit]
  • A military-industrial complex may generally distort the intended representative and democratic nature of the U.S. political system.[12]: vii 
  • High defense spending could give the DoD excessive control over domestic industries.[12]: vii 
  • Technological determinism may arise where competition between weapons systems drives relentless development of new weapons, not because they are needed, but because they are possible.[10]: 32–33 
  • Military funding of academia may distort academic thought.[21]: 4 
  • A self-perpetuating military-industrial complex would serve as an obstacle to arms control.[1]: 25 

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b Wolf, Charles (1972). "Military Industrial Simplicities, Complexities and Realities". In Sarkesian, Sam (ed.). The Military-Industrial Complex: A Reassessment. Sage Publications, Inc. pp. 25–52. ISBN 0-8039-0134-8.
  2. ^ Pilisuk, Marc; Hayden, Thomas (1972). "Chapter 3: Is There a Military-Industrial Complex?". In Pursell, Carroll (ed.). The Military-Industrial Complex. Harper & Rowe. pp. 51–80. SBN 06-045296-X.
  3. ^ Goodwin, Jacob (1985). Brotherhood of Arms. Times Books. p. 320. ISBN 0-8129-1151-2. Since that night in 1961 commentators, journalists, and the general public have come to believe in a nefarious network of greedy, influence-peddling arms manufacturers, incompetent and tradition-bound military officers, self-serving political appointees in the Pentagon, and corruptible members of Congress. Actually the conception of a venal military-industrial complex is largely a myth.
  4. ^ Brandes, Stuart (1997). Warhogs: A History of War Profits in America (PDF). University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 0-8131-2020-9.
  5. ^ a b Nelson, Keith (1972). "Chapter 1: The Warfare State: History of a Concept". In Pursell, Carroll (ed.). The Military-Industrial Complex. Harper & Rowe. pp. 15–30. SBN 06-045296-X.
  6. ^ a b c d Molander, Earl (1977). "Chapter 12: Historical Antecedents of Military-Industrial Criticism". In Cooling, Benjamin (ed.). War, Business, and American Society. Kennikat Press. pp. 171–187. ISBN 0-8046-9156-8.
  7. ^ a b Weiss, Linda (2014). America Inc.?. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-5268-0.
  8. ^ a b Koistinen, Paul (1980). The Military-Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective. Praeger Publishers. ISBN 0-03-055766-6.
  9. ^ Cooling, Benjamin (1981). "Introduction". In Cooling, Benjamin (ed.). War, business, and world military-industrial complexes. Kennikat Press. pp. 3–7. ISBN 0-8046-9276-9.
  10. ^ a b c d e Roland, Alex (2021). Delta of Power: The Military-Industrial Complex. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 9781421441818.
  11. ^ Ledbetter, James (2011). Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military-Industrial Complex. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-15305-7.
  12. ^ a b c d e Sarkesian, Sam (1972). "Introduction". In Sarkesian, Sam (ed.). The Military-Industrial Complex: A Reassessment. Sage Publications, Inc. pp. vii–xii. ISBN 0-8039-0134-8.
  13. ^ Aspaturian, Vernon (1973). "Chapter 5: The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex: Does it Exist?". In Rosen, Steven (ed.). Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex. Lexington Books. pp. 104–134. ISBN 0-669-84871-9.
  14. ^ a b Gansler, Jacques (1995). Defense Conversion: Transforming the Arsenal of Democracy. The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07166-5.
  15. ^ DeGrasse Jr., Robert (1983). Military Expansion, Economic Decline: the impact of military spending on U.S. economic performance. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-87332-258-4.
  16. ^ Proxmire, William (1972). "Chapter 17: Retired High-Ranking Military Officers". In Pursell, Carroll (ed.). The Military-Industrial Complex. Harper & Rowe. pp. 253–263. SBN 06-045296-X.
  17. ^ Hackemer, Kurt (2001). The U.S. Navy and the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex: 1847-1883. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-333-8.
  18. ^ Kelly, Thomas (1977). "Chapter 9: The Concrete Road to MIC; National Defense and Federal Highways". In Cooling, Benjamin (ed.). War, Business, and American Society. Kennikat Press. pp. 133–145. ISBN 0-8046-9156-8.
  19. ^ Pursell, Carroll (1972). "Introduction". In Pursell, Carroll (ed.). The Military-Industrial Complex. Harper & Rowe. pp. 1–12. SBN 06-045296-X.
  20. ^ Ropp, Theodore (1977). "Chapter 1: Nineteenth-Century European Military-Industrial Complexes". In Cooling, Benjamin (ed.). War, Business, and American Society. Kennikat Press. pp. 100–110. ISBN 0-8046-9156-8.
  21. ^ a b Moskos, Charles (1972). "The Military-Industrial Complex: Theoretical Antecedents and Conceptual Contradictions". In Sarkesian, Sam (ed.). The Military-Industrial Complex: A Reassessment. Sage Publications, Inc. pp. 3–24. ISBN 0-8039-0134-8.
  22. ^ Harrison, Mark (2008). "Afterword". In Harrison, Mark (ed.). Guns and Rubles: The Defense Industry in the Stalinist State. Yale University Press. pp. 255–260. ISBN 978-0-300-12524-5.
  23. ^ Gaddy, Clifford (1996). The Price of the Past: Russia’s Struggle with the Legacy of a Militarized Economy. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-3016-0.
  24. ^ Almquist, Peter (1990). Red Forge: Soviet Military Industry Since 1965. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-07066-7.
  25. ^ Homze, Edward (1981). "Chapter 3: The German MIC". In Cooling, Benjamin (ed.). War, business, and world military-industrial complexes. Kennikat Press. pp. 51–83. ISBN 0-8046-9276-9.
  26. ^ a b c Cobb, Stephen (1973). "Chapter 8: The United States Senate and the Impact of Defense Spending Concentrations". In Rosen, Steven (ed.). Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex. Lexington Books. pp. 198–224. ISBN 0-669-84871-9.
  27. ^ Trotter, Anne (1977). "Chapter 6: Development of the "Merchants of Death Theory"". In Cooling, Benjamin (ed.). War, Business, and American Society. Kennikat Press. pp. 93–104. ISBN 0-8046-9156-8.
  28. ^ Gansler, Jacques (1980). The Defense Industry. The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07078-2.

Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-smith" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-lischka" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-ferrell" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-sunseri" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "koistinen-aspin" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "sarkesian-lieberson" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "rosen-rosen" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "rosen-slater-nardin" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "rosen-lieberson" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "rosen-hanson-russett" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-kipp" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-bothwell" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-merrett-schedvin" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-bohme-olsson" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-moorcraft" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "pursell-goldwater" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "pursell-galbraith" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "harrison-harrison" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "harrison-harrison-markevich" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "bradford-cooling" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cuff" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "oligarchy" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "riefler" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "thomas" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "leonidov" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "greenberg" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "yarmolisnky" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-beaumont" is not used in the content (see the help page).