Draft:Military-industrial complex intellectual origins

  1. Home
  2. Wiki

Intellectual origins

[edit]

Social

[edit]

Popular anxiety that a ruler may lead a nation into war for his own self-interests has a long history, dating to the dawn of society. This fear motivated a trend toward limited government that culminated in republicanism. Thomas Paine said of monarchies: “War is their trade, plunder and revenue their objects.” Both Benjamin Franklin and George Washington favored disarmament, with the latter saying in his farewell address: “Overgrown military establishments are, under any form of government, inauspicious to liberty, and are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty.” Abraham Lincoln directly questioned the Mexican-American War with his Spot Resolutions, saying: “no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.” Similar criticisms were made during both world wars, and the Vietnam War. There were widespread charges during the 1940s that Franklin D. Roosevelt “lied us into war.”[1]: 17 [2]: 175 

Four historical movements joined forces to conceive of the concept now known as the military-industrial complex:[2]: 173–176 

  • General distrust of businessmen and broad concern with economic motives in warfare,
  • The movement to establish permanent peace through disarmament in the 17th Century promoted in America by the Quakers,
  • The debate over the sale of arms to belligerents by neutrals, also in the 17th Century, analyzed by Hugo Grotius and Emer de Vattel,
  • Public concern with the price, quality, and delivery of materiel purchased by the government during the American Revolution.

America was blessed with free security (due to its geographic isolation from rivals) starting at the end of the War of 1812 until well after WWII. This allowed the country to go without having a standing army.[3]: 24  During that time, the army staved off antimilitarism by engaging positively in civil affairs. The Corps of Engineers and the Quartermaster Department were known for exploration, land surveys, and development of roads, canals, and railroads. West Point graduates became prominent engineers, factory foremen, and business executives.[4]: 24–25  Military contracting was controlled exclusively by the Ordnance Department and other army agencies. However, civilian involvement in munitions planning was adopted in 1917 and with it came corporate involvement in national defense.[4]: 42 

From the American Revolution until the 20th century the military looked on business disdainfully and shied away from associations with it. This was partially due to shoddy performance by vendors such as those who provided groceries to servicemen until government commissaries were established. However, with time, the commissary system came to be plagued by inefficiencies caused by special interest groups.[5]: vii 

Starting in the Civil War, arms production was beset by boom-bust cycles associated with war and peace that bankrupted manufacturers just at the moment when they perfected production.[4]: 35 [6]: 1, 5  Heavy industry became critical to warfare starting after the Civil War when armored naval vessels came into being.[7]: 43  The importance of the arms industry has caused the government to engage in ad hoc industrial policy to allow arms makers to survive in an otherwise volatile and unpredictable market.[3]: 7 

WWI saw the creation of the War Industries Board by American businessmen for the purpose of mobilizing the economy. Conflicts of interest among the members of this board were rife, and so Woodrow Wilson, Congress, and the public viewed the War Industries Board with suspicion. The War Department initially refused to cooperate with the War Industries Board, however it became clear that the government lacked the expertise and capacity to mobilize the economy effectively. The compromise that resulted was that Wilson forced the War Department and the War Industries Board to merge. WWI revealed that industrial production was at least as important to modern warfare as tactics or strategy, and so the War Department was forced to take responsibility for planning economic mobilization in future conflicts.[5]: 11 

"Since his usefulness to the capitalist-military oligarchy that rules Japan with an iron hand lay in his ceremonial capacities, his funeral was intended to lack none of the ancient and impressive rites that might be made use of." [emphasis added]
 —The Daily Worker 1927

The potential for a military-industrial complex was seeded by Progressive reforms that brought government and big business closer together during the first two decades of the 20th Century.[8]: 1–2  Public outcry in the wake of WWI crystallized into the merchants of death theory.[7]: 43–44  The Nye Committee revealed that, while there were numerous instances of true patriotism and sacrifice in the War Industries Board, its members also had rampant conflicts of interest and engaged in questionable practices that put their personal gain ahead of the interests of the nation.[5]: 11  Merchants of death is a direct intellectual ancestor of military-industrial complex.[9]: 103 

WWII was the turning point that showed a standing defense industrial base would be critical to future security.[3]: 7 [10]: 20  On the eve of World War II, the possibility of a coming capitalist-military oligarchy was considered by the editors of the Progressive opinion magazine The New Republic.[1]: 21  They warned that war planning might lead to "repression and injustice."[11]: 716  A pair of influential publications came out in 1941 hinting at the formation of the military-industrial complex theory. Harold Lasswell’s concept of The Garrison State, where distinctions between civil and military personal are erased by specialists in violence, shares much in common with the military-industrial complex theory’s focus on militarization of the social order.[1]: 21 [12]: 7  James Burnham, meanwhile, predicted a managerial revolution where managers transcend the means of production to triumph over propertied classes by setting corporate and government policies.[12]: 7 

The first known use of military-industrial complex was by Winfield W. Riefler in 1947.[13]: 222 [a] Riefler attributed the outcome of the war to the balance of aggregate economic potentials of the belligerents which he termed "military-industrial complexes".[14]: 95 

A permanent war footing to contain communist expansion was made official policy in 1950 with policy paper NSC 68.[3]: 24 [15]: 2  However, the American ethos would not tolerate a large standing army. This caused the American military to pursue a strategy focused on advanced technology as a force multiplier to counter the superior numerical strength of the Soviets during the Cold War.[3]: 7  A 1960 article in Jessica Smith's magazine New World Review criticized "the military industrial oligarchy" of America.[16]

In 1956 C. Wright Mills published The Power Elite which said that a democratically unaccountable class of military, business, and political leaders with convergent interests exercised the preponderance of power in the contemporary West.[13][17] The Power Elite is a benchmark for subsequent writings because it is a distillation of two major sociological traditions.[12]: 4  The first posits that ruling elites, who may have power-seeking psychological traits, are governmental and political leaders who are appointed or elected. This Machiavellian tradition represented by Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca substitutes an elite/mass cleavage for the Marxist class conflict. The second views power as arising more from occupancy of top positions in governmental bureaucracy, than from the Marxist notion of power arising from capital ownership and was advocated by Max Weber.[12]: 4  These Machiavellian and Weberian traditions are also apparent in Lasswell's and Burnham's 1941 writings.[12]: 7 

At first glance this kingdom ideal, springing from starry-eyed poets and prophets familiar with agrarian culture, may seem scarcely relevant to our typically industrial and urban—and now terror-filled—civilization .... Our military-industrial complex does not contain the solution of its problems within itself. [emphasis added]

— Wendell Thomas in Friends Journal 1958[18]

Technological

[edit]
Further information: Industrial warfare

The concept of a military-industrial complex would not have made sense prior to the Industrial Revolution and the subsequent mechanization of warfare. Up until that time, technology and industrial production were less important than manpower, training, and morale.[10]: 12–14  However, technological advances revolutionized weaponry and broke down the distinction between the civilian and military spheres.[5]: 23  Weapons technology was long the purview of governments, until the Second Industrial Revolution saw private firms eclipse government innovation.[19]: 3  Some of the first steps of the Industrial Revolution occurred in government facilities such as the Royal Arsenal, but these innovations were then greatly expanded upon by civilians, such as Henry Maudslay. Private innovations in originally military technology accelerated in the US where engine technology from railroads and steamships found applications in the United States Navy and where firearms manufacturers began developing the technology of interchangeable parts.[19]: 3 

The Navy, which required difficult to build ships and skilled sailors, started the rise of a standing military in the US. Support for naval expansion rose throughout the early 19th century as shipping became important to some regional economies, such as the economy of the Northeastern United States, and as Manifest Destiny came into vogue. This trend reached a crescendo in 1854 during the Black Warrior Affair when the cargo of an American vessel was seized in Havana by the Spanish government. Federal money for six new steam frigates was appropriated a few months later.[19]: 3 

The specialized military technologies of the modern warfare coupled with the speed with which war can break out has created a situation where defense requires either high levels of peacetime spending to maintain surge capacity, large stocks of finished materiel, or the ability to rapidly convert civilian businesses into munitions manufacturers.[6]: 25, 85  The existence of a standing military and defense industrial base runs contrary to the hopes of the Founding Fathers of the United States.[3]: 5 [19]: 48 

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b c Nelson, Keith (1972). "Chapter 1: The Warfare State: History of a Concept". In Pursell, Carroll (ed.). The Military-Industrial Complex. Harper & Rowe. pp. 15–30. SBN 06-045296-X.
  2. ^ a b Molander, Earl (1977). "Chapter 12: Historical Antecedents of Military-Industrial Criticism". In Cooling, Benjamin (ed.). War, Business, and American Society. Kennikat Press. pp. 171–187. ISBN 0-8046-9156-8.
  3. ^ a b c d e f Roland, Alex (2021). Delta of Power: The Military-Industrial Complex. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 9781421441818.
  4. ^ a b c Smith, Merritt (1977). "Chapter 2: Military Arsenals and Industry Before World War I". In Cooling, Benjamin (ed.). War, Business, and American Society. Kennikat Press. pp. 24–42. ISBN 0-8046-9156-8.
  5. ^ a b c d Koistinen, Paul (1980). The Military-Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective. Praeger Publishers. ISBN 0-03-055766-6.
  6. ^ a b Gansler, Jacques (1980). The Defense Industry. The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-07078-2.
  7. ^ a b Lischka, Johannes (1977). "Chapter 3: Armor Plate: Nickel and Steel, Monopoly and Profit". In Cooling, Benjamin (ed.). War, Business, and American Society. Kennikat Press. pp. 43–58. ISBN 0-8046-9156-8.
  8. ^ Pursell, Carroll (1972). "Introduction". In Pursell, Carroll (ed.). The Military-Industrial Complex. Harper & Rowe. pp. 1–12. SBN 06-045296-X.
  9. ^ Trotter, Anne (1977). "Chapter 6: Development of the "Merchants of Death Theory"". In Cooling, Benjamin (ed.). War, Business, and American Society. Kennikat Press. pp. 93–104. ISBN 0-8046-9156-8.
  10. ^ a b Ropp, Theodore (1977). "Chapter 1: Nineteenth-Century European Military-Industrial Complexes". In Cooling, Benjamin (ed.). War, Business, and American Society. Kennikat Press. pp. 100–110. ISBN 0-8046-9156-8.
  11. ^ "The Way to Prepare". The New Republic. Vol. 102. 27 May 1940. pp. 715–716.
  12. ^ a b c d e Moskos, Charles (1972). "The Military-Industrial Complex: Theoretical Antecedents and Conceptual Contradictions". In Sarkesian, Sam (ed.). The Military-Industrial Complex: A Reassessment. Sage Publications, Inc. pp. 3–24. ISBN 0-8039-0134-8.
  13. ^ a b c Ledbetter, James (2011). Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military-Industrial Complex. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-15305-7.
  14. ^ Riefler, Winfield W. (October 1947). "Our Economic Contribution to Victory". Foreign Affairs. 26 (1): 90–103. doi:10.2307/20030091.
  15. ^ DeGrasse Jr., Robert (1983). Military Expansion, Economic Decline: the impact of military spending on U.S. economic performance. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-87332-258-4.
  16. ^ Leonidov, A. (June 1960). "The Thoughtful American". New World Review. Communist Party USA. Retrieved 16 September 2025.
  17. ^ Brunton, Bruce G. (1988). "Institutional Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex". Journal of Economic Issues. 22 (2): 599–606. doi:10.1080/00213624.1988.11504790. ISSN 0021-3624. JSTOR 4226018.
  18. ^ Thomas, Wendell (21 June 1958). "The Kingdom". Friends Journal. Philadelphia: Friends Publishing Corporation. Retrieved 15 September 2025.
  19. ^ a b c d Hackemer, Kurt (2001). The U.S. Navy and the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex: 1847-1883. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-333-8.

Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-ferrell" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-kelly" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-sunseri" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "koistinen-aspin" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "gansler conversion" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "sarkesian-sarkesian" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "sarkesian-wolf" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "sarkesian-lieberson" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "rosen-rosen" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "rosen-slater-nardin" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "rosen-lieberson" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "rosen-aspaturian" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "rosen-cobb" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "rosen-hanson-russett" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-cooling" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-homze" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-kipp" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-bothwell" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-merrett-schedvin" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-bohme-olsson" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cooling-moorcraft" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "pursell-pilisuk-hayden" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "pursell-proxmire" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "pursell-goldwater" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "pursell-galbraith" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "harrison-harrison" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "harrison-harrison-markevich" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "harrison-harrison2" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "gaddy" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "almquist" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "brandes" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "bradford-cooling" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "cuff" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "greenberg" is not used in the content (see the help page).

Notes

[edit]
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "first usage" is not used in the content (see the help page).


Cite error: There are <ref group=lower-alpha> tags or {{efn}} templates on this page, but the references will not show without a {{reflist|group=lower-alpha}} template or {{notelist}} template (see the help page).