Draft:Haredi conscription in Israel during the Gaza war (2023–present)

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Haredi conscription in Israel during the Gaza war refers to policy, legal, and social developments related to the conscription of Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) men since the Hamas–Israel war that began on October 7, 2023. The issue has been debated in Israeli public and political discourse for years, and since the war it has moved to the forefront of that debate.

Scholarly and policy analyses (e.g., by the Knesset Research and Information Center and the Israel Democracy Institute), together with statements by IDF officials, document increased manpower needs in the IDF since October 2023, which in turn have intensified the debate over the scope and structure of Haredi exemptions and deferments.[1][2]

Background

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Since the establishment of the State of Israel, mandatory military service has been the de facto norm. The government has allowed deferment for full-time Torah study, commonly termed torato umanuto, and many Haredi yeshiva students renew this deferment until passing the age of mandatory conscription; today this is the most common path of avoiding service among Jewish male Israeli citizens.[3] Over the years, multiple bills and temporary arrangements have sought to regulate Haredi conscription and deferment in law, but none has been enacted as a permanent statute; accordingly, the matter is not legally regulated.[1]

Developments since October 2023

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The Gaza war significantly amplified the need to expand IDF manpower, with an emphasis on combat soldiers. According to statements by the Chief of Staff and IDF representatives in official forums, the IDF requires thousands of additional soldiers due to expanded fronts, casualties and injuries, strengthened home-front defense, and the growing burden on the reserve system.[4] The Head of the IDF Manpower Directorate told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that there is an urgent operational need to recruit Haredim, and that the IDF is short roughly 10,000 soldiers, the majority of whom are needed in combat, and some in combat-support.[5] Contemporary policy analysis surveyed legislative options and implications for force structure, budgeting, and civil–military relations.[6] As a result, the issue of Haredi conscription became a prominent item on Israel’s public and political agenda.[7]

With the expiration of the Tal Law, the absence of alternative legislation regulating conscription, and repeated High Court rulings, authorities were required under the Military Service Law to impose institutional, economic, and personal sanctions on yeshiva students classified as deserters. Consequently, portions of draft-refusing yeshiva budgets were cut; economic benefits (such as daycare subsidies and municipal-tax discounts) were canceled, and travel restrictions were imposed on those who had received a first draft notice.[8][1]

Mounting public criticism after the war—including among voters for coalition parties such as serving Likud voters and the Religious Zionism public—created a political challenge: on the one hand, the Prime Minister and coalition leaders sought to preserve unity and alliances with Haredi parties advocating a broad exemption that would blunt sanctions; on the other, there was broad public opposition to legislation not aligned with IDF needs.[9] This tension was reflected by several coalition Knesset members who opposed such measures.[10]

In 2025, the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee held deliberations on a new conscription bill. Committee chair Yuli Edelstein stated he would advance only legislation that supported IDF needs.[11] As part of coalition contacts, Edelstein reportedly offered certain concessions in a draft amendment regarding Haredi conscription in exchange for an unequivocal public declaration by leading rabbis that Haredim who are not studying must enlist; the proposal was rejected. Due to coalition-management needs and Edelstein’s opposition to a blanket-exemption bill, he was removed as chair in July 2025 and replaced by Boaz Bismuth.[12]

Meanwhile, the implementation of sanctions had tangible social effects and heightened fears in Haredi communities. Central organizations launched fundraising campaigns to compensate for the loss of state funding to yeshivot and related subsidies, with leading rabbis raising large sums in Israel and abroad—media reports cited totals on the order of $100–$120 million—to sustain the yeshiva system in lieu of reduced state allocations.[13]

Haredi-compatible service frameworks

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Over the years, the IDF has created tracks designed specifically for Haredi soldiers that enable maintenance of a fully Haredi lifestyle (gender separation, fixed times for prayer and Torah study, mehadrin/glatt-kosher food, and religious oversight).[14]

The Hasmonean (Hashmonaim) Brigade (Brigade 613; also known as the “Haredi Brigade”) is an IDF infantry brigade established in 2024 as part of the effort to recruit Haredim after the war. It operates within a framework intended to allow Haredi combatants to serve while preserving their lifestyle and identity; despite significant investment, as of September 2025 reports indicated the brigade had struggled to meet recruitment targets.[15]

The Netzah Yehuda Battalion (Battalion 97; formerly the “Nahal Haredi” when under the Nahal Brigade) was established in 1999 in cooperation among the IDF, rabbis, and the Ministry of Defense to allow Haredim to combine combat service with observance of their way of life. Soldiers typically serve in combat roles and then undertake vocational training and Bagrut completion; the battalion is part of the Kfir Brigade.[16][17]

Shachar (Hebrew acronym for Shiluv Haredim, “Integrating Haredim”) integrates Haredi soldiers in rear-echelon and technological roles and is aimed at older deferment-holders and those with families; the first cohort enlisted in November 2007 in the Air Force technical corps, after which other branches adopted the model.[18][19]

Conscription of Haredim whose torato umanuto does not apply

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According to estimates by the Israel Democracy Institute, as of 2025 there are at least 35,000 Haredim who do not study full-time; some are employed, while others neither study nor work.[20]

Declared positions regarding such conscription

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Within the Haredi public and leadership there is a declared dispute over drafting Haredi youth who do not study. A minority of Haredi politicians and rabbis state that Haredim who do not study Torah should enlist in the army.[21][22][23][24] Some contend, however, that it is not their role to ensure that such Haredim are drafted.[25][26][27] In 2025, Yuli Edelstein reportedly offered concessions in a draft amendment regarding Haredi conscription in exchange for an unequivocal statement by leading rabbis that non-studying Haredim must enlist; the response was negative.[28][29]

Most Haredi rabbis have expressed firm opposition to drafting Haredi youth who are not studying Torah. In 2024, the Sephardic Chief Rabbi, Yitzhak Yosef, said that even one who is an idler (batlan) is forbidden to go to the army.[30] Additional members of Shas’s Council of Torah Sages and prominent Hasidic decisors likewise stated that even a Haredi youth who is not studying Torah is under no circumstances permitted to enlist, even in a Haredi-designated track.[31][32][33][34]

There are differing views regarding Rabbi Elazar Shach’s position. Some claim he did not oppose drafting Haredim who are not studying,[35] citing statements that yeshiva heads must not grant torato umanuto status to one who does not study, and that one who receives such status without studying has the status of a rodef (pursuer).[36] Others contend his intent was to spur youth to study, and that for those who truly cannot study, other ways should be found to avoid military service.[37][38][39]

Various surveys show that the share of Haredim prepared to accept drafting non-studying Haredim under certain conditions ranges between 29% and 44%, while those opposed under any circumstance range between 46% and 56%.[40][41][42][43] The principal argument advanced by opponents is fear of leaving Haredi society and religion, a concern that may be even stronger among those for whom the yeshiva framework is not suitable.[44][45][46] Research by IDI maps perceived risks and motivators within Haredi society in the context of conscription debates.[2] Others cite broad emotional distance from the Zionist project—“this is not our story.”[47][48][49]

Actual conscription practice

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The torato umanuto arrangement requires a deferment recipient to study Torah at least forty hours per week (“three sedarim” per day) in a recognized yeshiva or Kollel, and not to work at all until age 22.[50] Haredi youth receiving exemption by virtue of torato umanuto are commonly categorized in three groups: (a) students who fully meet the conditions; (b) students who meet them only partially; and (c) young men registered in yeshivot who hardly meet the conditions at all.[51]

There are differing estimates regarding the size of each group. At least (approximately) one-third of those registered in yeshivot belong to groups (b) or (c), as they are officially recorded as working.[50] [52]

Yeshiva students who study only partially

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Students in this group study a substantial portion of the time (e.g., one daily seder) but also work or pursue other activities, and therefore do not meet the quota of “three sedarim” and/or the condition forbidding work.[51] Researcher Asaf Malchi reports that 21% of students in regular yeshivot experience difficulties in studies and also work.[53]

Young men registered but hardly studying
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A significant portion of these youth (about 9,000) are registered in “soft” yeshivot (yeshivot noshrim, “dropout yeshivot”) and constitute about one-third of Haredim who neither study nor enlist. These frameworks are formally recognized as yeshivot and grant exemption under torato umanuto, although the actual scope of study is far below required thresholds; they are intended for youth from Haredi families who have ceased maintaining a fully Haredi lifestyle and/or are unable to sustain intensive study.[20][54] These frameworks are considered relatively “soft”: the atmosphere is less strict, smartphones and work are permitted under rabbinic supervision, and formal attendance requirements may be minimal.[54]

In 2024 there were about 130 such yeshivot, comprising nearly one-fifth of all Haredi yeshiva students; nearly three-quarters of their students in fact work during their time in yeshiva.[55][56][57] Many view these frameworks as granting a fictitious exemption to youth who do not truly fit torato umanuto.[54][58][59] Journalist and scholar Avishay Ben Haim argued that their existence shows the Haredi public is not prepared to agree to the enlistment of non-studying Haredi youth.[60]

In January 2025, the organization Yisrael Hofsheet (Be Free Israel) petitioned the High Court of Justice against Ministry of Welfare funding for 21 such yeshivot (480 students), a budget designated for “disconnected Haredi youth” that totaled 49 million NIS in 2023 and 35 million NIS in 2025 (about 72,000 NIS per person per year). In July 2025, the Court ruled these students would no longer receive such funding unless they report to the draft office and receive a full exemption from military service; in response, Haredi leadership sought private donations to sustain these frameworks.[61][62]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ a b c "חוק הגיוס – כשלים בהצעות הקיימות והמלצות לחקיקה הרצויה" (in Hebrew). Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
  2. ^ a b "גיוס חרדים מנקודת המבט החרדית: עמדות, מוטיבציות ותפיסות חברתיות" (in Hebrew). Israel Democracy Institute. 30 April 2024.
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Category:Conscription in Israel Category:Haredi Judaism in Israel Category:2020s in Israel