Draft:China Dissent Monitor

The China Dissent Monitor (CDM) is a project created by Freedom House to track levels of dissent in China and fill an information gap caused by extensive media restrictions and censorship in China.

China employs large numbers of people to monitor online opinions, aiming to prevent open government criticism and maintain political control^[1]. China’s Great Firewall enforces further censorship by filtering key words and blocking access to certain websites^[2]. These mechanisms have led Freedom House to rank China 177 out of 180 in 2023, for media control, making it one of the most restricted countries in the world.

As a result, the China Dissent Monitor is a crucial tool for tracking “the frequency and diversity of dissent” ^[3]. The data collected by Freedom House increases transparency about opposition movements and criticism of the Chinese Government. The monitor records offline collective action such as protests, marches, demonstrations, and workers strikes as well as online dissent, including social media campaigns and public criticism of officials. It also documents authorities’ responses to dissent, including arrests, detentions, intimidation, and instances of violence related to dissent.

Research Design

The CDM uses a descriptive research design based on a specific definition^[4] of dissent with necessary and sufficient conditions to track acts of dissent and document political behaviour in China^[5]. Because direct data on protests is censored, the project relies on indirect methods of collection and publicly available sources. The initiative aims to produce a systematic record of dissent across China and provide researchers, journalists, and policymakers with reliable information that would otherwise remain inaccessible. It also contributes to documenting how Chinese citizens express dissent.

The research follows a mixed-method design^[6], combining quantitative and qualitative approaches to build a descriptive account of dissent. Each unit of analysis represents a single act of dissent, recording when, where, what, who, and how it occurred, as well as the strength of evidence^[5]. This descriptive method of research allows the CDM to accurately document political behaviour in China^[7].

The main variables include the date, type of dissent, region, actors involved, state response, level of evidence, case number. The dataset covers events from June 2022 onwards and records over 12,000 protests across at least 27 provinces of the PRC^[5]. In the first six months of 2025 it tracked over 2,500 protests^[8].

Data Sources

Data is gathered from multiple open sources, including Chinese and international news outlets, social media platforms ^[8] such as Weibo and WeChat, and reports by NGOs or other local organisations. It collects and archives digital sources like videos, images and social media posts.^[5]

Not all cases are fully coded due to capacity limitations, but most have visual documentation. Freedom House collaborates with Doublethink Lab, which uses a machine-learning algorithm to detect and organise protest data.^[5]

These findings are then reviewed manually by researchers to ensure reliability and consistency. The Detailed Data tab of the website contains the most complete documentation with links, images, and descriptions. The Protest Images tab shows the protests that have been uploaded so far, thousands more are still being processed. ^[5]

Case Selection Criteria

Dissent in the CDM is defined by necessary and sufficient conditions. Necessary conditions for an event to be included in the database are when individuals or groups in China challenge political or social authorities by expressing complaints, asserting rights, or advancing their interests. Sufficient conditions include that the case uses non-instutional means, has a high visibility, translates a viral event of online speech or involves a risk of or actual reprisal by state or non-state actors. The event needs to have at least one sufficient condition to be included in the database. ^[5]

The CDM focuses on bottom-up action. Therefore protests are selected when the population challenges those with power and exclude pro-state activism.

Verification and Transparency

The CDM uses verification tiers to ensure transparency and reflect the level of evidence (strongest, moderate and least evidence) for each event of dissent recorded. The level of evidence depends on the amount of data available to the public allowing the public to verify events. The verification tiers depend on the number of sources the CDM have, the diversity of data they have (videos, photos, etc), if it has been verified by a news or civil society organisation. ^[5]

Uses of the CDM's Research

CDM’s data has been used by major international media outlets including The Economist^[8] and the New York Times^[9].

Key Findings and Patterns

In 2024 the China Dissent Monitor (CDM) documented 1,465 events of public dissent across China. The majority of these incidents, 806 in total, were group demonstrations (55%), revealing that most cases of public dissent across the country were carried out collectively rather than individually. Next were sign protests, with 180 incidents being recorded. This form, often on a smaller scale, refers to the public display of written and symbolic messaging through posters and banners. The data also recorded 103 incidents relating to the spreading of religious beliefs as a mode of dissent, highlighting how even acts of religious expression can be viewed as dissent in China. In addition to these forms of protest, CDM also documented 52 individual posts (e.g social media post/online statement), 51 acts of obstruction or vandalism, 48 collective petitioning, and 46 strikes.^[10][11][3]

Geographic and Social Patterns of Dissent

Most of these incidents occurred in the populous and economically developed regions of Guangdong (195), Henan (138), and Shandong (120).^[10][11][3] This aligns with participant data showing that 52% of those who protested were ordinary citizens such as rural and urban residents, labor workers (production workers and transportation workers), parents, and students. Property buyers and buyers made 35% (26% property buyers and 9% property owners)^[3][10][11]. Lastly, construction workers accounted for 12% of all the protests that occurred in 2024, with a total of 565 participants.^[3][10][11] Together, these details suggest that dissent in China’s economic centres, where high proportions of urban residents and labor workers are concentrated, stem from labor, housing, medical, and economic grievances.^[12]

Since June of 2022 (the first documented act of protest documented by the CDM) the form of protest, regions where they occurred, and groups involved have remained consistent. Group demonstrations, sign protest, and spreading religious beliefs dominate the modes of dissent, with most occurring in Guangdong, Henan, and Shandong. Across the years these protests have persistently targeted property developers, local governments, and construction companies, with only a few directed at China’s central government. This pattern reflects China’s current real estate and economic climate where labor and construction workers often face low and delayed pay,^[13] and where employers “are colluding with local government[s] … to sanction this sort of employer behaviour.” Housing projects also go unfinished or unsold. This explains that, “wage arrears, lack of enforcement of labour contracts and the ineffectiveness of unions in protecting workers’ rights are among the most significant labour issues that affect the wellbeing of migrant workers and their families in China’s urban labour market.”^[13]

Notable Examples of Documented Protests

From the beginning of 2025 to 1 October 2025, a total of 3,976 protest incidents occurred across 27 provinces in China, with Guangdong Province recording the highest number at 634 cases. When categorised by group, worker protests accounted for 44 per cent of the total, property owners/buyers constituted the second largest group at 27 per cent, followed by rural residents at 13 per cent. The most representative examples of these are respectively:

Worker Protest

On May 14, The Tianyue Garden project in Baishizhou, constructed by China Construction Second Engineering Bureau in Shenzhen, Guangdong, experienced a collective strike by construction workers.^[14] Despite multiple outreach attempts, the workers collectively blocked the gate after months of unpaid wage. However, the project administration did not issue a public response to the workers' demand, prompting the local human resources department intervention and investigation. This case of wage arrears has raised widespread concern over the extent in which “if large state-owned companies are fulfilling their duty to safeguard workers rights.”^[14]

Property Owners/Buyers

On April 11, residents of Hongshan Tianchen Estate gathered outside Zigong Municipal Government to protest against the developer’s alterations to the project's plans. Police cordoned off the area and monitored the protesters.^[15] Hongshan Properties deceived property owners by calling them individually to inform them of the incorrect revised rules for Phase Three. Following the residents' feedback, the Housing and Urban-Rural Development Bureau of Zigong temporarily suspended the project’s approval and promised to continue collecting residents’ concerns and relaying them to the construction company.

Rural Residents

On January 12, villagers from Xiaoliuzhuang Village, Yincun Township, Zaozhuang City, staged a protest outside the Zhong District People’s Government building over issues relating to their resettlement housing.^[16] Reports indicate that the demolition of residential areas has been ongoing for five years, while the resettlement housing project has been halted for three years and transitional compensation has remained unpaid for two years, leaving villagers struggling to defend their rights.

Criticism and Challenges

The CDM has run into a variety of challenges since its launch in 2022 with the official website, being blocked by Chinese government censors directly after its launch in November 2022.

Chinese Government Suppression

The database is run by a small group of analysts in Taipei, who comb Chinese social media for evidence of both grassroots protests as well as larger ones. Due to the prevalence of Chinese government presence on Chinese social media platforms such as Weibo and WeChat, the team behind the CDM operates to collect protest data from social media before it is removed by government censors^[17]

Additionally, the protest information that is available on Chinese social media is often purposely suppressed by the Chinese government. There is scholarly evidence that initiatives such as the 50 Cent Party (Wumao) ^[18] are used by the government to distract from protest events across China, and redirect attention away from popular dissent. Information suppression strategies such as this one mean that it is often difficult for the CDM team to examine grassroots protest movements in China.

U.S. State Department Funding Cuts

In July 2025, there were concerns that the project would cease operating due to Trump administration budget cuts to State department grant funding for human rights and pro-democracy nonprofits.^[17]

Following the Executive Order on Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid, in January 2025, the CDM, as a part of Freedom House, lost funding from the U.S. government.^[19]

On 11 June 2025 Freedom House secured enough funding from private donors to keep the CDM running for another sixty days ^[19], and was able to publish a September 2025 report on the state of popular dissent in China. As of October 2025 the website is still active, however public communication from Freedom House regarding the CDM from June through August 2025 has indicated that it now relies on consistent public donation to remain active.^[19]

References

1. Hunt, Katie; Xu, Cy (7 October 2013). "China 'employs 2 million to police internet'". CNN. Retrieved 27 October 2025.
2. Xu, Beina; Albert, Eleanor (17 Feb 2017). "Media Censorship in China". cfr.org. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 27 October 2025.
3. China Dissent Monitor Issue 9: July - September 2024 (PDF). China Dissent Monitor (Report). Taipei: Freedom House. October 2024. Retrieved 24 October 2025.
4. Babbie, Earl R (2021). The Practice of Social Research (15 ed.). Boston: Cengage. ISBN 9780357708668. Retrieved 24 Oct 2025.
5. Freedom House. "China Dissent Monitor: about this project". chinadissent.net. Freedom House. Retrieved 24 Oct 2025.
6. Creswell, John. W (2017). Designing and conducting mixed methods research (3 ed.). London: Sage publications. ISBN 9781506394671. Retrieved 24 Oct 2025.
7. Holmes, Carolyn E.; Guliford, Meg K.; Mendoza-Davé, Mary Anne S.; Jurkovich, Michelle (1 November 2023). "A Case for Description". PS: Political Science. 57 (1): 51–56. doi:10.1017/S1049096523000720. Retrieved 27 October 2025.
8. The Economist. "The surprising nature of protest in China". The Economist. Retrieved 27 October 2025.
9. Buckley, Chris; Chang Chien, Amy (7 August 2025). "Why a Teen Bullying Case in China Set Off Protests and a Crackdown". New York Times. Retrieved 27 October 2025.
10. China Dissent Monitor Issue 7: January - March 2024 (PDF). China Dissent Monitor (Report). Taipei: Freedom House. April 2024. Retrieved 24 October 2025.
11. China Dissent Monitor Issue 8: April - June 2024. China Dissent Monitor (Report). Taipei: Freedom House. July 2024. Retrieved 24 October 2025.
12. Chen, Xingyan; Zhan, Shaohua (2022). "Drawn-out Protests in China's Rustbelt: Land Revenue and the Limits to Bargained Authoritarianism". The China Quarterly. 252: 1162–82. doi:10.1017/S0305741022000844. Retrieved 24 October 2025.
13. Cheng, Zhimeng; Nielsen, Ingrid; Smyth, Russell (2015). "5". Determinants of wage arrears and implications for the socio-economic wellbeing of China's migrant workers: evidence from Guangdong province. London: Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 115–125.
14. The Chinese Daily, “Shenzhen construction workers strike，” January 12, 2025, https://www.trrb.net/%e6%b7%b1%e5%9c%b3%e5%bb%ba%e7%ad%91%e5%b7%a5%e4%ba%ba%e7%bd%a2%e5%b7%a5%ef%bc%81%e4%b8%ad%e5%bb%ba%e4%ba%8c%e5%b1%80%e7%99%bd%e7%9f%b3%e6%b4%b2%e9%a1%b9%e7%9b%ae%e6%ac%a0%e8%96%aa3%e4%b8%aa%e6%9c%88/
15. Douyin post(s), video(s), "Concerning the Construction of Phase III of the Hongshan Tianchen Project in Jing District, Zigong City,” April 12, 2025 https://wz.mala.cn/wz/wzinfo?wid=283947
16. Douyin post(s), video(s), ” Villagers from Yincun and Xiaoliuzhuang in Zaozhuang, Shandong, gathered in front of the municipal government building in the city centre to protest over resettlement housing issues,” January 6, 2025 https://x.com/whyyoutouzhele/status/1876905271311704542
17. Allen, Bethany (18 July 2025). "The last public database tracking protests in China is about to go dark". aspistrategist.org.au. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Retrieved 27 October 2025.
18. King, Gary; Pan, Jennifer; Roberts, Margaret E. (2017). "How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, not Engaged Argument" (PDF). American Political Science Review. 111 (3): 484–501. doi:10.1017/S0003055417000144. Retrieved 22 October 2025.
19. Freedom House. "The Effects of the US Foreign Aid Freeze on Freedom House". freedomhouse.org. Freedom House. Retrieved 22 October 2025.