Better Never to Have Been

Better Never to Have Been
First edition cover
AuthorDavid Benatar
LanguageEnglish
Subject
GenrePhilosophy
PublisherOxford University Press
Publication date
2006
Publication placeUnited Kingdom
Media type
  • Paperback
  • ebook
  • audiobook
Pagesxi + 237
ISBN978-0-199-29642-2
OCLC427507306

Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence is a 2006 book by South African philosopher David Benatar, in which he argues for antinatalism, the philosophical position that coming into existence is always a harm. Benatar defends this view primarily through two arguments: the asymmetry argument, which holds that the absence of pain is good even when not experienced, while the absence of pleasure is not bad unless someone is deprived of it; and an argument from philosophical pessimism, which asserts that due to cognitive biases, human beings systematically underestimate the negative aspects of life.

The book expands on ideas first presented in Benatar's 1997 paper "Why It Is Better Never to Come into Existence", and has received both praise and criticism from philosophers and ethicists. It has also influenced cultural works, most notably the television series True Detective.

Background

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The book builds upon arguments first developed in Benatar's 1997 paper "Why It Is Better Never to Come into Existence",[1] in which he introduced the key concepts that would later form the foundation of his antinatalist philosophy.[2]

Summary

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Better Never to Have Been directly addresses Benatar's antinatalist philosophy, which asserts that sentient beings are harmed by being brought into existence, making procreation morally wrong.[3] He reaches this conclusion through two main arguments: an asymmetry between good and bad things, such as pleasure and pain, and the view that human beings have an unreliable assessment of life's quality.[4]

Asymmetry between pleasure and pain

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Benatar argues that there is an asymmetry between good and bad things, such as pleasure and pain:[5]: 30 

  1. The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone, whereas
  2. The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

According to Benatar, the absence of pleasure is only considered bad if someone exists to experience this deprivation. When no one exists, the absence of pleasure does not carry negative value.[6]

On the subject of childlessness, Benatar writes that "the reason why we do not lament our failure to bring somebody into existence is because absent pleasures are not bad."[5]: 35 

He further contends that the asymmetry between pleasure and pain is both quantitative and qualitative. Benatar argues that there is more pain than pleasure in an average human life, and that people instinctively treat pain and pleasure as distinct categories, rather than comparable experiences. He illustrates this with an example: if offered the choice to endure extreme pain for an hour in exchange for sublime pleasure for the rest of the day, most people would reject the trade.[7]

Cognitive biases and life's quality

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Benatar argues that individuals tend to overestimate the quality of their lives due to a range of cognitive biases, many of which he considers to be evolutionarily ingrained. He cites the optimism bias, the tendency to recall positive experiences more readily than negative ones, and the common belief that one's quality of life is above average. According to Benatar, such biases lead people to underestimate the extent of suffering in life, including widespread experiences such as illness, death, and chronic pain. He also argues that people often adapt to negative circumstances by adjusting their baseline for wellbeing, which may obscure the actual level of harm experienced. Benatar presents this as part of a broader philosophical pessimism, which holds that life may be objectively worse than it is commonly perceived to be, and that subjective evaluations of life's quality are not reliable grounds for assessing its worth.[7]

Critical reception

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In his review, philosopher Yujin Nagasawa questions why Benatar framed Better Never to Have Been as a positive thesis rather than as a counter-intuitive philosophical puzzle. As a result, he states that he cannot recommend the book to a general audience.[8]

Bioethicist David DeGrazia published a rebuttal to Benatar's arguments in 2010; although he disagrees with Benatar's conclusions, he praises the book for its intellectual rigor and philosophical engagement"[9]

In 2013, Benatar responded to critics of the book in the paper "Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics".[10]

Publication history

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Better Never to Have Been was published on 12 October 2006 by Oxford University Press.[5] The book has been translated into Czech, Japanese, Turkish, Italian, Korean, and Polish, with a Chinese translation forthcoming.[11] An audiobook version narrated by Dennis Kleinman was published on 24 January 2023 by Tantor Media.[12]

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The creator of True Detective, Nic Pizzolatto, has cited Better Never to Have Been as an influence on the creation of the character Rust Cohle.[13]

References

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  1. ^ Benatar, David (1997). "Why It Is Better Never to Come into Existence". American Philosophical Quarterly. 34 (3): 345–355. ISSN 0003-0481. JSTOR 20009904.
  2. ^ Belshaw, Christopher (9 June 2007). "Review of Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. ISSN 1538-1617.
  3. ^ Singh, Asheel (2018). "The Hypothetical Consent Objection to Anti-Natalism". Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21 (5): 1135–1150. doi:10.1007/s10677-018-9952-0. ISSN 1386-2820. S2CID 254464712. Anti-natalism is the view that it is (almost) always wrong to bring people (and perhaps all sentient beings) into existence. This view is most famously championed by David Benatar (1997, 2006).
  4. ^ Smuts, Aaron (2014). "To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living". Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 17 (4): 711–729. doi:10.1007/s10677-013-9461-0. ISSN 1386-2820. S2CID 254462083. Benatar presents two independent arguments for anti-natalism. The first argument attempts to show that it is always prudentially bad to be brought into existence. This argument depends on a controversial asymmetry between goods and bads: The absence of pain is good, whereas the absence of pleasure is neither prudentially good nor bad for the non-existent. The prudential asymmetry grounds the anti-natalist moral claim. Accordingly, I will refer to this as the asymmetry argument. The second argument does not depend on the asymmetry. Instead, it defends a wholesale pessimism about the human condition. We can call this the argument from pessimism.
  5. ^ a b c Benatar, David (2008). Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296422.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-954926-9.
  6. ^ Metz, Thaddeus (2011). "Are Lives Worth Creating?: Critical Notice of David Benatar, Better Never to Have Been (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006)". Philosophical Papers. 40 (2): 233–255. doi:10.1080/05568641.2011.591828. ISSN 0556-8641. S2CID 147119569. Again, Benatar suggests that these emotional reactions are best explained by the asymmetry thesis. In particular, we exhibit negative emotions toward unhappy lives because pain is bad and its absence is good, and we do not exhibit negative emotions toward nonexistent lives that lack happiness because the absence of happiness is not bad when there is no one to be deprived of it.
  7. ^ a b Liljenberg, August (9 May 2023). "The Case for Anti-Natalism". Farsight. Retrieved 4 May 2025.
  8. ^ Nagasawa, Yujin (1 July 2008). "Review: David Benatar: Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence". Mind. 117 (467): 674–677. doi:10.1093/mind/fzn089. ISSN 0026-4423.
  9. ^ DeGrazia, David (1 August 2010). "Is it wrong to impose the harms of human life? A reply to Benatar". Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. 31 (4): 317–331. doi:10.1007/s11017-010-9152-y. ISSN 1573-1200. PMID 20625933. S2CID 10284785.
  10. ^ Benatar, David (1 June 2013). "Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics". The Journal of Ethics. 17 (1): 121–151. doi:10.1007/s10892-012-9133-7. ISSN 1572-8609. S2CID 170682992.
  11. ^ "Better Never to Have Been". University of Cape Town. Retrieved 4 May 2025.
  12. ^ "Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence". Storytel International. Retrieved 4 May 2025.
  13. ^ Calia, Michael (2 February 2014). "Writer Nic Pizzolatto on Thomas Ligotti and the Weird Secrets of 'True Detective'". WSJ. Retrieved 31 May 2020.
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