Anonymous game
In game theory, an anonymous game is a game in which (a) all players have the same set of possible actions; (b) the payoff of each player depends only on his own choice of strategy and the number of the other players playing each strategy, but not on the identity of these players.[1][2][3][4][5]
A prominent example of an anonymous game is a congestion game. As an example, consider the "game" played by drivers who have to decide which road to take on their way home. The drivers want to minimize their delay, so the payoff of each driver is (minus) the amount of time he spends on the road; this is determined only by the road he chooses to take and by the number of other drivers who choose the same road, but not by their identity.
References
[edit]- ^ Blonski, Matthias (1999-08-01). "Anonymous Games with Binary Actions". Games and Economic Behavior. 28 (2): 171–180. doi:10.1006/game.1998.0699. ISSN 0899-8256.
- ^ Daskalakis, Constantinos; Papadimitriou, Christos (October 2007). "Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games". 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'07). pp. 83–93. arXiv:0710.5582. doi:10.1109/FOCS.2007.24. ISBN 978-0-7695-3010-9.
- ^ Daskalakis, Constantinos; Papadimitriou, Christos H. (2015-03-01). "Approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games". Journal of Economic Theory. Computer Science and Economic Theory. 156: 207–245. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.02.002. ISSN 0022-0531.
- ^ Chen, Xi; Durfee, David; Orfanou, Anthi (2015-06-14). "On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Games". Proceedings of the forty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing. STOC '15. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery. pp. 381–390. doi:10.1145/2746539.2746571. ISBN 978-1-4503-3536-2.
- ^ Cheng, Yu; Diakonikolas, Ilias; Stewart, Alistair (January 2017), "Playing Anonymous Games using Simple Strategies", Proceedings of the 2017 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), Proceedings, Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, pp. 616–631, doi:10.1137/1.9781611974782.40, ISBN 978-1-61197-478-2, retrieved 2025-07-29