Alief (mental state)
In philosophy and psychology, an alief is an automatic or habitual belief-like attitude, particularly one that is in tension with a person's explicit beliefs.[1] For example, a person standing on a transparent balcony may believe that they are safe, but alieve that they are in danger. A person watching a sad movie may believe that the characters are completely fictional, but their aliefs may lead them to cry nonetheless. A person who is hesitant to eat fudge that has been formed into the shape of feces, or who exhibits reluctance in drinking from a sterilized bedpan may believe that the substances are safe to eat and drink, but may alieve that they are not.[citation needed]
The term alief was introduced by Tamar Gendler, a professor of philosophy and cognitive science at Yale University, in a pair of influential articles published in 2008.[2][failed verification] Since the publication of these original articles, the notion of alief has been utilized by Gendler and others—including Paul Bloom[3] and Daniel Dennett[4]—to explain a range of psychological phenomena in addition to those listed above, including the pleasure of stories,[3] the persistence of positive illusions,[4] certain religious beliefs,[5] and certain psychiatric disturbances, such as phobias and obsessive–compulsive disorder.[4]
References
[edit]- ^ Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2008a). "Alief and Belief" (PDF). Journal of Philosophy. 105 (10): 634–663. doi:10.5840/jphil20081051025. ISSN 0022-362X.
- ^ Philosopher's Annual. Philosophersannual.org http://www.philosophersannual.org/. Retrieved 27 May 2010.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ^ a b Bloom, Paul (2011). How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We Like What We Like. W. W. Norton & Co. ISBN 978-0393340006.
- ^ a b c McKay, Ryan T.; Dennett, Daniel (2009). "The Evolution of Misbelief" (PDF). Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 32 (6): 493–510. doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990975. PMID 20105353. S2CID 2763525.
- ^ Hodge, K. Mitch (2011). "On Imagining the Afterlife". Journal of Cognition and Culture. 11 (3–4): 367–389. doi:10.1163/156853711X591305.
Further reading
[edit]- Albahari, Miri (February 2014). "Alief or belief? A contextual approach to belief ascription". Philosophical Studies. 167 (3): 701–720. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0122-x. JSTOR 42920338.
- Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2008b). "Alief in action (and reaction)". Mind and Language. 23 (5): 552–585. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00352.x.
- Hubbs, Graham (October 2013). "Alief and Explanation". Metaphilosophy. 44 (5): 604–620. doi:10.1111/meta.12056. JSTOR 24441723.
- Mandelbaum, Eric (August 2013). "Against alief". Philosophical Studies. 165 (1): 197–211. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9930-7. JSTOR 42920172.
- Wilkinson, Sam (2016). "Can There Be Belief Without Evidence?". Teorema. 35 (1): 13–34. JSTOR 44077427.