1981 Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization strike

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The PATCO Strike of 1981 was a union-organized labor strike of air traffic controllers (ATCs). Following a decade of successful strikes in other industries, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) declared a strike on August 3, 1981, demanding higher wages and more benefits. Despite 13,000 ATCs striking, the strike ultimately failed, as the Reagan administration was quickly able to replace the striking ATCs, resulting in PATCO's decertification. The failure of the PATCO strike impacted the American labor movement, accelerating the decline in labor unions in the country, and represented a major break in federal policy and attitudes toward labor unions.[1]

Background

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The decades leading up to the PATCO strike saw reform within American labor unions, with country-wide unionization rates peaking at 35% in 1954.[1] In the late 60s, corrupt union leaders were called out and replaced by younger leaders, often motivated Vietnam veterans with strong anti-authority positions.[2] The strikes and boycotts organized by these reformed unions were successful in achieving new laws for safety and labor, such as the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972.[2]

The increased popularity of air travel in the 1970s brought a burden upon the ATC community, causing long hours, higher stress, and overall discomfort within the workplace. The successful labor movements of the 1960s and 70s inspired PATCO to go on strike in an attempt to reduce stress in the workplace. Many of the workers were veteran Air Force pilots, as well as Republican voters who had backed Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign, so they believed that a strike would be supported and ultimately be successful.[3]

The PATCO strike of 1981 was important to American labor relations. This strike illuminated the problems faced by air traffic controllers and the growing animosity between organized labor and the federal government. Stress at work and a desire for better working conditions, such as fewer hours, more money, and increased worker safety, were the main reasons controllers chose to go on strike. The controllers' burnout became worse under the heavy workload brought on by increasing aviation traffic. Members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), many of whom were veterans of the armed forces with strong rebelliousness towards authority, had shown much of the support for the organization. Strikers were certain of their victory against the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), but this confidence proved to be unfounded.[4] President Ronald Reagan, from whom they expected reciprocal support, responded aggressively to the strike. Despite Reagan’s membership in the Screen Actors Guild, he opposed strikes as a tactic.[4] He quickly ruled the strike unlawful and ordered the dismissal of more than 11,000 striking controllers.

Preparation and strike

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PATCO's overall goal was to "privatize" its relationship with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).[5] The original demands requested a $10,000 pay increase across the board, a four-day work week, increased pension and disability benefits, and cost-of-living adjustments.[6]

Stress was seemingly thrown aside by the government and the general public. In some cases, employers saw that stress was just a "phenomenon"[7] that only a few workers felt. Despite these claims, it was inherent that many air traffic controllers were all under some form of stress. There was clear pressure on those who were air traffic controllers at the time. Over time the work caused them to seemingly break down psychologically the longer they continued to work.[7] Unfortunately the air traffic controllers emotions were not taken into consideration and were just pushed off to the side. As air traffic controllers would work, they would often become fatigued. Fatigue is often one of the symptoms of stress. But this feeling was pushed to the side as just another characteristic of the job by employers.[7]

On Monday, August 3rd, 1981, over 13,000 ATCs went on strike. By the morning, the strike had stopped over 50% of flights;[8] this number rose to 70% later in that day.[5] Prior to the strike, former Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis and former FAA Administrator Lynn Helms had prepared a contingency plan in preparation for such a strike. Two days into the strike on Wednesday, August 5th, the Reagan administration gave the striking ATCs 48 hours to return to their jobs. Then on August 5th, only 875 union members returned to work following Reagan's request. During this time, new ATCs were being trained and replacing the striking union members. ATC towers were staffed by non-striking ATCs, along with military personnel and retired ATCs who agreed to return to work. Ultimately, the government action was effective at defeating the union. Only 1,300 of the striking workers were able to retain their jobs, and none of them attained their demands.[5] The strike lasted until Wednesday, August 5th, 1981.

Aftermath

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The failure of the PATCO strike reshaped the American labor movement. Unionization within the United States consistently declined following the failure of the strike, from 20.9% in 1981 to 10% in 2024.[1] The PATCO strike demonstrated that the federal government would act as a strike breaker, making labor unions more hesitant to use strikes as a tool. There had been no federal government intervention on labor unions to shut down a strike since President Grover Cleveland shut down the Pullman Strike of 1894.[9] The PATCO strike was a reversal of stance for the federal government. Whereas previously, labor unions could count on a neutral--or in some cases even supportive--government, halting PATCO showed that the federal government was willing to act as a strike barrier. Consequently, labor unions grew more hesitant about using strikes as a tool.[10] PATCO greatly shaped the decline of the labor movement through the 1980s and 1990s.

On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the strike, the New Labor Forum published an article by looking back on the walkout, and why it failed. Among those reasons was a lack of public relations material from PATCO to sway the general public in their favor.[11] According to labor sociologist Art Shostak, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had "one of the biggest propaganda machines outside the Kremlin."[11] For example, the FAA used their connections with news outlets to frame the strike as unlawful and a threat to poor Americans, claiming PATCO's contract demands would result in higher inflation. President Reagan also acted on the side of the FAA, criticizing PATCO for what he believed to be abandoning their posts.[11] Without countermeasures from PATCO, the federal government was largely able to control public opinion, characterizing the strike as illegal and impractical. [11]

References

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  1. ^ a b c Peterson, John (2024-12-16). Colossus. p. 109. ISBN 979-8-218-55488-0.
  2. ^ a b Cowie, Jefferson (2010). Stayin' Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class. New York: The New Press. pp. 17, 63, 141, 306, 311, 362–363. ISBN 978-1-56584-875-7.
  3. ^ Perlstein, Rick (August 18, 2020). Reaganland: America's Right Turn (1st ed.). New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 883. ISBN 9781476793054.
  4. ^ a b Shostak, Art (2006). "An Unhappy 25th Anniversary: The Patco Strike in Retrospective". New Labor Forum. 15 (3): 74–82. ISSN 1095-7960.
  5. ^ a b c Northrup, Herbert R. (January 1984). "The Rise and Demise of PATCO". ILR Review. 37 (2): 167–184. doi:10.2307/2522839. JSTOR 2522839.
  6. ^ Tesh, Sylvia (1984). "The Politics of Stress: The Case of Air Traffic Control". International Journal of Health Services. 14 (4): 569–587. ISSN 0020-7314.
  7. ^ a b c Tesh, Sylvia (1984). "The Politics of Stress: The Case of Air Traffic Control". International Journal of Health Services. 14 (4): 569–587. ISSN 0020-7314.
  8. ^ "CONTROLLERS STRIKE, HALTING 7,000 FLIGHTS; REAGAN GIVES 48-HOUR NOTICE ON STRIKERS OF DISMISSAL". New York Times. August 4, 1981.
  9. ^ McCartin, Joseph (2006). "PATCO, Permanent Replacement, and the Loss of Labor's Strike Weapon". Perspectives on Work. 10 (1): 17–19. JSTOR 23272081.
  10. ^ Traynor, Thomas L.; Fichtenbaum, Rudy H. (1997). "The Impact of Post-Patco Labor Relations on U.S. Union Wages". Eastern Economic Journal. 23 (1): 61–72. ISSN 0094-5056.
  11. ^ a b c d Shostak, Art (2006). "An Unhappy 25th Anniversary: The Patco Strike in Retrospective". New Labor Forum. 15 (3): 74–82. ISSN 1095-7960.

Bibliography

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