135th Rifle Division

135th Rifle Division (September 7, 1939 – December 27, 1941) 135th Rifle Division (January 5, 1942 – July 1945)
Active	1939–1945
Country	Soviet Union
Branch	Red Army (1939-46)
Type	Infantry
Size	Division
Engagements	Soviet annexation of Western Belorussia Operation Barbarossa Battle of Kiev (1941) Roslavl–Novozybkov offensive Battles of Rzhev Operation "Seydlitz" Operation Mars Operation Büffel Operation Kutuzov Battle of the Dnieper Battle of Kiev (1943) Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive Kamenets–Podolsky pocket Svir–Petrozavodsk offensive Vistula-Oder offensive Lower Silesian offensive Upper Silesian offensive Siege of Breslau
Decorations	Order of the Red Banner (2nd Formation)
Battle honours	Krakow (2nd Formation)
Commanders
Notable commanders	Maj. Gen. Fyodor Nikandrovich Smekhotvorov Col. Yosif Ivanovich Popov Col. Vasilii Grigorevich Kovalenko Col. Aleksandr Nikitich Sosnov Maj. Gen. Filipp Nikolaevich Romashin

The 135th Rifle Division was first formed as an infantry division of the Red Army in early September 1939 in the Ukrainian (later Kiev Special) Military District, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of September 13. Although barely formed it took part in the invasion of eastern Poland later that month as part of Ukrainian Front. At the outset of the German invasion on June 22, 1941, it was moving toward the frontier in western Ukraine near Dubno, as part of 5th Army. It quickly encountered the panzers of III Motorized Corps and was driven off toward Rivne, losing most of its strength in the process. After taking up defenses on the north flank of the German penetration to Kyiv during July, it was moved to the rear and was partly rebuilt before being reassigned to the new 40th Army on Southwestern Front's extreme right flank. When the German drive to encircle this Front began in the first days of September the 135th narrowly escaped the trap and gradually fell back to the east in the Kharkiv area. By the end of October it was clear that the resources weren't available to rebuild it again and its headquarters was disbanded, while one rifle regiment continued to fight under Army command. The division was officially stricken on December 27.

A new 135th was created in early January 1942, on the basis of a 400-series division, largely at Kolomna in the Moscow Military District. It was soon sent west to join Kalinin Front, being briefly assigned to 4th Shock Army before being moved back to Front reserves for further training. In May it was moved to 41st Army in the same Front. In July, Army Group Center launched an operation to clear the rear areas of its Rzhev salient and the division was quickly encircled; its remnants were forced to break out at enormous cost and were then returned to Front reserves for an almost complete rebuilding. In October it was assigned to 39th Army of the same Front, and formed part of its shock group in November's Operation Mars.

1st Formation

The division was formed on the basis of a cadre from the 25th Rifle Division at Pryluky in the Ukrainian Military District on September 7, 1939. Given this experienced cadre it was able to take part in the invasion of eastern Poland later that month. Maj. Gen. Fyodor Nikandrovich Smekhotvorov was given command of the 135th on June 13, 1940, and he would remain in command for the duration of the first formation. This officer had been serving since September 1936 on the staffs of the Siberian Military District and the Kharkov Military District.

At the start of the German invasion at 0400 hours the division was moving east of Dubno,^[1] near Kivertsy Camp, some 100km from the frontier, marching from Ostriv and Iziaslav in the direction of Lokachi. Smekhotvorov had 9,911 personnel on strength, including 935 officers and 1,550 NCOs, and they were armed and equipped with 6,682 rifles, 422 submachine guns, 465 light machine guns, 233 heavy machine guns, a pair of quad antiaircraft machine guns, 54 45mm antitank guns, four 37mm and four 76mm antiaircraft guns, 35 76mm guns (cannon and infantry guns), 28 122mm and 13 152mm howitzers, 12 120mm, 54 82mm, and 83 50mm mortars, 276 trucks, 17 tractors, and 2,078 horses.^[2] It was in 5th Army's 27th Rifle Corps of the Kiev Special Military District (soon redesignated Southwestern Front), which also contained the 87th and 124th Rifle Divisions.^[3] Its order of battle was as follows:

• 396th Rifle Regiment
• 497th Rifle Regiment
• 791st Rifle Regiment
• 276th Artillery Regiment^[4]
• 184th Howitzer Artillery Regiment
• 173rd Antitank Battalion
• 170th Antiaircraft Battalion
• 120th Reconnaissance Battalion
• 157th Sapper Battalion
• 168th Signal Battalion
• 138th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
• 135th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Platoon
• 119th Motor Transport Battalion
• 115th Field Bakery
• 178th Field Postal Station
• 347th Field Office of the State Bank

While on the march it came under air attacks. On June 24 Smekhotvorov received new orders to advance toward Volodymyr to join forces with the 87th. The division went over to the attack at 1400 hours, but German armor of III Motorized Corps arrived by 1700 and it was forced to retreat to a line some 12km-16km west of Lutsk. Having suffered heavy losses in this effort it pulled back to the east bank of the Styr the next day and attempted to counterattack, but by June 26 it was in full retreat toward Rivne.^[5] As of July 1 the 87th had been detached from the rest of the Corps.^[6]

Battle of Kyiv

As of July 7 the 135th was attempting to hold along the Sluch River south of Novohrad-Volynskyi.^[7] By July 10 the 27th Corps had been disbanded and the 135th and 124th were under direct Army command.^[8] Smekhotvorov had been ordered to organize a fall-back line along the Irsha River with what remained of his division, which amounted to 1,276 personnel, just 38 guns and mortars of all types, and ten heavy machine guns.^[9] This position was established by July 22,^[10] but by now the division had just 400 men remaining.^[11] By August 1 it had been assigned to 15th Rifle Corps, still in 5th Army,^[12] but between August 8-10 it was withdrawn to the Korosten area, losing its rearguard to an encirclement move in the process. Over the following weeks it received replacements, in the form of march battalions and some raw recruits, bringing it back to a strength of 4,500 by August 25, although it still had very few heavy weapons.^[13]

In the last days of the month the 135th was placed under command of 40th Army, a scratch force intended to link Southwestern Front with Bryansk Front to the north. Southwestern Front's commander, Col. Gen. M. P. Kirponos, issued his Operational Directive No. 00322 at 1600 hours on August 28, several hours after the Army made initial contact with German forces, in which he described its mission, in part:

3. 40th Army (293rd and 135th RDs, 10th [Tank Division], 2nd [Airborne Corps], and 5th [Antitank Brigade]), having occupied the Korop and Maloe Ust'e sector [30km west of Korop] with the units of 2nd AbnC, which are arriving by auto-transport, will continue to defend the Pirogovka Station and Stepanovka [from 50km northeast of Korop to 65km west-southwest of Korop] front along the southern bank of the Desna River.
The army's mission - prevent a penetration by the enemy along the Krolevets, Vorozhba and Konotop axes and firmly defend the right wing of the front against attacks by the enemy from the north.
Headquarters - Konotop.

Thus the Army, under command of Maj. Gen. K. P. Podlas, raised hurriedly, was expected to defend a 115km-wide front with a paltry force of just over four divisions manned by roughly 50,000 men and about 40 tanks. At 2200 Podlas reported that the 135th was on a line from Bolshoe Uste to Volovitsa, from 32km to 68km west-southwest of Korop, an extremely wide sector for a depleted division.^[14]

As his formations continued arriving in the Hlukhiv, Krolevets and Konotop region, Podlas committed them to action immediately, with orders to attack the lead elements of XXIV Motorized Corps' 10th Motorized and 3rd Panzer Divisions as they crossed the Desna. By the time they did, 3rd Panzer was well north of Novhorod-Siverskyi, and 10th Motorized had seized Korop. Complicating Podlas' task was that while 40th Army was under Kirponos' command, it was actually wedged between Bryansk Front's 21st and 13th Armies. The obvious solution, to move 40th Army from one Front to the other, was rejected.^[15]

Roslavl-Novozybkov Offensive

In the Southwestern Front's operational summary at 2200 hours on August 30, the 135th was said to be "attacking with part of its forces toward Korop, occupied Sukhachi [6km west of Korop], and is continuing its advance." This was being led by the 791st Rifle Regiment. Beginning in the afternoon and through all of August 31 the division, along with 2nd Airborne and two regiments of the 293rd, made converging counterattacks on the lead battlegroup of 10th Motorized south of Korop, plus its main body at Korop itself. While the airborne troops managed to encircle the lead German battalion and force it back to the town, having lost some 200 men, Smekhotvorov was mainly involved in constructing defenses along the river and conducting reconnaissance in an effort to join hands with 21st Army. The commander of 2nd Panzer Group, Gen. H. Guderian, was sufficiently concerned with the plight of 10th Motorized that he called for reserves from Army Group Center. On the same day the Front reached the conclusion that "The enemy forces attacking toward Chernigov are trying to reach the rear of our units operating to the north of Kiev..."^[16]

The situation remained largely static until September 2, when XXIV Panzer Corps renewed its drive to the south, splitting the 135th from the 293rd. A report reached Podlas' headquarters at 0130 hours on September 3 stating that "up to 50 enemy tanks with motorized infantry and motorcyclists are in the Dobrotovo region [17km east-southeast of Korop] and the woods 2 kilometres south of Obtovo..." The sudden strike had smashed the defenses of 40th Army's right wing and 4th Panzer Division took Krolevets. The 791st Regiment was reported as moving eastward to the Krasnopole region; the German advance was effectively pushing the 135th and 293rd outside the upcoming Kyiv pocket. Podlas was receiving reinforcements from 3rd Airborne Corps but this was little help against a panzer corps. The German force broke into the clear on September 4-5 and Podlas had no choice but to withdraw toward Konotop and the Seym River.^[17]

The 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions were able to cross the Seym on September 8 before seizing Konotop the next day, although Guderian noted how much his forces needed rest and replenishment. In the morning of September 13, 3rd Panzer captured Lokhvytsia, where it would meet up with 1st Panzer Group two days later, completing the encirclement of the Kyiv pocket.^[18] During the last weeks of the month the remnants of Southwestern Front were gradually eliminated, while 40th Army struggled to hold a defensive line east of, and later west of, Kharkiv. During fighting through the end of October Smekhotvorov's headquarters controlled regiments of several other divisions, including the 123rd Rifle Regiment of the 62nd Rifle Division and the 244th Rifle Regiment of the 41st Rifle Division, but finally the headquarters was disbanded, leaving the 791st Rifle Regiment to serve as a separate unit under direct command of 40th Army. In common with many other divisions of Southwestern Front the 135th was officially written off on December 27.^[19] Smekhotvorov would soon be given command of the 193rd Rifle Division, which he would lead in the defense of the factory district at Stalingrad. He was then moved to the 106th Rifle Division, but was severely wounded and hospitalized in August 1943, and spent the remainder of his career in the educational establishment before retiring in November 1954.

2nd Formation

A new division, preliminarily numbered as the 401st, began forming at Slobodskoy in the Moscow Military District in early December 1941 before being moved to Kolomna. On January 5, 1942, it was redesignated as the 135th.^[20] Col. Yosif Ivanovich Popov was appointed to command on January 23. When complete its order of battle was as follows:

• 396th Rifle Regiment
• 497th Rifle Regiment
• 791st Rifle Regiment
• 276th Artillery Regiment
• 173rd Antitank Battalion
• 170th Antiaircraft Battalion
• 120th Reconnaissance Company
• 157th Sapper Battalion^[21]
• 168th Signal Battalion (later 251st, 1436th Signal Companies)
• 138th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
• 192nd Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company
• 119th Motor Transport Company
• 410th Field Bakery
• 821st Divisional Veterinary Hospital (later 831st)
• 1714th Field Postal Station
• 1054th Field Office of the State Bank

In February it began moving west into the large salient that had been formed around Toropets where it came under command of Kalinin Front, being assigned to 4th Shock Army in March.^[22] This salient formed the western face of the Rzhev salient held by German 9th Army.

Battles for Rzhev

In April the 135th again came under direct command of the Front, before being assigned to 41st Army in May.^[23] After months of winter combat both sides were close to exhaustion, and the tactical position was extremely complex. 9th Army was determined to secure its rear areas before the Red Army could renew its efforts to cut off the salient. To this end, on May 24 Operation Hannover was launched against Group Belov near Vyazma. By June 27 the survivors of this Group had broken out to friendly territory. Army Group Center now planned Operation Seydlitz, intended to eliminate Kalinin Front's 39th Army and 11th Cavalry Corps, operating between Bely and Sychyovka in a salient around Kholm-Zhirkovsky.^[24]

Seydlitz began in the morning of July 2, after several delays due to weather. Communications between the Front and its 39th and 22nd Armies were limited to a narrow corridor and both formations were dangerously low on supplies. The attackers focused on the narrowest part of the corridor, striking 41st Army near Bely and the 39th and 22nd on the Olenino axis. Tough Soviet resistance limited or stopped any German advance with heavy losses. On July 4 the attack was renewed, now on three directions, with air support near Sychyovka, and the village containing the 39th Army headquarters was taken. Armored reinforcements were added the next day, and the corridor was cut at the village of Pushkari, north of Bely, on July 6. In addition to 39th Army the left wing of 41st Army (135th, 17th Guards Rifle Division, 21st Tank Brigade) and the right flank of 22nd Army were all now trapped. The next day, German forces attacking from Sychyovka reached Bely and created a second pocket. The German command sent infiltrators, speaking Russian or Central Asian languages and wearing Red Army uniforms, to spread disinformation and even lead trapped men into captivity. During July 7-9 units of 41st Army filtered out of the pocket before German reinforcements came up to more fully seal the encirclement. Seydlitz was officially finished on July 13, but individuals, small groups, and even large groups managed to get out over the coming weeks. Starting at 2200 hours on July 21 the 41st and 22nd Armies launched deliberate operations to link up with these groups; by 0400 the next day some 10,000 men had got out. Eventually about 18,000 escaped, including Colonel Popov and some 1,000 of the 135th, but during the month 41st Army had suffered 13,902 casualties, including 2,000 killed and 6,347 missing.^[25]

On July 31 the division was ordered back to Kalinin Front reserves in the Torzhok area,^[26] where it arrived by August 12. On October 7, Popov was replaced in command by Col. Vasilii Grigorevich Kovalenko. Popov now took deputy command of 41st Army and would later lead 33rd Guards and 94th Rifle Corps; the 135th would come under his command again as part of the latter in 1944. Kovalenko had previously led the 18th Cavalry Division (part of 11th Cavalry Corps) before it was disbanded in August. Shortly after this handover the 135th was assigned to the rebuilt 39th Army,^[27] still in Kalinin Front.

Operation Mars

Operation Mars. Note position of 39th Army.

General Zygin was in command of 39th Army in November; the Army was deployed at the northernmost tip of the Rzhev salient, around the village of Molodoi Tud and the small river of the same name. In the planning for Operation Mars the main weight of the attack was to come from Western Front's 20th Army and Kalinin Front's 41st Army to pinch off the main body of 9th Army north of Sychyovka. 39th Army's task was largely diversionary in nature, intended to draw German reserves, but if successful it would reach and cut the Rzhev–Olenino road and railroad.^[28]

The 135th, on the left flank of Zygin's shock group, had the 497th and 791st Rifle Regiments on the left bank of the Volga west of the village of Sevastlanovo, while the 396th was in Army reserve to the rear. The 81st Tank Brigade was also deployed behind the forward regiments. The terrain in the sector was difficult, and the German forces had heavily fortified the south bank of the Molodoi Tud River, but in mitigation they had only one division, the 206th, in the line, although 14th Motorized Division was known to be in reserve. Zygin saw his immediate objective as the town of Urdom, which would encircle the 206th. He planned to attack across the river with the 158th, 135th, and 373rd Rifle Divisions after a one-hour artillery preparation, supported by the 81st and 28th Tank Brigades. The 348th Rifle Division was in reserve.^[29]

The artillery fire began at 0900 hours on November 25, but visibility was hampered by a mix of snow and fog. The infantry assault went in at 1000, led by sappers carrying timber and logs to place across the frozen Molodoi Tud, where sounds of rifle and mortar fire soon erupted. Less than 30 minutes later Col. D. I. Kuzmin of the 81st got the word to advance, but as his tanks reached the river with the main force battalions of the 135th and 373rd men of the lead companies began to reappear on the far bank. It quickly became apparent that the artillery had failed to destroy or suppress many of the German strongpoints, and these men had been forced back by heavy fire. Despite this, Kuzmin's KV and T-34 tanks, in narrow columns, forced crossings and advanced unsupported, but this failed to move the infantry and he ordered his battalions back to the river. Zygin soon learned that the 158th had fared equally poorly for much the same reasons. Zygin ordered all three divisions to regroup to renew the attack the next day. Meanwhile, the forces on 39th Army's flanks gained some successes and seemed to be making the German position untenable until the arrival of elements of the Panzer-Grenadier-Division Großdeutschland at 1800 partly restored the situation.^[30]

Early on the morning of November 26 a slightly stronger artillery preparation was laid on, with much improved observation as the weather cleared, which also allowed air support. This time the tanks and infantry got across as a team, aided by better visibility as German strongpoints were wiped out one by one by artillery and tank fire. Colonel Kuzmin was killed by antitank fire near the village of Kazakovo, but the 81st pushed on with Kovalenko's lead regiments. By dusk the defenders had been pushed back 2km to the village of Palatkino, which was taken after heavy fighting. This formed part of the second defensive line of 206th Infantry's 301st Grenadier Regiment, which counterattacked repeatedly to no avail. The attack was renewed early the next morning, and Kovalenko committed the 396th Regiment late in the afternoon, which forced the 206th Infantry commander, General Hitter, to order the first of a series of withdrawals. Despite this pressure, by nightfall Hitter had stabilized his line but desperately hoped for assistance from Großdeutschland. All that could be spared were a few company teams to reinforce his 301st Grenadier Regiment as the remainder of the panzer grenadiers were needed in the Luchesa valley to the south. Zygin was pleased with his progress and expected to take Urdom the next day.^[31]

In the event, despite a renewed artillery preparation in the morning the Soviet advance stalled. Numerous German strongpoints were dug in through a network of villages and a seesaw struggle went on into November 29, although this mainly involved the 135th and 373rd Divisions, as well as the tanks. Urdom was approached but not taken, and Zygin's proposal to commit the 348th was approved. Zhukov emphasized that the drive on Urdom and Olenino must be accelerated. Before dawn on November 30 Zygin conferred with his main subordinates on a new plan to take Urdom, despite the 135th and 373rd having lost nearly half of their personnel in the previous days. The 135th and 348th were to strike the defenses west and east of the town while a regiment of the 373rd, along with the remaining tanks, led by a handful of KVs, would try to envelop the position. The attack went on all day, and the KVs reduced the remaining strongpoints with direct fire, at the cost of roughly half of their remaining numbers. By nightfall Urdom was in 39th Army's hands, although the defenders still held along the road to each side of it, leaving their line intact. Zygin had no choice but to call off further attacks until his force had regrouped and received reinforcements.^[32]

Army Gen. G. K. Zhukov issued orders on December 8 for his forces to "press ahead... in the general direction of Olenino, crush the enemy group there by 16 December, and emerge in the vicinity of Olenino," attempting to salvage something from an offensive that had already clearly failed. Zygin had already renewed attacks east of Zaitsevo and on the Gliadovo sector, which he was to continue. He had already regrouped the 135th from Urdom to back up several local successes by the 178th Rifle Division and 46th Mechanized Brigade near Trushkovo. On December 7 the combined force had smashed through the defenses at the junction of 14th Motorized and the 251st Infantry Division, forcing the former to give way and surrender Gonchuki and several nearby villages after an advance of up to 3km. What remained of the 14th was subordinated to the 251st. On December 11 a large Soviet tank force broke through the defenses opposite Gonchuki and pushed into the forests to the southwest. Only the intervention of a battlegroup of 6th Infantry Division neutralized this threat. Zygin renewed his attack, at Zhukov's insistence, on December 13 with a massive 4-hour artillery preparation, but this produced meagre results. The fighting continued, in waning strength,until December 23, when Zhukov finally ordered the 39th Army over to the defense. While the Urdom salient proved nearly the only permanent gain of Operation Mars, it cost the 39th very heavy casualties and left it almost 20km short of the Rzhev–Olenino route.^[33]

On January 4, 1943, Colonel Kovalenko was removed from his post, soon becoming deputy commander of the 158th. In September he was given command of the 219th Rifle Division, which he would lead for the duration of the war. He was replaced by Col. Aleksandr Nikitich Sosnov. Beginning on March 2 the 135th, along with the rest of its Army, took part in the Rzhev-Vyasma offensive, also known as Operation Büffel, the evacuation of the Rzhev salient. Through the month it followed up the withdrawal until reaching the prepared positions at its base.^[34] On April 5 the 135th left 39th Army and Kalinin Front to enter the Reserve of the Supreme High Command where it was assigned to 11th Army for extensive rebuilding. On July 12 it returned to the front as part of the Army's 53rd Rifle Corps,^[35] now as part of Bryansk Front.^[36]

Postwar

When the shooting stopped the men and women of the division shared the full title of 135th Rifle, Krakow, Order of the Red Banner Division. (Russian: 135-я стрелковая Краковская Краснознамённая дивизия.) According to STAVKA Order No. 11096 of May 29, part 8, the 135th was listed an one of those divisions to be "disbanded in place".^[37] In accordance to this directive the division was disbanded in July.

References

Citations

1. Artyom Drabkin and Alexei Isaev, Barbarossa Through Soviet Eyes, trans. C. Summerville, Pen & Sword Books Ltd., Barnsley, UK, 2012, p. xiii
2. Charles C. Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 68
3. Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 9
4. Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 68
5. David Stahel, Kiev 1941, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2012, pp. 70-71
6. Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 16
7. Stahel, Kiev 1941, pp. 78-79
8. Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 24
9. Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 68
10. Stahel, Kiev 1941, pp. 84-85
11. Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 68
12. Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 33
13. Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 68
14. David M. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2012, pp. 123-25
15. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 123-24
16. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 395-99
17. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 440, 443, 450, 452, 463
18. Stahel, Kiev 1941, pp. 209, 219-20, 229
19. Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 68
20. Walter S. Dunn Jr., Stalin's Keys to Victory, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2007, p. 101
21. Sharp, "Red Swarm", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed From 1942 to 1945, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. X, Nafziger, 1996, p. 50
22. Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1942, pp. 44, 63
23. Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1942, pp. 82, 101
24. Svetlana Gerasimova, The Rzhev Slaughterhouse, ed. & trans. S. Britton, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2013, pp. 56-57, 58-59
25. Gerasimova, The Rzhev Slaughterhouse, pp. 59-62, 65-66, 69
26. Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1942, pp. 144
27. Sharp, "Red Swarm", p. 51
28. Glantz, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1999, pp. 28-30
29. Glantz, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat, pp. 67-69
30. Glantz, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat, pp. 151-56
31. Glantz, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat, pp. 157, 159-61
32. Glantz, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat, pp. 160-62, 177, 218
33. Glantz, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat, pp. 266-74
34. Gerasimova, The Rzhev Slaughterhouse, p. 145
35. Sharp, "Red Swarm", p. 51
36. Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1943, p. 190
37. STAVKA Order No. 11096

Bibliography

• Grylev, A. N. (1970). Перечень № 5. Стрелковых, горнострелковых, мотострелковых и моторизованных дивизии, входивших в состав Действующей армии в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945 гг [List (Perechen) No. 5: Rifle, Mountain Rifle, Motor Rifle and Motorized divisions, part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Voenizdat. p. 66
• Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1964). Командование корпусного и дивизионного звена советских вооруженных сил периода Великой Отечественной войны 1941–1945 гг [Commanders of Corps and Divisions in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Frunze Military Academy. p. 166

External links

• Fyodor Nikandrovich Smekhotvorov
• Yosif Ivanovich Popov
• Filipp Nikolaevich Romashin